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"A favorite theory of mine—to wit, that no occurrence is sole and solitary, but is merely a 
repetition of a thing which has happened before, and perhaps often.”1 
 
In 2004, at the Baghdad Operations Center, the deposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was 
held as a detainee by the FBI for a series of interviews. Agent George Piro was responsible 
for interrogating Saddam before he was handed over to the newly created Iraqi government, 
taking advantage of the opportunity to press the fallen dictator for insight into his leadership 
and decision-making.  In the resulting interviews and conversations, which include casual 
conversations in Saddam’s prison cell, Piro tried to elicit incriminating information from 
Saddam about the existence of weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi links to terrorism.  
However, the façade of the evil Iraqi dictator that had been compounded by the U.S., and 
had guided Americans into war with Iraq twice, was not vindicated. In one casual 
conversation, Piro pressed Saddam for the reason he was so obstinate toward the United 
Nations weapons inspections. According to Saddam, the reluctance to open Iraq up to 
weapons inspectors was a strategic regional move, not because of the threat posed by the 
U.S. towards Iraq, but because of the threat posed by Iran. Saddam explained that while the 
United Nations dismantled Iraq’s military capabilities and crippled their economy with 
sanctions throughout the 1990s, Iran continued to advance technologically. Saddam 
confided in Piro that “Iraq would have been extremely vulnerable to an attack from Iran, and 
[Iraq] would have sought a security agreement with the United States to protect it from 
                                                          
1
 Mark Twain, The Jumping Frog: In English, Then in French, Then Clawed Back into a Civilized Language Once 
More by Patient, Unremunerated Toil (Harper Brothers, 1903), 64. 
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threats in the region.”2 Although Saddam admitted that a security arrangement with the U.S. 
would have been improbable, he understood Iraq would not succeed in a war against the 
U.S. In another conversation that explored allegations that Saddam was working with 
terrorists, Saddam was adamant that he had never cooperated with those he deemed 
“zealots.” When asked by Piro why he would not align himself with those he described as the 
enemies of the U.S., Saddam replied that “the United States was not Iraq’s enemy.” 
According to Saddam, had he wanted “to cooperate with the enemies of the United States,” 
he would have approached “North Korea, which he claimed to have a relationship with, or 
China.”3 It was not the U.S. that Saddam described as an enemy, only that there were U.S. 
policies that were in conflict with Iraqi interests. 
These casual conversations, which were released in 2009, illustrated a picture of Saddam 
Hussein that was largely absent from the history that shows the U.S. going to war with Iraq. 
The history was further muddled when Saddam Hussein insisted, in another conversation 
with Piro, that he was fascinated by the U.S., and “was interested in understanding the 
American culture, and did so by watching American movies.”4 However, the conversations 
also raise questions about why it was that the U.S. found itself at war with Iraq in 2003, after 
having already gone to war with Iraq in 1991, and in both cases confronting Saddam 
Hussein. If Saddam Hussein was not the enemy of the U.S. that he was made out to be, but 
instead a dictator obsessed with his regional interests, and with a window that faced 
Hollywood, what prompted George H. W. Bush in 1991, and George W. Bush in 2003, to 
decide to intervene militarily in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, this research looks to compare 
the history of two American presidents and their decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 
2003. The research is focused on President George H. W. Bush, and President George W. 
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 U.S. Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation Casual Conversation with Saddam Hussein, Session 
2, Baghdad Operations Center, June 11, 2004. 
3
 U.S. Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation Casual Conversation with Saddam Hussein, Session 
4, Baghdad Operations Center, June 28, 2004. 
4
 U.S. Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation Casual Conversation with Saddam Hussein, Session 
1, Baghdad Operations Center, May 13, 2004. 
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Bush, and aims to articulate the domestic and diplomatic origins of both the 1991 and 2003 
decisions to go to war. Ultimately, this research will identify the similarities shared between 
the presidents as they take on domestic and diplomatic considerations in their decision-
making, from their inauguration to the point of military contact with Iraq, and the differences 
that emerged. Like with the brief, casual conversations with Saddam Hussein in his prison 
cell in Baghdad, the purpose of this research is to interrogate the U.S. decision to go to war 
and the decision-makers who believed that war was necessary.  
A guiding aim of this research is to illustrate a history of the origins of the decision, in 1991 
and 2003, to go to war with Iraq. In order to articulate this history, the framing and explaining 
of American foreign policy is emphasised and elaborated through a method of qualitative 
analysis that focuses on a diplomatic and domestic considerations that influence U.S. foreign 
policy. This deliberate framing is utilised so that a narrative emerges that is able to explain 
why there was a decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. In conjunction with a 
history of the domestic and diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq, this 
research will focus on the presidential character and decision-making of George H. W. Bush 
and George W. Bush in relation to Iraq. A focus on the similarities between each 
administration and decision to go to war, alongside the differences, will be among the 
primary aims of this research, and will help establish the incongruities that exist within the 
American presidency, and the shared dilemma of presidential decision-making, especially in 
light of the relationship between George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush.  Finally, as a 
result of this history, the research will contend that each decision to go to war with Iraq 
emerged differently from domestic and diplomatic considerations that compelled each 
president towards aggressive action, and were compounded by each president’s strengths 
and weaknesses.  
In order to construct these research aims into a coherent analysis, there are several 
research questions that serve as a foundation for this research. The first question asks why 
the U.S. decided to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and, again, in 2003. This question presents 
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an opportunity to explore the president and their administration as they confronted a threat 
they deemed imperative to U.S. national security.  From this question emerge two others 
that ask, respectively, what similarities and differences existed between the decisions to go 
to war. These questions emphasise the twelve years between the two Iraq wars, and 
illustrate the parallels in decision-making and fundamental differences between the two 
administrations. The final question explores the considerations contributed to both decisions 
to go to war with Iraq, and considers the political and historical continuity between both 
decisions to go to war, and both administrations. These questions all help to establish why 
the U.S. went to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003.  
In order to satisfy the research aims, and explore the research questions, this research will 
be comprised of the following structure. The research will begin with chapter one, a literature 
review, that contextualises the research questions. From there, chapter two will present the 
methodology and elaborate how this research differentiates itself from the existing historical 
analysis. The research will progress through chapter’s three to six, illustrating and framing 
the domestic and diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. 
Finally, in chapter seven, there will be a conclusion that draws on the research aims, and, in 
light of the historical analysis, provides answers for the research questions.  
As presented in chapter one, the literature review, there already exists a diverse cross 
section of discourse that explores the decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The 
literature, however, is split broadly into different historical frames that embrace their own 
scopes and limitations. The first frame is an international history of the wars with Iraq. This 
frame considers why the U.S. went to war with Iraq in relation to political and historical 
trends that exist in an international context, with little emphasis placed on the domestic 
concerns that were faced by the president. In contrast to this international history is a 
regional history that focuses on the Persian Gulf and considers regional concerns that 
influenced the decision to go to war with Iraq. The last frame is a focus on presidential 
history that ranges from personal memoirs to journalist accounts that explore the domestic 
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influences on decision-making. The culmination of this literature review is found in the 
discourse that promotes a comparison between the George H. W. Bush and George W. 
Bush presidencies. This research aims to contribute to this literature by adding a sustained 
and equal comparison of the diplomatic and domestic origins of the decision to go to war 
with Iraq in 1991 and 2003, bridging the gap between international, regional, and 
presidential histories. 
In chapter two it is demonstrated how this research will add to the literature is through a 
method of framing and explaining American foreign policy that emphasises the domestic and 
diplomatic considerations that contribute to presidential decision-making. This research 
defers to a long line of academic thought that has helped inform the interpretation of 
American foreign relations throughout the twentieth century. In order to illustrate the source 
material, this research defers to the criticisms of diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis in 
regards to the construction of diplomatic history and international relations. As a result, the 
methodology of this research constructs a framing of history that helps to promote 
methodological rigour and present an illuminating historical narrative. The resulting 
methodology explores the decision to go to war with Iraq, and the processes of presidential 
decision-making, by viewing the decision to go to war through domestic and diplomatic 
origins. The contention is that the decisions to go to war with Iraq emerge, to a differing 
degree, from these two origins, and by constructing each frame separately, the history is 
able to detail a set of circumstances and influences that deepen the understanding of why 
the U.S. went to war with Iraq. 
The domestic and diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq are presented in 
chapters three through to six of this research. Chapters three and four are a breakdown of 
the George H. W. Bush administration into the domestic and diplomatic origins. In each 
frame, the timeline focuses on the inauguration of the president, and ends with the beginning 
of hostilities with Iraq. Chapters three and four emphasise George H. W. Bush as a president 
whose foreign policy experience inspired confidence among Americans, reinforcing his 
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predilection to conduct diplomacy away from the domestic gaze. Bush’s reluctance to 
engage foreign policy in front of a domestic audience extended into hesitation to engage in 
domestic politics that left him open to political attacks from his opposition that withered away 
his public support. The domestic and diplomatic origins of George H. W. Bush’s decision to 
go to war with Iraq illustrate a Cold Warrior who sees, at a point in history when the 
international order was shifting, Iraq as a threat and assumes that Saddam Hussein’s 
capabilities as a leader are an indication of his intentions. The result is a war with Iraq in 
1991, in an effort to curtail this threat. 
In chapters five and six, however, the domestic and diplomatic origins of George W. Bush’s 
decision to go to war with Iraq are explored, emphasising a very different president. As is 
shown by these chapters, the decision to go to war with Iraq is made in an entirely different 
context and is influenced by the terrorist attacks in September 2001, against the U.S. 
Illustrating Bush’s lack of foreign policy experience and disparate advisors, yet bolstered by 
his confidence in domestic politics, the decision to go to war with Iraq is seen to defer to the 
American people for approval and support. In 2003, Bush conflates Saddam Hussein’s 
intentions with his capabilities, and, as a consequence, launches a war against Iraq in order 
to curtail, once again, a threat to the U.S.  
There are, however, parallels that emerge from the two presidential decisions that are 
emphasised by each chapter, just as there are differences that become increasingly evident. 
In chapter seven, the conclusion, it is contended that the decision to go to war with Iraq, in 
both 1991 and 2003, depended on different concerns and was approached in a manner that 
reflected the experiences and strengths of the president. However, on closer examination, it 
can be seen that both presidents were reacting to domestic or diplomatic events and 
drawing confidence from different considerations. Although this research is not as candid as 
the casual conversations Agent Piro was able to entertain with Saddam Hussein in between 
interrogation sessions at Baghdad Operations Center, it will add to the growing field of 
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history that hopes to elaborate and explain why the United States went to war with Iraq in 
1991 and 2003.  








“The cost of this war, in lives and treasure, for Americans and Iraqis, has been greater than 
we ever imagined. This story is still being written, and will be for many years to come. 
Sanctions and weapons inspections, prewar intelligence and diplomacy, troop levels and 
post-war planning – these are all important issues that historians will analyse for decades. 
But the fundamental question that we can ask and debate now is, Was removing Saddam 
from power the right decision? I continue to believe it was.”5 
 
The decisions to go to war with Iraq stretch across a decade, and across as many different 
analyses in the existing literature. However, in order to make more sense of the decisions to 
go to war this thesis brings these two decisions, two presidents, and two administrations 
closer together in order to compare each decision in the lead up to each war with Iraq. 
Therefore, the literature concerning the United States decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 
and 2003 can be classified into four separate categories. Each offers a framework through 
which the U.S. relationship to the Persian Gulf, and related presidential decision-making, can 
be more fully explored. In the first category, there are researchers who observe the history of 
the U.S. relationship with Iraq, and the decision to militarily intervene in the Persian Gulf, 
through an international relations framework. This international history emphasises the 
superpower status of the U.S. after the Cold War, and endows the process of decision-
making with the benefits and constraints of international power politics. These researchers 
contend that with the end of the Cold War a new era of international relations began and, by 
                                                          
5
 Condoleezza Rice, “Rethinking the National Interest”, Foreign Affairs,Vol. 87, Is. 4  (2008), 21. 




focusing on Iraq, an evolving U.S. foreign policy can be witnessed as the international 
community moves away from the burdens of the Cold War, and toward a murky, unsure 
future that is seared by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.6 This category stresses 
the global dimensions of decision-making, casting aside domestic constraints and judging 
George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush based on an international criteria. In the second 
category, a subset of the literature draws away from the U.S. and frames a regional history 
of the Persian Gulf. Specifically, this approach focuses on the decision-making of the Iraqi 
leadership regime as it experiences U.S. foreign policy. The discussions in this category add 
an understanding of regional history that emphasises Iraqi motivations, and stress the 
consequences of ambiguous policies. The third category focuses on the presidential history 
of both presidents in an effort to understand their motivations. The literature in this category 
is more diverse, including efforts by historians to sift through what primary documents are 
available to reconstruct accounts of decision-making, alongside undocumented journalist 
narratives and published memoirs from administration insiders. Despite the scattered 
accounts of each presidency, this category illustrates both presidents as key decision-
makers, and emphasises the pressures, constraints, and influences that affect foreign policy. 
Unlike post-Cold War histories that search for political explanations for decision-making, or 
the Persian Gulf histories that emphasise the consequences of U.S. foreign policy, the third 
category constructs a diverse history whereby the president is judged by his motivations and 
actions. This leaves the final category, and where this research distinguishes itself from the 
literature. In this final category, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush are compared. 
There is a consensus within the comparative literature that both presidencies are exceptional 
in a way that transcends a father and son relationship because of their confrontation with 
Saddam Hussein. By exploring the accounts of decision-making within both administrations, 
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 The term “International Community” can be defined, thanks to Glenda Sluga in Internationalism in the Age of 
Nationalism, as a community that supports the “introduction of international laws enforcing cooperation and 
arbitration between states.” This definition has a long history, emerging from the gathering of French-based 
peace societies that met in 1902, in Toulouse. See Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 17. 




the lingering consequences of U.S. foreign policy, and a paradigm shift that began with the 
end of the Cold War, this research will deviate from these categories of literature in order to 




The international history that focuses on the U.S. and the Persian Gulf considers global, 
transnational, and international factors, and how they influence foreign policy. In an effort to 
characterise how the U.S. formulated, and acted out, foreign policy in the aftermath of the 
Cold War is Sarah Kreps in Coalition of Convenience: United States Military Interventions 
after the Cold War.7 Kreps explores the way in which the U.S. turned toward multilateralism 
when considering foreign policy options after the Cold War, and illuminates the degree to 
which the U.S. relied on multilateral approaches in response to acts of aggression. 
According to Kreps, because of the unipolar strength of the U.S. multilateralism was only an 
option, whereas unilateralism was a certainty. Focusing on the Gulf War, Kreps argues that 
George H. W. Bush resorted to the United Nations Security Council in 1991 not out of 
necessity, but because “A UN authorization became the way by which the United States 
could bring along the substantive contributions of [allies].”8 Kreps explains that this was 
important, as utilising multilateralism could substantially decrease the burden any 
international action placed on the U.S., and could integrate allies into a long-term solution. 
However, Bush’s efforts in 1991 contrasted with George W. Bush’s efforts at multilateralism 
in 2003. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. shifted from a 
reactive posture to a proactive posture when considering threats abroad, and Iraq presented 
itself as an immediate threat. Adhering to Kreps initial contention that multilateral 
                                                          
7
 Sarah E. Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War (Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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approaches were optional, Bush did initially seek to include the United Nations within the 
U.S. plans to confront Iraq. Kreps explained that Bush’s expectation that the United Nations 
be included was an “unintended consequence of the UN success in the Gulf War.”9 
However, despite U.S. efforts to include the United Nations, “the United States was merely 
after a hands-off environment in which these actors did not stand in the way of the invasion. 
The simple interest in permissiveness was derivative of the operational expectations: the 
United States did not expect to need the resources of these regional actors as it had in 1991. 
It just needed them not to interfere.”10 Kreps concludes that this unipolarity was not 
inherently bad, explaining that “Unipolarity put the United States in a position of global 
leadership to craft multilateral solutions that might not otherwise have been possible…Power 
meant that the United States went multilaterally, not unilaterally because it could.”11 The 
result of Kreps’ study is that with the increase in global power the U.S. is seen to be more 
likely to consider multilateral options in order to offset its own responsibilities, in the process 
admitting that there is an increasing role for diplomacy, but only under the leadership of the 
U.S.  
Keith Shimko adds to Kreps’ political explanation of U.S. power post-Cold War by examining 
the influence of a coinciding revolution in military affairs. In The Iraq Wars and America’s 
Military Revolution,12 Shimko explains that the Gulf War in 1991 saw the successful 
implementation and application of new military technologies that irrevocably changed how 
military power could be applied throughout the world. Focusing on Iraq, Shimko notes that as 
of “the spring of 2009, the United States had been at war with or in Iraq for six of the 
previous 19 years. Including its role in enforcing no-fly zones between the wars, the United 
States has been militarily involved in Iraq continuously for almost two decades. By almost 
any measure, including obviously the commitment of troops and resources, the United 
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States’ other military engagements during that period pale in comparison.”13 By utilising 
military affairs as a frame, Shimko explains that the decision to confront Iraq was made 
possible because of advances in military technology that promised efficient and victorious 
military campaigns. In 1991, this “revolution” in military efficiency meant that the ground 
invasion would only need one hundred hours to rout enemy forces and declare strategic 
victory, thanks to guided munitions that efficiently decimated Iraqi fortifications. The success 
of this campaign went on to influence decision-making in 2003, as Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld argued that the benchmark set in 1991 could be improved. Initially, 
Secretary Rumsfeld was vindicated as “with better technology but only half the troops that 
liberated Kuwait in 1991, American forces advanced rapidly and struck precisely with an 
unprecedented degree of situational awareness to eliminate the Baathist regime in short 
order.”14 Despite these successes, Shimko notes that the 2003 invasion of Iraq quickly 
changed into an occupation of Iraq that reversed the initial successes of the military 
revolution. In the absence of the perfect enemy, the U.S. found itself fighting an insurgency 
that echoed the defeat suffered in Vietnam. As a result, Shimko concludes, “ideally, 
American defense policy should be the product of a coherent strategic analysis. In reality, of 
course, political and institutional interests inevitably intrude.”15 The benefit of Shimko’s 
analysis to this research is that his discussion of defense policy establishes a connection 
between the decision to confront Iraq in 1991 and 2003. By following Shimko’s connection, 
this research is able to explore one element of the undergirding motivations that influenced 
George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush to confront Saddam Hussein.  
A third approach to considering U.S. foreign policy post-Cold War is Alexander Thompson in 
Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq.16 Whereas Kreps 
focuses on power relations and Shimko on military affairs, Thompson considers what role 
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international organisations play in U.S. foreign policy. Focusing on the United Nations 
Security Council for its ability to create binding resolutions for United Nations members, 
therefore embodying the closest to international authority, Thompson introduces the 
superpower of the U.S. into the strategic arrangement. Instead of isolating the U.S., and 
suggesting that the United Nations was a partner in multilateral commitments, Thompson 
argues that the organisation is seen as a necessary tool for helping engage U.S. foreign 
policy. Using Iraq as an example, Thompson argues that the “U.S. and allied leaders framed 
their coercion of Iraq in two important ways: (1) the conflict was portrayed as an issue of Iraq 
versus the world community, and (2) the coalition was said to be enforcing compliance with 
international rules. Explicit Security Council approval was obviously necessary to facilitate 
both of these framing strategies.”17 According to Thompson, the Security Council was a tool 
for the U.S. to confer legitimacy on its actions abroad, with the added benefit of reducing the 
political and economic costs. Thompson points out that:  
First, as in the Gulf War case, working through the Security Council would demonstrate 
to the international community that the United States was willing to be constrained and 
to accommodate the interests of others. This would diminish the threat posed by the 
U.S. intervention in the region to the interests of various politically important 
governments. Second, and most important, the Bush administration was concerned with 
the reactions of domestic publics abroad…Security Council approval would signal to 
their publics that the coercive policy being pursued was designed to provide broad 
international benefits – beyond the narrow interests of the United States.18  
Therefore, according to Thompson, the Security Council plays a pivotal role in U.S. foreign 
policy post-Cold War. In both George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush’s administrations, 
Thompson argues that domestic politics had little bearing on U.S. foreign policy, and it was 
instead foreign publics that were more concerning. Thompson’s conclusion is that “in the 
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wake of Iraq, foreign policy idealists and realists now converge on a common prescription: 
the United States cannot succeed without including the UN and other multilateral institutions 
in its diplomatic and military quiver.”19 That the United Nations Security Council has played 
an important role in international affairs post-Cold War cannot be denied, and it is true that 
the U.S. has been intimately involved in guaranteeing that the United Nations function as an 
important international institution. However, Thompson’s dismissal of American domestic 
politics and its influence over the president’s foreign policy decision making reduces the 
analytical scope. This research, agreeing with Thompson that the Security Council has an 
increased importance post-Cold War, goes on to contrast the decision making of each 
president as the domestic and diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq are 
explored. Unlike Thompson’s study, this contrast shows that both presidents were 
concerned about what role the United Nations would take in U.S. foreign policy, and the end 
result was calculated with the U.S. domestic audience in mind.  
In an attempt to bridge the gap between academics and policy-makers, Jeffrey Legro and 
Melvyn Leffler published an edited collection called In Uncertain Times: American Foreign 
Policy after the fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11,20 in which policy-makers and academics were 
brought together to discuss U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. The volume includes 
contributions from academics such as John Mueller, who draws on a comparative exercise 
to illustrate the U.S. confronting threats to its national security after the Cold War, and Bruce 
Cumings, who constructs an interpretive inquiry that posits that reductivist conclusions relied 
on assumptions that led the repetition of mistakes after the Cold War. Alternatively, the 
volume has contributions from policy-makers such as Philip Zelikow, who writes a personal 
account of U.S. strategic planning in 2001-2002, and Paul Wolfowitz, who writes a similar 
account of Defense planning in 1992. The volume contributes substantially to the academic 
literature that surrounds U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. In one review, the volume is 
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regarded holistically as illustrating how scholars “completely fail to engage the policymakers 
on their own terms as individuals who in periods of uncertainty had to decide what the United 
States should do. Meanwhile, the policymakers for the most part are oblivious to the kinds of 
mistaken judgements that are so obvious to the academics, whose expertise decision-
makers often ignore.”21 This impression continues into the book launch, where Philip Zelikow 
criticises the “intellectual ivory tower,” and Paul Wolfowitz argues that historians lack the 
capacity to ask “what if” questions.22 Responding to criticism concerning the purpose of the 
volume, Melvyn Leffler argues, “we highlight the nearsighted vision, faulty assumptions, 
bureaucratic battles, and domestic priorities that plagued the policy process.” The additional 
benefit of the volume is that it illuminates “how key policymakers saw themselves tackling 
unprecedented challenges, our intent is to encourage scholars to assess such efforts with 
empathy, wisdom, and humility.”23 For the most part, the mixture of contributors adequately 
illustrates the spread of analysis that surrounds U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. The 
volume posits that “In Uncertain Times” defines how the U.S. set a course since the 
paradigmatic change that enveloped the international community when the Soviet Union 
began to recede, and eventually vanished. The volume denotes that in this period of change 
it was, separately, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001 that prompt the greatest shifts in U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, this research finds 
it legitimate to focus on George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush as they were responsible 
for navigating U.S. foreign policy through the murk of international politics during both 
events. That both presidents confront the same threat in Saddam Hussein, and that both 
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Adding to the rising prominence of international histories is an avenue of analysis that aims 
to illustrate an Iraqi perspective of the U.S. This area of study is renewed after 2003, when 
the occupation of Baghdad meant a number of Iraqi documents were captured by the U.S. 
military, adding to accounts already published by Iraqi exiles describing Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein.25 Hal Brands is a leading proponent of studying the regional history of the Persian 
Gulf, and, in regards to Iraq, inserting Saddam Hussein as the focal point of the region. 
Brands contends in “Saddam Hussein, The United States, and the invasion of Iran: Was 
there a green light?” that the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war was the first instance where 
Saddam Hussein acted out against what he perceived to be American interests in the region. 
Contrary to the persistent belief that the U.S. provoked the war between the Iran and Iraq, 
Brands suggests that it was, in fact, because of Saddam Hussein, and argues that according 
to Iraqi perceptions of U.S. foreign policy “Saddam never trusted the United States enough 
to undertake an invasion on the basis of assurances of American support, and given his aim 
in taking on Iran, he did not believe that such support was forthcoming.”26 The end result 
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was that Saddam Hussein would elicit support from both Moscow and Washington as Iran 
moved forward with its revolutionary government, and Iraq was seen as the natural counter 
to any Iranian regional ambitions. Brands stresses, “no green light was given by Washington, 
and none was perceived by Saddam.”27 However, this study shows that Saddam Hussein 
instigated the war against Iran because of what he perceived as the meddling of 
superpowers in the Persian Gulf that threatened his own regional power, adding a degree of 
agency to Saddam Hussein that counters the prevailing narrative that the U.S. is the primary 
antagonist in the Middle East. 
In addition to Brands’ analysis is F. Gregory Cause III in “Iraq’s decision to go to War, 1980 
and 1990.”28 Moving beyond the instigation of the Iraq-Iran war, he argues that Saddam 
Hussein exhibits the same degree of autonomy in decision-making in his decision to invade 
Kuwait in 1990. In both cases, Cause argues, Saddam Hussein “identified foreign sources 
of, or foreign support for, threats to his domestic hold on power…Saddam’s decision to 
invade was not to increase his popularity domestically, but rather to break up what he saw 
as a regional/international effort to weaken and destabilize him at home.”29 Cause brings 
forward Brands’ assertion that Saddam Hussein was pressured to invade Iran in 1980 
because of his own paranoia, and adds to the decision to invade Kuwait in 1990 that “Iraqi 
ruling circles came to believe during 1989 that they had evidence that a number of foreign 
powers, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, were attempting to infiltrate Iraqi 
society to collect intelligence and pressure the government.”30 This sense of urgency that 
engulfed Saddam Hussein forced him to take action, and in both cases his only way forward 
was through military action in order to crush a perceived threat before it materialised. Cause 
concludes that Saddam Hussein invited external powers into the Persian Gulf because of his 
willingness to take advantage of instability, in order to consolidate domestic and regional 
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security. Cause explains, “it was Saddam’s perception that, because of his domestic 
problems, he could not wait to deal with the Iran issue.”31 This was repeated in 1990 against 
Kuwait. Hal Brands and David Palkki add to Cause’s argument in “’Conspiring Bastards’: 
Saddam Hussein’s Strategic view of the United States.” Brands and Palkki explain, 
“Saddam’s escalating apprehensions regarding the United States and its allies, and his 
belief that many of Iraq’s troubles could be traced back to Washington, were central to his 
strategic outlook in early 1990 and seem to have pushed him toward increasingly risky and 
aggressive behaviour.”32 According to Brands and Palkki, Saddam Hussein saw the first Gulf 
War as the continuation of a war against growing U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf that had 
begun in 1986, when it was discovered that the U.S. had secretly supplied munitions to Iran 
while they were at war with Iraq. For Saddam Hussein, this was the pivot in U.S.-Iraqi 
relations, as he became increasingly agitated by the U.S. presence in the region.33 The 
extent of perceived U.S. interference heightened Saddam Hussein’s paranoia, and 
eventually affected his decision making as “By the spring of 1990, Saddam was effectively 
caught in a feedback loop of suspicion and apprehension.”34 The invasion of Kuwait then 
came about as a result of Saddam Hussein’s misinterpretation of U.S. policy in the Persian 
Gulf. Brands and Palkki contend that “Saddam saw conflict with the United States as 
inevitable, that he viewed Washington and its allies as potentially mortal threats to Iraq, that 
after the Iran-Iraq war he believed this conspiracy would unfold sooner rather than later, and 
that he had identified Kuwait as a key player in U.S. designs.”35 Therefore, it made sense to 
Saddam that a quick strike against Kuwait would put Iraq at a strategic advantage to 
confront the geopolitical interests of the United States and its regional ally, Israel.  Brands 
and Palkki conclude that “Saddam did not expect forbearance from a country he considered 
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an aggressive imperial power; he expected conflict.”36 These two studies highlight the 
ongoing, central role of Saddam Hussein in the crises that envelop the Persian Gulf. The 
centrality of Saddam Hussein in the region has a useful purpose for this research as it 
emphasises his lingering influence on U.S. foreign policy. 
Taking advantage of documents that were captured by U.S. armed forces in the wake of the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, and held at the United States National Defense University’s Conflict 
Records Research Center, Lawrence Rubin elaborates Cause, Brands and Palkki’s 
arguments that Saddam Hussein had a history of lashing out against competitors in the 
Persian Gulf. Rubin explains that the prominent question arising before the 2003 invasion 
was whether Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the U.S. through his support for terrorism. 
Rubin’s preliminary findings suggest that it was plausible that Saddam Hussein might 
contribute to the needs of certain terrorists, however, the issue was complex. Rubin explains 
“while Saddam Hussein’s support of leftist groups due to shared pan-Arab revolutionary 
ideological goals may have played a significant role, it did not prevent him from trying to 
eliminate groups with similar ideological orientations. More to the point, Iraq’s support of 
radical groups such as the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya or the mujahideen al-Khalq 
(MeK) tells us that support was motivated by a shared strategic enemy.”37 Despite the lack of 
evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with al-Qaeda, Rubin notes, “The Hussein 
regime very cautiously cooperated with radical Islamic groups when the benefits outweighed 
the risks.”38 Rubin posits that decision-making, both from within the Persian Gulf and 
towards the Persian Gulf, was saturated in ignorance, and that it appeared “Decision-makers 
[drew] incorrect inferences about the reasons for its adversary’s actions and base[d] their 
policy on the inaccurate assumptions. Similarly, this adversary will make inferences based 
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on its opponent’s behaviour, which was based on misperception.”39 It was apparent that 
Saddam Hussein had miscalculated the U.S. will to confront Iraq at the slightest hint of 
adversity. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein was clearly basing his strategic decision 
making on insecurity. Rubin’s study, in conjunction with Brands, Palkki, and Cause, shows 
that Saddam Hussein’s actions were remarkably consistent throughout his reign as dictator, 
and that the 2003 invasion was the culmination of a longstanding confrontation between the 
U.S. and Iraq. In fact, from the perspective of regional history, Iraq is not an idle spectator 
dominated by expanding U.S. foreign policy, but is instead an active instigator of action 
within the Persian Gulf. This is important as it highlights Saddam Hussein’s central role in 
how the U.S. shaped its foreign policy toward the region. 
 
Presidential History 
The third category of the literature that helps frame the history of the U.S. confronting Iraq 
focuses specifically on presidential decision-making. In this case, the literature is split 
between publications that explore either George H. W. Bush or George W. Bush. The 
literature begins chronologically with George H. W. Bush. Philip Zelikow and Timothy Naftali, 
at the opening of the George H. W. Bush Oral History Archives at the Miller Center, part of 
the University of Virginia, in 2011, stress the important role of Bush in responding to crises 
that developed in the wake of the Cold War. Naftali was adamant that any history focused on 
international events at the end of the Cold War would have to consider Bush as an active 
participant, and Zelikow wondered if Bush was more than his moderate, pragmatic 
appearances.40 The Miller Center oral history project came one year after the journal, 




 The George H. W. Bush Oral History Symposium, Miller Center at the University of Virgnina, 2011. In addition 
to the Oral History project there are numerous memoirs of former members of George H. W. Bush’s 
administration. They include Baker III, James A. and DeFrank, Thomas M. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, 
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Diplomatic History, had published a collection of papers exploring the foreign policies of the 
Bush administration, presenting the multi-faceted nature of Bush as decision-maker. In 
conjunction with the published collection in Diplomatic History was a roundtable presented 
by the scholars at H-Diplo that reviewed the latest efforts to revisit Bush and the end of the 
Cold War. Historian Jeffery A. Engel notes that the renewed interest in Bush would assist 
emerging contemporary histories, explaining that “Future historians may well gain insights 
into the 2000s by the way we reconsidered a generation before.”41 Turning to Bush, Engel 
notes his confidence, as he “responded time and again to events and crises fully confidant in 
his perception of the world and of the national security options shepherded to this desk by 
Scowcroft, without pausing to question the underlying tenets of his or his administration’s 
general worldview.”42 Engel stresses that there is a conflict evident in Bush as his cautious 
approach to change clashed with the momentous events cascading around the world, 
explaining that Bush “felt no real need to develop a new vision for the world after 1989 and 
even after 1991, because doing so would have entirely unmoored him from the Cold War 
world he inhabited, and quite frankly, enjoyed and embraced.”43 This is an observation that 
Engel would go on to pursue in a standalone piece, published in Diplomatic History. 
This dichotomy in the presidency of George H. W. Bush, between a pragmatic realist and 
reluctant radical, was explored more fully by Engel in “A Better World…But Don’t Get Carried 
Away: The Foreign Policy of Bush Snr Twenty Years On.”44 Engel argues that the decision-
making of Bush “is best understood as the culmination of a long-standing American vision, 
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not as the progenitor of something radically new.”45 As Bush had been tempered by the 
American political system under the mantle of the Cold War, having served in various 
capacities in the foreign policy and intelligence hierarchy of the U.S., Bush did not believe 
that the U.S. would have to prove its supremacy with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
because it was already implicitly acknowledged. More important, Bush’s reluctance to act out 
was because “Bush feared volatility most of all.”46 Engel uses this to frame the decision by 
Bush to confront Saddam Hussein after invading Kuwait. When put into context with the end 
of the Cold War, Engel insists that Bush believed “the president’s job to shepherd this new 
world through its period of change, to contain the violence and instability he could not 
control, and to impose structure and order whenever possible.”47 Therefore, Bush viewed the 
response to Iraqi aggression as an opportunity to show the world that the U.S. could prompt 
the international system into functioning as originally envisioned by the founders of the 
United Nations at the end of World War II. Confronting Saddam Hussein echoed Bush’s past 
experiences of “American-led international resolve and American-led leadership of an 
international coalition of democracies that had secured the great victories of Bush’s own 
youth and that had set the stage for the free world’s triumph over communism.”48 As a result, 
Bush is modelled as a pragmatic president who cautiously evaluated international politics 
and acted deliberately, so that the desired results were almost always achieved in the 
interest of the U.S. However, Bush’s successes in diplomacy, and management of his 
advisors, according to Engel, are marred by the controversial tenure of George W. Bush ten 
years later.49 
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In contrast to Engel’s account of George H. W. Bush as a “shepherd” during a transitional 
point in international politics, Timothy Naftali provides more depth in a biography of Bush. 
Having curated the Richard Nixon presidential library, Naftali is well positioned to provide a 
nuanced account of the presidency.50 Like Engel, Naftali explained that Bush’s experiences 
in World War II, and in various foreign policy positions throughout the Cold War, had 
tempered his decision-making skills. However, instead of creating a reluctant leader, those 
experiences, argues Naftali, made for a deliberate leader. According to Naftali, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 presented the greatest challenge to the presidency of Bush and 
illustrated his leadership capabilities. Naftali focuses on the practicality of Bush’s decision 
making, explaining “Bush was not a conceptual thinker. He had a sense of appropriate goals 
and appropriate means of attaining those goals.”51 This meant that Bush at once understood 
that the U.S. could not tolerate the aggressive annexation of states under its new role as 
guarantor of international stability. Convinced of the need to repel Iraq from Kuwait and 
reinforce security in the Persian Gulf, because it was the right thing to do, Bush set about 
achieving that goal first through deliberations with his advisors, and then through 
deliberations with allies. As a result of Bush’s measured approach, the Iraqi occupation was 
reversed and the status quo was reasserted in the Persian Gulf. Bush’s confidence in his 
decision-making never wavered, and years after his failed bid to be re-elected in 1992 he 
met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Richard Cheney and Brent Scowcroft, who all 
agreed that they had managed the war against Iraq in 1991 appropriately. Bush did regret, 
however, his assumption that Saddam Hussein would fade away with time.52 But it was this 
success and longevity as a foreign policy leader that Naftali stresses. Under the weight of 
these accolades, it was presumed George W. Bush would have as much foreign policy 
success as his father. However, without George H. W. Bush’s foreign policy experience and 
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management credentials, the strong personalities of each advisor would clash under George 
W. Bush.53  
John Mueller, in a contrasting account of George H. W. Bush as president, publishes a study 
in 1994 that illustrates Bush’s successes, or lack thereof, as a domestic leader. Agreeing 
with Naftali that the Gulf War was the focal point of Bush’s presidency in a leadership sense, 
Mueller collects an overwhelming amount of polling data in order to map the public opinion 
concerning Bush’s decision to go to war against Iraq in 1991. Mueller is insistent that Bush’s 
successful implementation of a war against Iraq was a remarkable success given that “his 
threats never sufficiently frightened Saddam Hussein, but they did alarm the American 
public.”54 Despite Bush’s skill as a foreign policy leader, his execution as a domestic policy 
leader was flawed. Attempting to justify why a military response might be required for 
reversing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, “the problem as it developed for Bush was that the case 
became too good, that in a sense he was too effective at selling the war and at personalizing 
the issue: the public came to see the removal of Hussein from office as a central war aim.”55 
According to Mueller, Bush did not convince the American public to go to war: 
Rather, he managed to lead the country to war because, as President, he was able to 
keep the issue brewing as an important one; because he could unilaterally commit the 
country to a path that dramatically increased a sense of fatalism about war and perhaps 
convinced many that there was no honourable alternative to war; because he could 
credibly promise a short, beneficial, and relatively painless war; because he and his top 
aides enjoyed a fair amount of trust in matters of foreign policy at the time; and because 
Saddam Hussein played the role of villain with such consummate skill.56  
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Although Bush successfully went to war against Iraq, he could not maintain his success at 
home, and Mueller is critical of Bush’s capacity as a domestic leader. Mueller concludes “to 
a considerable degree, it seems, his demise in the approval ratings can be attributed to his 
apparent inability to provide leadership on domestic issues; to his frantic, even panicky, arm-
waving jolt from issue to issue; and to his inability to project the impression that he knew 
what was going on domestically, that he cared, and that he had a policy to do something 
about it.”57 It is Mueller’s contrarian account of Bush’s presidency that challenges the image 
of a confident, pragmatic leader that is evoked by diplomatic historians. 
On the other hand, George W. Bush lacks the extent of primary documentation that is 
available to scholars researching George H. W. Bush, either through deliberate obfuscation 
or because the declassification process is still underway. Instead, the literature is mostly 
furnished with accounts of the controversial aftermath of various policies. Despite this, there 
is a strong foundation for a popular history of Bush’s presidency that rests on the 
undocumented accounts of journalists such as Bob Woodward, James Mann, Thomas 
Ricks, or Patrick Tyler.58 Complimenting these accounts are just as many memoirs published 
by members of the administration, including George Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Donald 
Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney.59 This coincides with the edited collection In Uncertain Times: 
American Foreign Policy after the fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11 that demonstrates a 
willingness to engage the foreign policy makers of Bush’s presidency in order to uncover the 
motivations of the president. As with the George H. W. Bush administration and the 1991 
confrontation with Iraq, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is considered a prominent event of 
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George W. Bush’s presidency. In an effort to highlight the interconnectedness of policy 
between the administrations, Frank P Harvey, in “President Al Gore and the 2003 Iraq War: 
A Counterfactual Test of Conventional “W”isdom,” argues that the decision to go to war with 
Iraq in 2003 was the culmination of policy, rather than a unique decision constrained to Bush 
in 2003. Harvey contends that Democrat candidate Al Gore, who lost to Bush, would have 
followed a similar path toward war with Iraq because of what Harvey refers to as “Path 
Dependence.” This explains the “interlinkages and mutually reinforcing relationship between 
specific decisions in a rational sequence of choices moving forward. It was the momentum 
produced by the combined effects and pressures of all previous decision that led to the final, 
rational choice for war.”60 More important, Harvey attempts to excise from the decision-
making process the theory that “neoconservatives” hijacked Bush. Responding to criticism of 
Harvey’s publication that soon followed the article, he explained that his “arguments 
contradict very entrenched (and politically motivated) ‘memories’ of what transpired.”61 
Harvey’s insistence that Bush remains responsible for his decision-making, more than is 
suggested by theories of policy hijacking, is juxtaposed by Thomas Graham in Unending 
Crisis: National Security Policy after 9/11, where Graham states that several foreign policy 
disasters under Bush were solely because of the ideological hijacking of the United States 
presidency. Graham insists that an ideology of “neoconservatism” suffocates the policy 
making process and, as a result, “the effect of this witches’ brew of misguided ideas turned 
out to be deeply inimical to U.S. national security, to the prosperity of the United States, and 
to its place in the world. For generations, U.S. policy had been based on multiculturalism at 
home and multilateralism abroad. The Bush administration opposed and virtually wrecked 
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both.”62 Graham is convinced that Bush was set on invading Iraq from the outset of his 
presidency, arguing that “the actual reasons for the Bush administration’s decision to invade 
Iraq appear to be some combination of demonstrating to the world that the United States 
cannot be trifled with, securing access to oil, and the neoconservative delusion of making 
Israel safe and establishing Iraq as a pro-U.S. satellite democracy.”63 With these pre-
meditated motivations “the administration agreed on the rationale of the alleged national 
security threat of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction even though the principals had to 
know from the very beginning that the issue was not beyond question.”64 This snapshot of 
the polarization within the literature that surrounds Bush and his execution of foreign policy 
will be found to coalesce, time and time again, around the decision to invade Iraq in 2003.65 
Terry H. Anderson, in Bush’s Wars, expands on George W. Bush’s role in the decision to go 
to war in Iraq in 2003, and prior to that Afghanistan. By contextualising the invasion of Iraq 
within the war on terror that began in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
Anderson does not adhere to the same premeditated calculations as Graham. In fact, 
Anderson is quite clear that the invasion of Iraq came about because of favourable political 
circumstances, and not necessarily premeditated motivations, adding that “just 72 days after 
the tragedy of September 11, at a time when the outcome in Afghanistan was not clear and 
bin Laden and his lieutenants were evading capture, [President Bush] instructed the 
pentagon to begin planning for a military operation against Iraq.”66 In order to cajole the 
public into supporting regime change in Iraq, Bush deliberately made Iraq a domestic 
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campaign issue in the 2002-midterm Congressional elections, something George H. W. 
Bush had avoided. With momentum gathering behind George W. Bush to confront national 
security threats, Anderson notes that “Americans were eager for revenge against someone, 
anyone for 9/11; they believed their president, were overwhelmed by events, or were not 
paying attention. The administration’s rapid repetition of its talking points continually 
appeared on hyperventilating cable news networks that were competing with Internet 
sources for the public’s attention.”67 The resulting political atmosphere meant that Bush, and 
the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Tony Blair, could successfully undertake military action 
against Iraq. However, Anderson’s analysis is criticised for beating a dead horse, as Andrew 
Bacevich, in his review for Bush’s Wars, wonders “rather than directing more kicks at Bush 
and his associates, historians would be better served at rousing dogs that have been too 
long allowed to slumber.”68 However, Anderson is quick to point out that the decision to 
invade Iraq in 2003 was uniquely Bush’s, and argues that it would be difficult to imagine 
George H. W. Bush “rushing off to war in a nation in the Middle East that had nothing to do 
with that national tragedy. The author of that policy was Bush, Jr., egged on by Cheney, 
Rumsfeld, and the neocons. There were many reasons for the war in Iraq – emotional fallout 
from 9/11, quick “victory” against the Taliban, neocon ideology and administrative 
groupthink, misperceptions of a future Iraq, WMDs, and of course oil.”69 For these reasons, 
George W. Bush is placed in a central decision-making position, resulting in Thompson’s 
analysis blaming Bush for the fallout of the war. 
In an effort to match the contribution made by In Uncertain Times, Melvyn Leffler added a 
survey in Diplomatic History of the substantial amount of memoir material that has emerged 
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from the George W. Bush administration.70 Leffler’s efforts present an historical overview of 
the Bush administration that is lacking in the broader accounts of Anderson or Harvey. 
Leffler’s article maintains focus on the motivations of each policy maker, especially Bush, 
spending a considerable time pondering the circumstances under which decisions were 
being made. Leffler argues that “No account of the Bush administration’s foreign policies 
should underestimate the degree to which fear and anxiety, guilt and responsibility shaped 
the mentality and psychology undergirding the administration’s approach to the Global War 
on Terrorism.”71 Leffler is careful to place Bush at the centre of decision-making, explaining 
that the consensus of the memoirs suggests that it is Bush who is “carefully orchestrating the 
tempo of events, avoiding any comprehensive and systematic deliberation of the pros and 
cons, cleverly deflecting the views of skeptics, offering cues where he wanted to go, 
mobilizing public opinion, and cultivating his British ally.”72 Indeed, Leffler points out “none 
doubted that Bush was, in fact, the decision-maker. Bush invited Cheney to participate fully 
in all decision, and he clearly confided in him and respected his advice. But Bush did not 
always follow Cheney’s recommendations.”73 However, Leffler also admits that the lack of 
primary documentation emerging from the administration means that relying on the memoirs 
of those who were involved is the most reliable method to understanding the decision-
making of Bush. Leffler explains, “what really happened and why will not be resolved until 
scholars have far more primary documents than they now have. Until then, we must make 
intelligent use of the memoirs, avoid quoting selectively from those which share our political 
dispositions, and ponder the challenges, complexities, and imponderables that engulfed 
officials making portentous decision in times of peril and uncertainty.”74 However, Leffler is 
willing to draw a conclusion from the material he researched. Leffler notes that:  
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The memoirs emanating from the Bush administration in their collectivity do not vindicate. 
Rather, they explain the terror and horror of 9/11 and its aftermath. They convey a sense 
of the extraordinary conditions under which policy makers operated with limited 
knowledge and intense anxieties…The memoirs illuminate policy makers scrambling to 
do something to overcome the shock of 9/11, display American power, and satiate 
popular American demands for vengeance and “justice”.75 
Despite Leffler’s research, the literature separates again to consider the domestic element of 
Bush’s leadership. Ole R. Holsti, in American Public Opinion on the Iraq War, replicated 
John Mueller’s earlier efforts in Policy and Opinion on the Gulf War, and collated the public 
opinion leading up to and beyond the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Holsti is quick to point out that 
the 1991 Gulf War, termed by Mueller as the “Mother of all polling events,” was replaced by 
the 2003 invasion in domestic importance.76 However, unlike Mueller’s study, Holsti engages 
in a highly polarised revisionist understanding of why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. 
Noting heightened partisan differences, Holsti explains that “Those who believed that the 
United States had done the “right thing” in using force against Iraq – that is, a very strong 
majority of Republican respondents – were most likely to view events on the ground as 
pointing toward success, thereby sustaining and reinforcing their policy preferences on the 
issue. Conversely, far fewer Democrats support the war, and in light of that it is hardly 
surprising that they were more likely to assess events there, including the post-Saddam 
insurgency, in a much less optimistic light.”77 Holsti suggests that this partisan divergence 
took time to develop, and was only substantial well after the invasion had taken place. 
Following the polling data, Holsti argues that “there was a fairly close concordance between 
public opinion and Bush administration policies during the two years leading up to the fall of 
Baghdad, but it would be a mistake to conclude that, therefore, public opinion was an 
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important driving force in Washington.”78 Holsti notes that public opinion would closely follow 
the public policy debates engaged by domestic leaders, and support was forthcoming when 
a bi-partisan consensus emerged. However, in consolidating this support, Bush encountered 
a similar issue experienced by George H. W. Bush in 1991. Holsti explains that the public 
soon grew disenchanted with the decision to invade Iraq when it became clear that the 
objectives that the public believed they were pursuing did not materialise. Holsti goes on, 
stating “events are ultimately the driving force behind public opinion, trumping vigorous 
public relations efforts to paint the war as an indispensable and winnable effort to protect the 
most vital national interests. That is especially the case when the administration faces a 
growing credibility gap.”79 As it became increasingly obvious that the U.S. had not secured 
Iraq; had not found Saddam Hussein’s hidden weapons of mass destruction; and was 
embroiled in an insurgency that was not planned for, the bi-partisan consensus snapped, 
and the public turned away from its support as pundits began searching for who to blame for 
the failure of the invasion. Holsti found, in the words of one analyst, “increasingly Democrats 
‘forgot’ that they had supported the invasion following the fall of Baghdad, whereas 
Republicans ‘forgot’ that their support had been conditioned on accepting administration 
claims about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction.”80 As a result, Holsti 
suggests that before the occupation of Iraq the public supported the invasion of Iraq, and, 
despite approaching confrontation with Iraq in two different ways, both George H. W. Bush 
and George W. Bush enjoyed these conditions.81 
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Comparing George H. W. Bush to George W. Bush 
The contribution of this research, however, is to compare the decision of George H. W. Bush 
and George W. Bush to go to war with Iraq. As is clear by the literature, there exists a 
multitude of accounts of each administration’s decision-making that encompass international 
relations theory, through to presidential biographies. However, few of these accounts sustain 
a direct comparison of the presidents in order to reflect on the similarities and differences in 
decision-making. In the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, observers began alluding to the 
influence of the 1991 Gulf War. Richard K. Betts, in an article published in Foreign Affairs in 
early 2003, argues that unlike 1991, there was the risk that any war fought against Iraq 
would not be on American terms. The possibility of a strike by Iraq against the U.S. with 
weapons of mass destruction, no matter how miniscule, meant that deterrence was the 
suitable approach to containing Saddam Hussein. Betts argues that American leaders during 
the 1991 Gulf War issued “a deterrent threat, warning Saddam against using biological or 
chemical weapons.”82 As a result, despite a humiliating defeat, Saddam Hussein “held back 
his high cards in 1991 because he was never forced to the wall or confronted with his own 
demise. That war, unlike the one now contemplated, was limited.”83 Bett’s suggests that the 
difference between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion, at the onset, was that George 
W. Bush lacked a grasp of the potential consequences of a war that appeared unlimited and 
inevitable. However, Kenneth Pollack had already beaten Betts to the mark by publishing 
The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq in late 2002. Pollack, who had worked 
as an analyst on Iraq for the CIA and National Security Council, wrote a long account 
justifying a military intervention to depose Saddam Hussein. Pollack’s argument was simple 
– “at the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the international community undertook a commitment 
to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the other nations of the Middle East. This commitment 
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was to prevent Saddam Hussein from ever threatening them as he had in the past.”84 
However, the solution in 1991 to establish sanctions and a regime for disarming Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction had, according to Pollack, failed, and “The United States made 
a good-faith effort to try to handle the problem of Saddam Hussein and his pursuit of 
weapons of mass destruction through multilateral containment.”85 Therefore, as a direct 
consequence of the decisions made during the 1991 Gulf War, Pollack concludes that 
“because we are the world’s only remaining superpower and the only country with the 
capability to prevent Saddam from again threatening the region and its oil supplies, we are 
the ones who will have to clean up the mess we tried to prevent others from making.”86 
Pollack gained further credibility when he was cited in Congress as evidence for supporting 
military intervention in Iraq in the lead up to the 2003 invasion. 
Andrew Bacevich, however, offered a different understanding of the initial decision to 
confront Saddam Hussein in 1991, and in contrast to the repetition in 2003. In American 
Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Bacevich stresses that there 
was a desire to establish a U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf as the world opened up in the 
wake of the Cold War. It is because of economic priorities that the decision to intervene in 
the Persian Gulf is initially made, as “on the surface [globalisation] promised a new 
economic order that would benefit all. Beneath the surface it implied a reconfiguring of the 
international political order as well.”87 According to Bacevich, the U.S. was motivated to keep 
Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq as it justified the presence of a significant U.S. military 
presence in the Persian Gulf, under the auspices of guaranteeing Persian Gulf security. 
Therefore, the priorities for the United States were best explained by Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright - “Military power was not to be unleashed; it was doled out in precisely 
measured increments. The use of force against carefully selected targets – preferably 
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inanimate objects – precluded the prospect of slaughter.”88 This omnipresence ensured that 
the U.S. remained on top of the international order, and guaranteed U.S. power over 
international politics. As a result of the political perception of military power that had begun 
with the 1991 Gulf War, Bacevich concludes, “the war that began on September 11, 2001, 
was a war to preserve and to advance the strategy of openness. Indeed, if anything, al 
Qaeda’s attack on the American homeland eased constraints that during the previous 
decade had inhibited U.S. officials in their pursuit of greater openness (and expanded 
American hegemony).”89 Therefore, in the wake of compounding political momentum, Bush’s 
decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was seen as a suitable and necessary response to reassert 
U.S. global power. 
There are accounts, however, that more directly compare the presidencies of George H. W. 
Bush and George W. Bush.90 Richard N. Haass, in War of necessity, War of Choice: A 
memoir of Two Iraq Wars, presents a compelling account of working within the decision-
making structure of both presidencies. Under George H. W. Bush, Haass was a member of 
the National Security Council, and was intimately involved in the discussions leading up to 
the confrontation with Iraq in 1991. Under George W. Bush, Haass secured the role of 
Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, working under the leadership of 
Secretary of State Colin Powell. Haass, much like Zelikow in In Uncertain Times, stresses 
the context for decision making, and criticises many of the accounts that precede his own, 
explaining that “Not surprisingly, historians and academics who have never experienced 
government and its pressures tend to overlook or discount physical strain as an influence on 
those making policy.”91 Haass remarks that George H. W. Bush’s administration, in 
comparison with the four other administrations he had worked under, appeared the most 
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functional. Haass notes that Bush genuinely believed in an “international community” that 
would emerge from the Cold War, and his decision to confront Iraq would embody that belief. 
As a consequence, Haass discounts the importance of the 1991 Gulf War, arguing, “The first 
Iraq war constituted an important moment in world history, not a transformation.”92 This 
contrasts with George W. Bush’s administration. Haass immediately noticed that the 
decision-making process included more than just the president’s voice, and added, “the fact 
that the Vice President’s office and the secretary of defense had a seat at the table equal to 
the secretary of state’s also increased the odds that diplomacy would be hobbled.”93 Under 
Bush, it appeared as though advice would be filtered, or outright ignored, because of a one-
sided debate that had emerged from a consolidated block of authority that included the vice 
president, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor, but not the State 
department. As a result of this insular decision-making process, Haass argues that unlike the 
1991 Gulf War, Bush wanted to transform Iraq and the Middle East in order to accomplish 
what it was believed George H. W. Bush had failed to achieve in 1991.94  
However, the research that focuses specifically on a comparison of the decisions of George 
H. W. Bush and George W. Bush to confront Iraq, and closely mirrors the contention of this 
research, is Michael F. Cairo in The Gulf: The Bush Presidencies and the Middle East. Cairo 
argues “personal beliefs and character in the presidency matter in the determination of 
foreign policy. The way both Bush administrations responded to the global changes taking 
place was a result of how each President Bush, and a small number of his advisers, defined 
those events.”95 Therefore, Cairo situates the decision to confront Iraq as part of each 
president’s worldviews, explaining, “While the older Bush emphasized defensive realism and 
neoliberal institutionalism, the younger stressed the offensive variant of realism and the 
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democratic peace argument.”96 These differing worldviews fundamentally changed the 
approach each president took toward international crisis, as George H. W. Bush was seen to 
act more diplomatically and flexibly, whereas George W. Bush was a crusader. Again, the 
confrontation with Iraq is used as evidence of the differing worldviews affecting policy 
choices, as Cairo points out that “George H. W. feared squandering American power and 
acted only after the crisis had emerged…on the other hand, George W. ‘hit the ground 
running,’ with a plan in mind; from the beginning of his administration, he intended to use 
American power to foster and advance American interests and ideals.”97 The juxtaposition of 
the two presidencies allows Cairo to conclude that there are two descriptions that can be 
applied to each president. Because of George H. W. Bush’s measured, prudent approach he 
is an “enlightened realist,” as evidenced by Bush’s preference for defensive realist options 
for foreign policy. George W. Bush, however, is labelled a “cowboy liberal” for his gut-instinct 
and good-intentioned approach to foreign policy, and the preference for offensive realism 
when considering foreign policy.98  
Where this thesis separates itself from Cairo’s comparison is by how much this worldview of 
the president can be used to explain decision-making. Although there is no denying that this 
is a valid observation that contributes to presidential decision-making, it is apparent that 
there are other concerns that interplay whenever a decision is to be made. By utilising each 
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category of literature, this research will be situated in the following way and deviate from the 
established literature. The international history of the wars in Iraq acknowledges that there is 
a context to decision-making that exists beyond the shores of the U.S. As a result, there are 
diplomatic origins that exist and influence the decision to go to war with Iraq. The regional 
history of the Gulf Wars supports this contention, highlighting that events occur irrespective 
of domestic motivations in the United States. The presidential history of the Gulf Wars, 
however, emphasises the opposite of the international history, and shows that there is a 
separate domestic origin for the decision to go to war. Drawing these categories together, 
this thesis will compare and contrast the domestic and diplomatic origins of the decision to 
go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. In order to further frame, and emphasise, the different 
origins, the research will focus separately on both George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, 
drawing together a comparison in the conclusion that highlights the similarities, and 
differences, of both president’s decision-making towards the Persian Gulf. 







“I have long held that all relevant motives should be carefully weighed, and that no one 
should be beaten to death or found where it did not exist.”99 
 
This research is considered a work of diplomatic history and relies on a qualitative analysis 
of source material derived from database, archival, and secondary publications, in order to 
explore why the United States went to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. As a result of this 
analysis, the decision to go to war will be contrasted in such a way as to emphasise the 
foreign policy making of George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush. This process frames and 
presents an account of the decisions to go to war that allows for a comparative historical 
analysis. This methodology is influenced by the approach of diplomatic historians, and draws 
some inspiration from the conceptual frameworks of political science. As will be described, 
two different, albeit corresponding, historical frames that emphasise the domestic and 
diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war will be used to illustrate the U.S. decision to go 
to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. Therefore, this methodology consists of two parts. First, 
there will be a survey of literature that shows political scientists and diplomatic historians 
intersecting in their efforts to establish a foundation for the interpretation and illustration of 
American foreign policy. From here there are two key points that relate to the methodology 
of this research. Initially, there is the importance of a framework when addressing historical 
questions and, following this, a framework is presented that portrays a history of American 
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foreign policy that is relevant to the decision to go to war with Iraq. What emerges from this 
discussion, and from the nexus of political scientists and diplomatic historians, is a 
framework that can be applied to this research, and helps establish a history of the U.S. 
going to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The second part of this methodology is how this 
research employs a method of qualitative analysis that frames the source material. This 
consists of exploring two separate origins of the decision to go to war against Iraq, the 
domestic and the diplomatic. Each resulting frame, utilising a different approach to the 
question of why the U.S. went to war against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, creates a history that 
explores the similarities, differences, and concerns that influenced George H. W. Bush and 
George W. Bush when they decided to go to war with Iraq.  
 
Framing American Foreign Relations 
There are many efforts, by both political scientists and diplomatic historians, to approach and 
conceptualise foreign relations, so that it might make sense. There are many proponents of 
both academic schools who agree to disagree about the merits of each school of thought. In 
fact, political scientist, and, arguably, historian, Hans J. Morgenthau contended in Scientific 
Man vs Power Politics that he considered the reduction of politics and history to scientific 
formulae a useless task. Morgenthau rallied against idealists, and explained: 
The age is forever searching for the philosopher’s stone, the magic formula, which, 
mechanically applied, will produce the desired result and thus substitute for the 
uncertainties and risks of political action the certitude of rational calculation. Since, 
however, what the seekers after the magic formula want is simple, rational, mechanical, 
and what they have to deal with is complicated, irrational, incalculable, they are 
compelled, in order to present at least the semblance of scientific solutions, to simplify 
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the reality of international politics and to develop what one might call the ‘method of 
single cause’.100   
Morgenthau prefers the approach of a diplomatic historian when reconciling his thoughts on 
international politics, arguing, “The professionalism of the historian flows from the 
competence with which he handles the factual material and the conclusiveness with which 
he marshalls it in support of his position. His aim, by which his efforts much be judged, is the 
coherent reconstruction of the past, which illuminates the past, the present, and the human 
condition, regardless of time and place.”101 It is, therefore, necessary for this research to 
establish a framing of American foreign relations that illuminates the history of American 
foreign policy. 
Forty years after Morgenthau lambasted political science in Scientific Man vs Power Politics, 
diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis resumed the debate in an article published in 
International Security, arguing that despite Morgenthau’s complaints, there is some merit to 
political science exploring American foreign relations. Gaddis argues that there is a 
misunderstanding between political scientists and diplomatic historians that could be 
construed as speaking different languages. Breaking down the complaints and accusations 
levelled at both schools of thought, Gaddis begins with political scientists, explaining that 
they presume to anticipate international politics and produce prescriptive solutions, 
needlessly limiting the scope and application of their research.102 Gaddis lists three reasons 
why political science is a limited frame for foreign relations: 
First, too much was promised. The idea that scientific certainties could be located in the 
field of politics in much the same way as in the physical sciences was a questionable 
one from the start…Second, the scientific approach to politics became preoccupied, to 
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the point of paralysis, with debates over methodology. As much time was devoted to 
debating definitions of terms, procedures for coding, and techniques for measuring as 
was spent on actually attempting to derive new insights about the field…Third, the data 
bases that were constructed confined themselves almost entirely to the public 
manifestations of international relations, which often amounted to whatever appeared in 
the pages of The New York Times.103  
At its core, the issues faced by political science framing foreign relations are that it confuses 
“technique with substance,” and focuses “so heavily upon the way in which international 
relations are conducted that one loses sight of the issues those relations address in the first 
place.”104 On the other hand, the diplomatic historian produces a remarkably different frame 
for the conduct foreign relations, and Gaddis is equally critical about the conduct of 
diplomatic history. Gaddis explains that in some circumstances historians succumb to the 
“antiquarian fallacy” that “assumes that history, by definition, concerns itself only with what 
has already happened and has nothing whatever to do with the present.”105 According to 
Gaddis, this means that “the history most relevant to contemporary concerns is often 
considered not to be history at all, but rather some slippery and not well understood variety 
of current events, best left to journalists.”106 Gaddis adds to his criticism, first, that there is a 
trend among historians to be afflicted by “presentism,” a narrow scope in which the historian 
assembles history in order to explain current events. Second, the historian proves reluctant 
to address methodology. And third, they ignore comparative elements within history that 
might identify relationships, because of the “monographic” fallacy that history must produce 
standalone work.107 Although critical, Gaddis does contend that there is a way to reconcile 
the best parts of political science and diplomatic history when framing foreign policy. 
According to Gaddis, there is a way to consider both “sequence and system,” and avoid 
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“falling into the traps of antiquarianism, presentism, and conceptual poverty that have 
afflicted historians, or the pitfalls of scientific hubris, methodological constipation, and 
linguistic incomprehension that have encumbered the political scientists.”108 Therefore, this 
research seeks to establish a framing of American foreign policy that avoids the criticism that 
Gaddis levels at the field of contemporary history. 
To that end, it is necessary to establish what constitutes American foreign policy, and how it 
is formed in relation to this research. A traditional understanding of foreign policy, and one 
that might adhere stringently to the constraints of either political science or diplomatic 
history, is that foreign policy operates in the space of international politics, and is unmoored 
from domestic concerns. However, this understanding has evolved along with the technology 
that has increasingly integrated the global into the local. In regards to American foreign 
policy, it can be seen that domestic pressure has become increasingly present in the 
formation and practice of foreign policy, either through the spectacle of protests that are 
broadcast live throughout the media, or the interviews and media liaisons that proceed a 
major policy announcement. As a sign for the times, President Barack Obama has a fulltime 
photographer employed solely to document his daily schedule. It takes seconds after those 
photos are taken for them to appear on the internet, and visible around the world. However, 
these two contexts, the diplomatic and domestic, constitute very different frames for foreign 
policy. According to Robert J. McMahon, this is the “Janus-face” of American relations. 
There is both a national history and an international history that has to be considered in 
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order to depict a whole picture of American foreign policy.109 This framing of American 
foreign policy generates questions that deepen any historical analysis, asking “How have 
elites attained, maintained, and exercised power? What have been the internal, or systemic, 
sources of the nation’s external behaviour? To what end have public or private elites 
interacted? What difference has the United States made in and to the wider global 
community?”110 Without considering these questions, went on McMahon, any diplomatic 
history of the United States would be incomplete. 
On the other hand, Melvin Small is more concerned with a quantifiable breakdown of 
American foreign policy, arguing that there were several ‘publics’ within the U.S. that 
constitute the formation of foreign policy. Small explains: 
At the top of the apex of a pyramid that might represent all citizens are the opinion 
makers, a very small coterie of government officials, respected national leaders and 
celebrities, editors, and journalists. Below them is the group called the attentive public 
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that might be as large as 25 percent on some issues. These well-educated and well-
read people tend to pay attention to international politics and influence others around 
them. Finally, more than 75 percent of the population makes up the mass public that 
usually does not care much about foreign affairs until the United States is in a crisis.111  
The purpose of breaking down the ‘public’ into constituent parts is Small’s way of 
acknowledging that there is a hierarchy present in the development of foreign policy. More 
importantly, a domestic framing of diplomatic history helps add to any analysis that fixates on 
the diplomatic dimensions of foreign policy.  
The bridge between the domestic and diplomatic is explained by Melvyn Leffler, who 
stresses that national security is the common denominator in the formation of foreign policy. 
Leffler writes that “National security policy encompasses the decision and actions deemed 
imperative to protect domestic core values from external threats. This definition is important 
because it underscores the relation of the international environment to the internal situation 
in the United States and accentuates the importance of people’s ideas and perceptions in 
constructing the nature of external dangers as well as the meaning of national identity and 
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vital interests.”112 For the observer of foreign policy, who might be attempting to frame 
foreign policy, Leffler provides a key to understanding what constitutes a nations core 
values. With these core values, the historian is then able to develop a domestic frame that 
emphasises an internal context that imposes itself on foreign policy from the inside, while the 
diplomatic frame creates an external projection of those core values. 
The purpose of deconstructing the framing of foreign policy is to explore the history of the 
U.S. going to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. Diplomatic historians have tussled to some 
extent after the Cold War to frame a contemporary history that might help explain the 
conduct of the U.S. after 1989.113 Historian Andrew Bacevich has been a leading proponent 
of the effort to engage contemporary American diplomatic history. In an article published in 
Military History, Bacevich complains that the framing of American foreign relations is in need 
of revision. Bacevich explains that “for history to serve more than an ornamental function, it 
must speak to the present.”114 Using an example of useful historical framing, Bacevich 
contends that there are two histories’ that emerge from the end of World War II. The first, a 
short history, sees the U.S. overcome Nazi Germany and embroil itself in an apocalyptic 
struggle with the Soviet Union, until finally the U.S. succeeds in beating Communism and 
standing unopposed as the world’s sole superpower. In the second history, the long history, 
events are understood sequentially and separately, and are remembered differently 
depending on perspective. If one were to draw contemporary lessons from these two 
histories, the first would expound the virtues and success of the U.S., and the second would 
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warn of the reality of those virtues and success. Bacevich points out that “for those with a 
taste for irony try this one: 1991 was the year in which the U.S.S.R. finally gave up the ghost; 
it was also the year of the First Persian Gulf War. One headache went away; another was 
about to become a migraine.”115 Central to Bacevich’s reframing of diplomatic history are the 
decisions that leaders make and how they are informed. Bacevich concludes that “the First 
Persian Gulf War deserves to be remembered chiefly as a source of wildly inflated and 
pernicious illusions. More than any other event, this brief conflict persuaded Washington, 
now freed of constraints imposed by the Cold War, that the application of U.S. military power 
held the key to reordering the Greater Middle East in ways likely to serve American 
interests.”116 Although a history of American foreign policy has to be mindful of its framing 
constraints, the useable aspect of the history is found in examining how leaders decided on 
a course of action. Therefore, this research defers back to the decision-making of George H. 
W. Bush and George W. Bush when exploring the domestic and diplomatic origins of the 
decision to go to war with Iraq. The importance of this history cannot be understated, and 
Bacevich stresses that the role of the historian is to provide their future students “with a 
useable past, preparing them as best we can to meet events as they unfold.”117 It is 
imperative that this research expresses a clear historical framing of the U.S. decision to go 
to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003, so that its history can be made ‘useable.’ 
 
The Domestic and Diplomatic Origins of the Decision to Go to War with Iraq  
This research, utilising the framing of foreign relations that can be divined from diplomatic 
history and political science, will frame and explain the history of the U.S. going to war with 
Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and explore the similarities and differences exhibited by George H. 
W. Bush and George W. Bush in their foreign policy making. In order to do this, this research 
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will employ a qualitative analytical approach to source material found in archives, databases, 
and secondary publications. This source material will be framed in two ways that 
encompass, and emphasize, different aspects of the decision to go to war. These different 
aspects, which are designated as five separate headings within each chapter, denote points 
in the analysis where a theme converged in the frame that influenced the decision making of 
the president. First, there are the domestic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq that 
is seen in chapters three and five. In this frame, the analysis considers the internal 
dimensions of decision making and foreign policy-making. The second frame focuses on the 
diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war that incorporate the external dimensions of 
foreign policy making, and is explored in chapters four and six. As a result of these two 
frames, a domestic perspective to the conduct of American foreign policy can be constructed 
and juxtaposed with the diplomatic perspective.  
The first frame utilised in chapters three and five is the domestic origins of the decision to go 
to war with Iraq. This research contends that there are domestic origins that can be shown, 
and are indeed evident, in the conduct of American foreign policy. The source material that 
constitutes this frame is found in the public papers of both presidents and through their 
public addresses, conferences, and interviews that involve the Persian Gulf, Saddam 
Hussein, or Iraq. The American Presidency Project at the University of Santa Barbara has a 
searchable database that assisted in indexing and collecting the public papers of both 
George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush. These public presentations of foreign policy 
create the domestic façade of the decision to confront Iraq, and are complimented by 
documents found at the National Security Archive at the George Washington University. 
Additionally, the Library of Congress provided a database that assisted in the collection of 
source material related to the domestic frame. However, in order to truly develop a domestic 
understanding of the decision to confront Iraq, the source material encompasses the 
discourse that is found in media publications, specifically newspaper commentary, op-eds, 
and editorials that critique and reflect a position on the administration’s policy-making. These 
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publications, which are the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Los 
Angeles Times, are often the chosen platforms for policy-makers, politicians, and diplomats 
to argue their case, or for other interested parties to attempt to influence a larger 
audience.118 This source material was collected through the Proquest Central Database, and 
was focused on mentions of “Saddam” or “Iraq” within the timelines of January 1, 1989 to 
January 17, 1991, and January 1, 2001 to March 18, 2003. In these publications we see 
editorial positions, biased commentary, policy-makers writing op-eds, and former decision-
makers, policy-makers, or experts all responding and arguing about the public presentations 
of policy. The resulting frame shows the domestic pressures that are exerted on the 
president as the administration seeks to reconcile competing interests in the pursuit of 
foreign policy. Ultimately, this frame shows the domestic origins of the decision to go to war 
with Iraq. In order to add depth to this frame, memoirs, interviews, and publications from 
former administration members are also incorporated into the analysis, in order to add to the 
compulsions and perspective of the president who decided to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 
2003.  
The second frame, chapters four and six, encompasses the diplomatic origins of the decision 
to go to war with Iraq. In contrast to the first frame, which looks inward, this frame focuses 
outward. This frame is more familiar to traditional diplomatic history, and the source material 
derives from, to a great extent, the dialogue between embassy outposts and the State 
Department, and U.S. conduct in the United Nations Security Council. In much the same 
way that the public discourse orchestrated by the president, and dissected by the media, 
constitutes a domestic frame of American foreign policy, the discourse between diplomats 
and the conduct of states in the United Nations constitutes the diplomatic origins of the 
decision to go to war. Once again, the National Security Archive at the George Washington 
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University was a resource for declassified primary resources regarding both presidencies. 
However, the George H. W. Bush Presidential Archives in College Station, Texas, proved 
valuable for accessing additional primary documentation. The George W. Bush Presidential 
Library and Archives, on the other hand, has only recently been opened and the archives 
remain inaccessible to historians. For source material from the United Nations, the United 
Nations Security Council provides a database of documents that is searchable, and this was 
utilised across the same timeline as the domestic frame to collect primary source material 
that involved “Saddam” or “Iraq” in United Nations Security Council meetings. In addition, 
memoirs and interviews of important international civil servants, particularly the head of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and 
Inspection Commission, are utilised throughout the frame to illustrate the depth of U.S. 
diplomatic conduct. The result of the diplomatic frame is to show the president’s efforts to 
apply foreign policy that benefits U.S. national interests, despite in some cases contrary 
pressure exerted by the domestic frame. By replicating these frames over similar timelines 
for both George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, a comparative history can then be used 
to contrast the similarities and differences between the decisions to go to war with Iraq. 
Central to both decisions is the president, and each timeline will begin with the presidential 
inauguration, continuing until the U.S. goes to war with Iraq. The purpose of the timeline is to 
exercise the comparative element of the history that is being explored. As a result, this 
research will be constructed in the following way. In chapters three and four, the domestic 
and diplomatic origins of George H. W. Bush’s decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 are 
constructed and analysed, focusing on foreign policy between 1989 and 1991. In chapters 
five and six, the domestic and diplomatic origins of George W. Bush’s decision to go to war 
with Iraq in 2003 are explored, following the decision making process between 2001 and 
2003. With the juxtaposition established between the two presidencies, there will be a 
conclusion that explores the similarities and differences in both foreign policy-making 
processes and decisions to go to war with Iraq. The qualitative analysis that emerges in 
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chapters three through to six explores the presidential decision-making of George H. W. 
Bush and George W. Bush and posits an answer as to why the U.S. went to war with Iraq in 
1991 and 2003. 





The Domestic Origins of the Decision to Go to War with Iraq, 1989-1991 
 
 “July 24th [1990]: If I didn’t have this budget deficit problem hanging over my head, I would 
be loving this job…”119 
 
In 1991, Time chose George H. W. Bush as its Person of the Year under the caveat that the 
president could be separated into two different leaders - a national leader and an 
international leader. The magazine applauded Bush’s response to the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait and the collapse of the Soviet Union, claiming that he had “midwifed” the new world 
order into existence. However, Bush had drifted on domestic policy and the magazine could 
only conclude, specifically in the wake of the Budget crisis, that “Bush affected domestic 
events decidedly for the worse.”120 This chapter will explore the contention that there were 
two different leaders, one of whom was confident and one of whom was indecisive, and will 
emphasise the domestic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991. Having 
established the constraints of conducting foreign policy with the pressure of domestic 
politics, this chapter will stress the importance of continuity that was established between 
Ronald Reagan and Bush.  It will be seen that Bush, from the outset, attempted to reconcile 
domestic affairs in the same way he would conduct foreign policy, through deliberation and 
appeals to negotiations and compromise, covered by the sleight of hand that accompanied 
effective diplomacy. However, it will come to the fore that domestic considerations are often 
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irrationally opposed to strategic interests and would conflict and impede policy options. By 
obfuscating and avoiding the issues that were raised domestically regarding Iraq and, in 
particular, Saddam Hussein, Bush’s immediate decision to denounce and oppose Iraq’s 
annexation of Kuwait in August is seen to be a step in the right direction. But Bush, through 
his separation of domestic and foreign affairs, found that Congressional members were able 
to leverage his inability to articulate domestic issues and adversely affect his domestic 
authority as president, dragging out the budget crisis until it influenced mid-term elections 
late in 1990. Overall, this chapter will emphasise the domestic origins of the decision to go to 
war with Iraq, a decision that Bush could only secure by blindsiding domestic politics. 
This chapter begins with the election of Bush as the 41st president to the United States, who 
immediately confronted a domestic agenda that was significantly impacted by the lasting 
effects of Reagan’s budgetary practices. Understanding his election as a sign of continuity in 
American politics Bush did not seek out any major reversals or changes in policy, choosing 
instead to take time to review and evaluate existing policies. Domestically, however, the 
media became increasingly obsessed with Iraq and U.S. Persian Gulf policy, emphasising 
the continuing U.S. trade relationship despite allegations of Iraqi chemical weapons abuse. 
Refusing to be drawn into a debate over unilateral sanctions, Bush ignored domestic 
agitation and avoided any debate over unilateral sanctions against Iraq even as Saddam 
Hussein was characterised as a threat to the U.S. On August 2, American politicians and 
pundits claimed “I told you so” as Iraq invaded Kuwait, annexing the small, Persian Gulf 
nation, prompting Bush to address domestically the issue of Iraq in the Persian Gulf. But, the 
international crisis coincided with a domestic political battle as Congress sought to 
undermine Bush’s proposed budget plans. Although Bush was deft at handling the 
diplomacy of the international crisis, he could not articulate the domestic crisis and the result 
would be a significantly compromised budget being approved by Congress that 
demonstrated Bush’s shortcomings as a domestic leader. Undeterred, Bush rallied in the 
wake of the budget crisis to step towards the use of force in the Persian Gulf after it became 
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obvious Iraq was not prepared to leave Kuwait despite international sanctions. Congress, 
emboldened by the successful budget battle, pushed to exert its influence on Bush’s 
movements in the Persian Gulf. Confronted by Bush compounding the crisis in the Persian 
Gulf through his exchanges with reporters, Congress waited for the opportunity to debate 
Bush’s decision to confront Iraq in the Persian Gulf only after Saddam Hussein’s atrocities 
had been well established within the media, and the United Nations Security Council had 
already approved the option of armed force to resolve the crisis. On January 16, the 
domestic origins behind the decision to go to war against Iraq resulted in a Congressional 
resolution that approved Bush to use all necessary measures to force Iraq out of Kuwait.    
 
The 41st President of the United States 
Emerging from the vice presidency under Reagan, Bush was elected by a resounding 
margin over his closest competitor, democrat Michael Dukakis, despite a relatively low voter 
turnout. This apathy was explained, in part, by what Bush represented politically to the 
American people, a point that was stressed by Reagan in his 1989 New Year’s address 
alongside Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev. Commenting on how proud he was to 
have overseen the improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States 
during his presidency, Reagan added that “The American people have chosen [Bush] 
because he represents continuity in the policies, foreign and domestic, that the United States 
has pursued over the past 8 years. I know that Mr. Bush will continue on the same course 
with equal commitment.”121 The reality of Reagan’s legacy was not lost on Bush as he gave 
his inaugural address on January 20, 1989. Bush acknowledged the continuity within the 
office of the president, expressing his gratitude to Reagan for what he had achieved 
throughout his presidential term and adding that it was two hundred years since George 
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Washington had taken the same presidential oath, but Bush was cautiously optimistic for 
what lay ahead. The world stood promisingly open for the U.S. as Bush explained that “A 
new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on. There is 
new ground to be broken and new action to be taken. There are times when the future 
seems thick as a fog; you sit and wait, hoping the mists will lift and reveal the right path. But 
this is a time when the future seems a door you can walk right through into a room called 
tomorrow.”122 Bush’s rhetoric stood in stark contrast with his cautious optimism. 
Despite the allegory of a hopeful, promising future rich with opportunity, in reality the 
remnants of Reagan’s domestic programs meant that Bush inherited a budget that had been 
decimated. As a consequence the remainder of the inaugural address remained firmly 
realistic about the extent of Bush’s social agenda with a call to Americans asking that they 
be prepared to help those most in need without additional resources. Bush explained, “The 
old solution, the old way, was to think that public money alone could end these problems. 
But we have learned that that is not so. And in any case, our funds are low. We have deficit 
to bring down. We have more will than wallet, but will is what we need. We will make the 
hard choices.”123 Public expenditure had to be harnessed because of the deficit created by 
Reagan. However, it relied on a bipartisan Congress in order for a full domestic agenda to 
take shape, and Bush appealed to the leaders in Congress for their support. Addressing the 
“loyal opposition”, Bush added, “I am putting my hand out to you, Mr. Speaker. I am putting 
my hand out to you, Mr. Majority Leader. For this is the thing: This is the age of the offered 
hand. And we can’t turn back clocks, and I don’t want to. But when our fathers were young, 
Mr. Speaker, our differences ended at the water’s edge.”124 It was imperative that the 
government “bring the federal budget into balance. And we must ensure that America stands 
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before the world united, strong, at peace, and fiscally strong…we need to compromise…We 
need harmony.”125 But most importantly, Bush needed support from Congress. 
On February 9, Bush detailed a more comprehensive direction for the U.S. in a speech 
before Congress. The immediate concern was the budget deficit, and Bush’s interim 
measure was to implement a spending freeze that aimed at generating an amount of savings 
within a year. The plan was cautious and fit well with Bush’s pragmatic approach to politics 
but was only a stalling mechanism for the impending budget crisis. In an effort to allay 
criticism of his fiscal planning Bush detailed his proposed social agenda where he stressed 
that a diversion of funds would go towards a war on drugs. Bush outlined that “The scourge 
of drugs must be stopped. And I am asking tonight for an increase of almost a billion dollars 
in budget outlays to escalate the war on drugs. The war must be waged on all fronts.”126 Illicit 
drug policy was close to Bush’s heart and where he planned to diverge from Reagan, whom 
he believed was too soft on international drug traffickers. Bush’s foreign policy agenda, 
however, did not otherwise deviate from the carefully laid path of his predecessors. The 
Soviet Union, according to Bush, remained the primary U.S. concern despite progress seen 
under President Gorbachev. Bush explained: 
Prudence and common sense dictate that we try to understand the full meaning of the 
change going on [in the Soviet Union], review our policies, and then proceed with 
caution…The fundamental facts remain that the Soviets retain a very powerful military 
machine in the service of objectives which are still too often in conflict with ours. So, let 
us take the new openness seriously, but let’s also be realistic.127 
Bush’s hesitation towards change was also apparent when he referred to the findings of an 
international conference on chemical weapons that had been held in Paris during January. 
Bush admitted in the Congressional address that chemical weapons “had to be banned from 
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the face of the Earth, never to be used again,” but explained that enforcing a chemical 
weapon ban would be “extraordinarily difficult.”128 It appeared that Bush shared Reagan’s 
distaste for unilateral sanctions, and his hesitancy implied that any solution to the issue of 
chemical weapons would have to emerge from a different political forum. 
What had prompted Bush’s acknowledgement of chemical weapons in his address before 
Congress were the proceedings of the Chemical Weapons Conference in Paris during 
January. The conference had emerged amidst allegations that Iraq, in the closing stages of 
its war with Iran, had used chemical weapons on its civilian Kurdish population. The 
allegations had first surfaced in the final months of Reagan’s presidency, and he had quickly 
declined to support Congressional efforts to sanction Iraq under the Prevention of Genocide 
Act of 1988. That the conference went ahead in Paris had been a compromise supported by 
Bush as vice president. However, the conference was marred from the outset by 
disagreement over what should be done regarding those states, such as the U.S., that had 
already stockpiled chemical weapons and retained manufacturing capabilities. This meant 
that the concluding statements, which were hoped to condemn Iraq’s use of chemical 
weapons, devolved into ambiguity and instead reiterated that chemical weapons be 
eradicated and never used. The inconclusiveness appeared to legitimate domestic concerns 
that international forums were unable to provide comprehensive solutions to acts that were 
deemed immoral and inhumane, and the New York Times accused the multilateral 
conference model of being ineffective and incapable of prosecuting an abuser of chemical 
weapons, especially when those being condemned were invited to take part in the 
proceedings. After all, as was reported, a “lack of remorse for resorting to such savagery 
was evident in the behaviour of [Iraq’s] delegate to the Paris conference, who passed the 
time working his crossword puzzle.”129 After Bush had addressed Congress in February and 
failed to specifically address Iraq’s alleged use of chemical weapons, the indignation of 
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some American commentators persisted in denouncing the lack of official response. In the 
Washington Post, Richard Cohen claimed that Iraq was “getting away with genocide,” and 
that a large movement of Iraqi Kurds in Northern Iraq was so obvious that even “the State 
department says Iraq is involved in a massive relocation program.” Cohen, drawing a parallel 
between Saddam Hussein and Hitler, argued that the only suitable response short of war or 
sanctions was “condemnation not only by the West but by other Arab governments and Third 
World nations as well.”130 The criticism, however, fell short of influencing Bush. 
Despite the commentary concerning Iraq, on March 31, Bush gave journalists an opportunity 
to express their thoughts and questions on the beginning of his administration in a press 
conference at the White House. Although the questions were far reaching, covering 
everything from the Chicago Mayoral race to the War on Drugs, there was no mention of the 
controversy surrounding Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. On the one occasion a reporter did 
inquire about Iraq they instead referred to reports that Iraq might be constructing a nuclear 
weapon, asking Bush “Does the prospect of this tiny, sometimes warlike nation being able to 
wage nuclear war – does it give you great concern for the future?” Bush could only respond 
with “I don’t want to give credibility to reports [and] I strongly stand against the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. We must strengthen IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] 
safeguards to be sure that there is as much inspection as possible.”131 However, in the same 
press conference Bush gave a glimpse at how he understood the presidency. Asked which 
president he would consider a role model, Bush spoke at length about Dwight Eisenhower, 
explaining that “he was a man that, I’m old enough to remember, was our hero. He led the 
Allied Forces, and helped free the world from imperialism and Nazism. And he brought to the 
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presidency a certain stability.”132 It would remain to be seen if Bush could embody those 
same attributes he admired in Eisenhower. 
Although preoccupied with the concurrent revolutions that were unfolding throughout Eastern 
Europe, the U.S. relationship toward Iraq maintained a degree of scrutiny within the media. 
Patrick Tyler observed in the Washington Post that Saddam Hussein “appears to be 
pursuing a more pragmatic political agenda that emphasizes stronger alliances with 
moderate Arab states, fresh appeals for western technology and a less bellicose relationship 
with Israel.”133 According to Tyler, U.S. officials were encouraging this behaviour so as to 
establish economic ties with Iraq for diplomatic leverage over chemical weapons policy. Yet 
it was not the U.S. relationship with Iraq that remained the most contentious issue in the 
Middle East. It was, instead, the ongoing mediation between Israel and the Arab world that 
was of more concern to Bush. In an address given by Secretary of State James A. Baker III 
at the political conference of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee on May 22, that 
coincided with Israeli President Yitzhak Shamir announcement of a “four-point plan” for 
conditional peace talks with the Palestinians, Bush had an opportunity to unveil the direction 
his leadership in an area of foreign policy that was often leaderless. Secretary Baker 
explained that the administration’s Middle East policy balanced the U.S. commitment to the 
region. However, Secretary Baker’s even-handedness caused controversy because of how 
he addressed the concerns of both the Israeli and Palestinian parties, stating: 
For Israel, now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a 
Greater Israel. Israeli interests in the West Bank and Gaza, security and otherwise, can 
be accommodated in a settlement based on UN Resolution 242. Foreswear annexation; 
stop settlement activity; allow schools to reopen; reach out to the Palestinians as 
neighbors who deserve political rights…For Palestinians, now is the time to speak with 
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one voice for peace: Renounce the policy of phases in all languages, not just those 
addressed to the West; practice constructive diplomacy, not attempts' to distort 
international organizations, such as the World Health Organization; amend the 
[Palestine National] covenant; translate the dialogue of violence in the intifada into a 
dialogue of politics and diplomacy. Violence will not work. Reach out to Israelis and 
convince them of your peaceful intentions. You have the most to gain from doing so, and 
no one else can or will do it for you. Finally, understand that no one is going to deliver 
Israel for you.134 
Secretary Baker recalled that he was “determined that the speech be balanced, fully aware 
that balance in this context might be considered something less than a virtue.”135 The 
immediate reaction of the pro-Israel crowd was a cold, silent reception and the perception 
that Bush was distancing himself from Israel. Although Secretary Baker recalled that after 
the speech he received praise for the candid appraisal of policy, he was soon made out to 
be disparaging Israel in the media.  
The fact remained that the Middle East, besides its importance to U.S. foreign policy, was 
still relegated to a lower priority ahead of the changes that were sweeping Eastern Europe. 
In April, Bush gave an address in Hamtramck, Michigan, to acknowledge the political 
changes occurring in Poland. Bush explained that “under the auspices of the roundtable 
agreements, the free trade union Solidarnosc was today – this very day, under those 
agreements – Solidarnosc was today formally restored. And the agreements also provide 
that a free opposition press will be legalized, independent political and other free association 
will be permitted, and elections for a new Polish senate will be held.”136 The changes in 
Poland that had resulted in the rejection of the Soviet Union were also being replicated in 
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Hungary where new political leaders were hoping to permit political pluralism that had been 
unthinkable in the past. In Poland and Hungary, Bush witnessed the cracks in the Soviet 
Union as East Europe began to break away from centralised control emanating from 
Moscow. While Bush and his advisors were watching the Soviet Union carefully as revolution 
spread throughout Eastern Europe, reports emerged from China that student protestors 
calling for democracy were being repressed by the Chinese military in Tiananmen Square.  
Bush’s immediate response was the suspension of all government to government 
transactions of weapons and the refusal of meetings between Chinese and United States 
officials. But Bush, in the news conference detailing his administration’s response, placed 
the repression of democratic protestors in China into a broader context, explaining that “the 
democratization of Communist societies will not be a smooth one, and we must react to 
setbacks in a way which stimulates rather than stifles progress toward open and 
representative systems.”137 When pressed if the administration would adhere to 
Congressional calls for tougher sanctions on China, Bush insisted that “I’m the President; I 
set the foreign policy objectives and actions taken by the executive branch. I think they 
know, most of them in Congress, that I have not only a keen personal interest in China, but 
that I understand it reasonably well. I will just reiterate to the leaders this afternoon my 
conviction that this is not a time for anything other than a prudent, reasoned response. And it 
is a time to assert over and over again our commitment to democracy.”138 It was, therefore, 
without much surprise that Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Senator 
Claibourne Pell (D - RI) was mostly ignored when he renewed his calls for Bush to 
implement unilateral sanctions because of Iraq’s previous persecution of its Kurdish 
population. In response to Senator Pell, and emerging humanitarian reports from Iraq that 
demanded the imposition of unilateral sanctions, the White House offered a curt dismissal 
that stated “we understand that a country like Iraq that has fought an eight-year war with a 
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neighbouring country while also facing rebellion among its own citizens faces internal 
security concerns.”139 Bush was making it clear that he would not deviate from his pragmatic 
standing on foreign policy. 
It was not until a speech on September 25 before the United Nations General Assembly that 
Bush explored his foreign policy agenda that had been kept largely separated from his 
domestic policies. Bush began by acknowledging the march of democracy across Eastern 
Europe and the possibility of a community of nations that shared interests and ideals 
meeting at the United Nations in the near future. For Bush, the true test of the United 
Nations would be in three areas of significant importance, not just to the international 
community but to the U.S. First, Bush pledged a commitment to global commerce and open 
markets, and the promise of opportunity that the free market embodied. This would help the 
U.S. domestically as open markets gave more opportunities for the U.S. to emerge from its 
budget morass. Second, Bush pledged a commitment to the environment, explaining that the 
United States would lead the way through the eradication of chlorofluorocarbons by the year 
2000 and with amendments to the United States Clean Air Act. Last, it was on chemical 
weapons that Bush attempted to redress domestic criticism over his inaction toward Iraq, 
explaining that “I want to announce steps that the United States is ready to take, steps to rid 
the world of these truly terrible weapons, towards a treaty that will ban – eliminate – all 
chemical weapons from the Earth 10 years from the day it is signed.”140 Bush’s demands 
were conditional and, in order for the U.S. to take steps toward eradicating its own chemical 
weapons stockpiles, Bush demanded the Soviet Union follow suit. With the Soviets focused 
elsewhere in Europe, the likelihood of a coordinated response was low. Nonetheless, his 
refrain hinted at the importance of the United Nations to Bush. Nearing the end of his 
address, Bush asked the chamber “can we not bring a unity of purpose to the United 
Nations? Can we not make this new world of freedom the common destiny we seek? I 
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believe we can. I know we can.”141 Bush would not have to wait long to test the resolve of 
the United Nations in an international crisis. 
 
Iraq Becomes an Issue 
Although Bush had a low prioritisation of the Persian Gulf and refused to acknowledge 
reports that concerned Iraq, in particular, rumours regarding weapons of mass destruction 
programs, the Persian Gulf nation remained an obsession for the American media. As early 
as August, reports had emerged that the Iraqi government had been accused of receiving 
non-approved banking credit through the American branch of the Italian owned bank, Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL). The reports described a scheme where undisclosed loans were 
authorised through the Atlanta branch of BNL for use on American agricultural loans to Iraq 
without the pre-requisite authorisation from BNL’s central branch. Because the loans were 
covered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and because their clandestine nature made 
them at risk of default, the news of the scandal was not received well by the public.142 
William Safire, in the New York Times, took the opportunity to resume accusations that Bush 
was neglecting Iraq’s Kurdish population in favour of his pursuit for positive relations with 
Iraq, arguing that Bush was deliberately avoiding Iraq’s “continual rape of human rights” as 
the State Department “eager to woo Iraq turns a blind eye to the suffering of the people 
being told to assimilate or die.”143 Safire’s demand that Bush explicitly condemn Iraq and 
suspend diplomatic relations was supported by the editorial stance of the newspaper, which 
went on to explain that the BNL accusations illustrated Iraq’s financial instability. The editors 
stressed the problematic nature of possible clandestine financial operations and asked “was 
the US government’s guarantee to the exporters, supposedly to help our farmers sell their 
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grain and our manufacturers sell their farm equipment and fertilizer, really used for that high 
purpose? Or was a large part of the Lavoro $3 billion paid to exporters of machinery and 
materials and chemicals to help Iraq build poison gas facilities and long-range missiles?”144 
The administration was all too aware that the agricultural program was the only real 
economic connection to Iraq that could be utilised for diplomatic leverage and accusations of 
financial fraud could destabilise the tenuous relationship. However, the media had already 
begun to conflate Iraq’s previous chemical weapons abuse with potentialities, and the 
allegations of financial fraud only added to the narrative that was emerging of an 
unrestrained rogue power in the Persian Gulf. 
It was well understood within the media that the strategic importance of the Middle East lay 
in the oil exports that fuelled the global energy market, and that the consolidation of oil 
exports by a few Arab states, namely, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates, 
would lead to regional instability. In 1989, the Middle East held 70% of the international oil 
supply and the United States imported 30% of its oil from the region.145 In the developing 
world the dependency on oil imports was even more acute, and consistent development was 
intrinsically connected to stable oil supplies. As a result of the pressure on international oil 
supplies, Bush stressed the importance of domestic natural gas suppliers to guaranteeing 
U.S. energy security in the future. Addressing the members of the natural gas supply 
association in October, Bush explained that “with growing difficulties in oil and gas leasing 
and difficulties in siting nuclear plants, we’re going to depend more than ever, as I say, on 
balanced energy sources.” Natural gas, according to Bush, was an important element for 
developing domestic sources of energy.146 The focus on securing some sort of energy 
independence and stability was influenced in part by the political fluctuations in OPEC and 
the uncertainty over price changes and production limits to oil supplies. The politics of OPEC 
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was covered in the New York Times where Ibrahim Youssef wrote “For months now two 
maverick members, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, have been producing almost 
double their allotted quota of one million barrels each.”147 As a result of the overproduction of 
oil by a couple of OPEC members, the oil price became diluted and, for a state such as Iraq 
that was dependent on inflated oil prices for generating higher national income, the 
overproduction of oil was likened to cheating within OPEC. Saudi Arabia was also concerned 
about the dropping oil price because of the inevitable sharp deviations in pricing alongside 
production that would occur within uncontrolled oil refining limits. Although an OPEC majority 
attempted to convince Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to curb their output their efforts 
were rebuffed,148 and in the U.S. Bush was left searching for energy policies that might 
guarantee a level of energy independence that insulated the U.S. from politics in the Persian 
Gulf. 
On December 8, the news broke that Iraq had tested a long-range ballistic missile, beating 
the official statement from the White House. The swiftness of the reporting, together with the 
delayed reaction from the White House, was evidence that the media was far more 
interested in Iraq than Bush. An editorial in the Wall Street Journal had decried Bush’s 
dismissal of the Iraqi missile launch, arguing that “Last month the Bush administration barely 
raised an eyebrow when Congress gutted the 1990 budget for strategic defense. Maybe 
someone will pay attention now that a country that wages chemical warfare has just 
launched a three-staged, 48-ton rocket capable of lifting a satellite into orbit.”149 In regards to 
foreign policy Bush had far more pressing matters to attend elsewhere. In Germany, the 
Berlin Wall was crumbling, leading to talks about the reunification of East and West 
Germany, and, in Panama, Bush orchestrated a military intervention to capture and extradite 
the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega to face drug trafficking charges in the U.S. These 
events were added to a list that included the revolutionary fervour that had been building 
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across Eastern Europe throughout the year and the continuing issue of Chinese and U.S. 
relations in the wake of the Tiananmen Square protests. On January 25, 1990, Bush was 
asked why the administration had been so quiet regarding Middle Eastern policy. He warned 
the reporters not to assume “because I have addressed myself in the statements to the 
China question and the question of Panama or the question of our domestic agenda that we 
have lost interest in trying to be a catalyst in the Middle East.”150 Bush could only focus on so 
many problems at once, and in contrast to other foreign policy concerns the Middle East was 
a low priority.151 
In the State of the Union address on January 31, Bush carried the optimism that had 
emerged from 1989 and added it to the promise of a new decade. Bush explained that 
“Nineteen forty-five provided the common frame of reference, the compass points of the 
postwar era we’ve relied upon to understand ourselves. And that was our world, until now. 
The events of the year just ended, the Revolution of ’89, have been a chain reaction, 
changes so striking that it marks the beginning of a new era in the world’s affairs.”152 The 
promise of a new era framed Bush’s less than ambitious social agenda that had to confront 
the reality of a budget deficit and a Congress that was dominated by Democrats. Bush 
reiterated his pledge not to raise taxes and emphasised his commitment to social 
programmes focused on children’s education and helping those in need. Although Bush 
insisted that his proposals were feasible he maintained that the agenda would depend upon 
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bipartisan support, and appealed to Congress that “there is work to do, and they [the 
American people] sent us here to get it done. And once again, in the spirit of cooperation, I 
offer my hand to all of you. Let’s work together to do the will of the people: clean air, child 
care, the Educational Excellence Act, crime, and drugs. It’s time to act.”153 The most 
ambitious change to the U.S. international presence, and incidentally the largest opportunity 
to cut costs for the budget, lay in the reorientation of defense strategy that emphasised a de-
escalation in military force around the world, the so-called “peace dividend,” as a result of 
the end of the Cold War. Bush explained that “the time is right to move forward on a 
conventional arms control agreement to move us to more appropriate levels of military forces 
in Europe, a coherent defense program ensures the U.S. will continue to be a catalyst for 
peaceful change.”154 Later, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Planning Paul Wolfowitz 
explained that it was soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall that defense policy underwent 
revision. The work focused on five things, “(1) alternative futures of the Soviet Union and the 
former Soviet Bloc, Western Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere; (2) the 
impact of technology and other factors on future U.S. military capabilities; (3) alternative U.S. 
strategies in difference future environments; (4) strategies other countries might pursue, 
including responses to U.S. strategies; and, (5) significantly the budget and force structure 
implications of alternative strategies.”155 The effects of the end of the Cold War had been 
impressed into all levels of the administration.  
This process took six months before any preliminary conclusions were drawn, and two years 
before any planning would be made public, but there was the intention going into 1990 to 
shift defense policy from a global to regional focus. To those in Congress, the obvious 
savings in the defense budget were already apparent and the House Armed Services 
Committee, headed by Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), had already stated in early 
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January that “only massive repression in the Soviet Union and a complete change in its 
foreign and security policies could reverse the momentum in Congress toward cuts in the 
military budget.”156 At a question and answer session hosted by the Commonwealth Club on 
February 7, Bush continued to detail the changes to defense policy. Fleshing out an 
historical context for the shift in policy, Bush argued that the administration’s defense budget 
held “down spending for the fifth year in a row, down to just above 5 percent of gross 
national product. I’m submitting this budget at a time when the postwar world that we have 
known, the world that began in 1945, is changing before our very eyes.”157 Bush added that 
“in the future, we will need to be able to thwart aggression – repel a missile or protect a 
sealane or stop a drug lord. We will need forces adaptable to conditions everywhere. And we 
will need agility, readiness, sustainability. We will need speed and stealth. And we will need 
leadership.”158 As for the military industry that existed in the U.S. as a result of defense 
expenditure throughout the Cold War, Bush extolled “the Bible speaks of beating swords into 
plowshares. We’re transforming the military runways into municipal airports, and military 
bases in industrial parks and community colleges, and missile hangars into factories. I don’t 
know how the pruning hook business is going out there, but we may go back into that too, 
cast them into pruning hooks.”159 Although Iraq, and the Middle East, remained in the 
recesses of the administrations strategic focus, the emerging threat posed by Iraq to the 
Middle East’s security did not feature in the changing defense policy.  
                                                          
156
 Stephen Engelberg, “The U.S. and Panama: The Military; Pentagon looks for ways to stave off Budget Cuts,” 
New York Times, September January 9,1990. 
157
 George H. W. Bush, Remarks and a question and answer session at a luncheon hosted by the 









Iraq Becomes a Threat 
Although Bush was primarily concerned with exploiting the “peace dividend” for budget 
savings, and attempting to reorientate the U.S. into a geo-political position that reflected the 
absence of an opposing superpower, the Persian Gulf remained a fixation for the American 
media. In the Wall Street Journal commentators identified Iraq’s rising status as an important 
regional state, pointing out that Iraq was now “Pumping three million barrels a day of its 
claimed crude-oil capacity of 4.5 million,” meaning that Iraq was the second-largest oil 
producer in OPEC after Saudi Arabia.160 The U.S. had also increased the importation of oil 
from Iraq to 500,000 barrels a day, putting Iraq as the sixth-largest supplier of oil to the U.S. 
This coincided with the strategic importance of Iraq to the U.S. Although Saudi Arabia had 
the largest oil reserves in the world, Iraq was second, and because they shared a border it 
meant stability was vital in the Persian Gulf. The strategic importance of Iraq also meant a 
level of official scrutiny that led human rights group’s to question who Bush was interested in 
protecting – Iraqi trade or Iraqi civilians. The London based Organization of Human Rights 
published a report by Amnesty International in late January that referred to an Iraqi army 
crackdown that had resulted in ten thousand people dying, with tens of thousands 
homeless.161 In February, the New York based Middle East Watch added to the criticism by 
publishing a report critical of Bush’s lack of condemnation for the situation in Iraq.162 It would 
not be until March that criticism would hit a tipping point. Adding to the outrage from 
humanitarians was the execution of Iranian-born, freelance journalist Farzad Bazoft, who 
was traveling in Iraq with British papers and was accused of spying. William Safire erupted 
with indignation in the New York Times, and added to his previous arguments against Iraq 
by writing that Saddam “sent no demonstrators to the U.S. embassy [to protest Western 
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criticism of the death sentence] for good reason: the Bush Administration’s reaction was of 
such studied indifference as to border on condoning the assassination.”163 Safire charged 
that “Mr. Bush ignores state murder, allows the U.S. to become dependent on Arab oil while 
Saddam urges OPEC to raise prices, and keeps guaranteeing loans to the country that 
spends billions on mustard gas and missiles.”164 Despite questions about human rights 
abuses in the media, it was, instead, the arrest of Iraqis in London who were attempting to 
smuggle components thought to be for nuclear weapons into shipments bound for Iraq that 
prompted an official response from Bush. Although the situation was acknowledged, the 
official statement referred broadly to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and avoided any 
specific accusations as a result of the arrests.165 Despite the official statement, a State 
Department official dismissed the shipments by stating that “the first rule of diplomacy is to 
avoid needless friction and that Iraq is being treated no differently than any other country.”166 
By the end of March, Saddam Hussein would finally reach the limit of Bush’s patience after 
warning in a speech before his military leaders that were Israel to attack Iraq, “By God, we 
will make fire eat up half of Israel,” and declaring that Iraq had possession of binary chemical 
weapons.167 Secretary Baker, who had so far maintained an even approach toward Iraq as 
Bush pushed his domestic agenda, later admitted that Saddam’s speech meant the 
beginning of a strategic recalculation toward the Persian Gulf.168 
In the wake of Saddam Hussein’s speech Bush had an exchange with reporters on April 3. 
Even despite the clearly reported words of the speech, Bush avoided explicitly condemning 
the Iraqi leader’s stance. Addressing the reporters, Bush said of the speech that “this is no 
time to be talking about using chemical or biological weapons; this is no time to be 
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escalating tensions in the Middle East. And I found those statements to be bad, and I would 
strongly urge Iraq to reject the use of chemical weapons…I would suggest that those 
statements be withdrawn and that – forget about talk of using chemical and biological 
weapons.”169 When pressed for what the administration knew about Iraq’s weapons 
capabilities, Bush wavered. Asked if Saddam Hussein had responded to any real threats to 
Iraqi facilities, Bush retorted “Well, maybe…there’s a lot speculation that he’s talking about – 
but I’ve seen no evidence of this.”170 The exchange with reporters did little to quell domestic 
speculation that Iraq was a dangerous state in the Persian Gulf. Safire, taking his column in 
the New York Times up a notch, wrote that “the Bush Administration has refrained from 
economic action to restrain the world’s most dangerous man,” and that American companies 
such as Hewlett-Packard were morally corrupt for providing “$10 million in computer 
technology, all approved by our Government, [being used] to crunch the numbers of 
murder.”171 Adding to Safire’s moral outrage was a corresponding column by A.M. 
Rosenthal, who wrote that “Mass murderers like Hitler and Hussein have a deep urge to tell 
the world of their blood lusts. That is their weakness – but only if the rest of the world 
believes, and acts.”172 But, Bush’s failure to respond to Iraq was embroiled in a wider 
campaign to discredit him as a Republican. Jim Hoagland, in the Washington Post, argued 
that Bush’s inaction toward Iraq was because he was secretly a liberal, explaining: 
Liberals believe in the perfectibility of man, while conservatives believe that people have 
to be accepted for what they have made of themselves and dealt with accordingly. The 
Left says that with a little help the worst of us can be engineered into something much 
better. The Right responds that we are in the environment we are in because of 
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ourselves, not because of the environment. The Bush administration came to office 
convinced that Saddam was among nature’s engineerables.173 
Bush had done little to apprehend this perception of his political leanings with his domestic 
portrayal of Saddam Hussein. 
Hoagland’s criticism continued to echo even as Bush gave a shared press conference with 
the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher after a four hour meeting to discuss 
the political upheaval around the world. Asked if more should be done to prevent the 
shipment of questionable material to Iraq, Bush continued to avoid condemnation of Iraq. 
One of the recent intercepted shipments was a long, steel pipe, believed to be a gun barrel, 
which was being investigated by the United Kingdom, and Margaret Thatcher was adamant 
that there had been a “strong effort” in place to police the shipments going to Iraq. Bush 
refused to acknowledge that the piping was, in fact, for a gun, dismissing speculation that 
was rife in the media by stating that “I think it’s a pretty good rule: First, find the facts before 
you make any further comment. But the point is that, even though we don’t quite know, it 
was apprehended and not allowed to be loaded, pending decision.”174 Bush’s avoidance of 
Iraq was highlighted by the increased interest in Iraq shown by Congress. In April, a Senate 
delegation that comprised of Senators Robert Dole (R-KS), James McClure (R-ID), Howard 
Metzenbaum (D-OH), Frank Murkowski (R-AK), and Alan Simpson (R-WY) travelled to Iraq 
and returned heaping positive praise for Saddam Hussein, referring to the Iraqi President as 
“a leader with whom the United States could work.”175 This contrasted with the introduction of 
a bill into the Senate by Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY) that aimed to prohibit “U.S. 
assistance to Iraq unless the President certifies to the Congress that such country has 
opened suspected chemical weapon sites to international inspection and ratified the 
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Convention on Biological Weapons.”176 The bill was deferred to a Foreign Relations 
Committee hearing on May 1, where Secretary Baker argued against imposing unilateral 
sanctions on Iraq, explaining that “such legislation would have robbed us of any flexibility in 
dealing with Iraq and would also have impinged upon the President’s right to conduct foreign 
policy.”177 Despite Secretary Baker’s insistence that the administration would never allow 
unilateral sanctions to take place, Senator Claibourne Pell (D-RI) revived the Chemical and 
Biological Weapon Control Act of 1989 in an effort to force unilateral sanctions on Iraq, only 
to have the bill postponed indefinitely on May 17.178 According to Safire, the Senate trip was 
enough to establish that Bush was more interested in a business relationship with Iraq than 
the alleged chemical and biological weapons that Iraq might have procured, warning his 
audience not to “overlook the relentlessly pro-Iraq tilt of the Bush White House or Saddam 
Hussein’s new supporter, Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole of corn-producing Kansas.”179 
Trying as hard as he might, it appeared as though Bush could not avoid Saddam Hussein in 
his everyday dealings with the American media. 
Adding to the media’s continued fascination with Saddam Hussein, the Wall Street Journal, 
late in June, published the first interview with the Iraqi leader by a Western news source in 
six years. More important, Saddam reiterated a number of statements that Bush had avoided 
acknowledging. When pressed about his statements concerning Israel, Saddam explained 
that Iraq “shall respond to an Israeli attack whenever it comes and wherever…if Israel 
attacks one country and there is no response, then the second country to be attacked surely 
will be Iraq.”180 And when asked how he felt about some Western media sources calling him 
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the Butcher of Baghdad, Saddam replied “Weakness doesn’t assure achieving the objectives 
required by a leader.”181 According to Saddam, such insults only showed that the West 
feared Iraq would become a powerful beacon of independence and strength to the rest of 
the Arab world. After all, it was only “natural such people reject expansionism, reject 
hegemony and reject capitulation.”182 But, Saddam left the interview without a doubt as to 
where he saw Iraq’s position in the Middle East. When asked if he believed his chemical 
weapons were enough of a deterrent, he responded, yes, but continued “If the U.S. were to 
lend us nuclear weapons with the objective of balancing those Israel was given we shall not 
decline them.”183 Despite Secretary Baker later describing Iraqi behaviour early in 1990 as 
simply “mischief,”184 for Saddam Hussein it was imperative that Iraq received a steady 
income from oil production through the guaranteed prices and quotas set by OPEC. This 
meant that Iraq had a strategic investment in ensuring that OPEC remained favourable to 
Iraq, and this meant stressing Iraq’s strengths whenever possible. By July, Saddam’s 
‘mischief’ had transformed into outright aggression, and he publically demanded that the 
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait cease their oil overproduction. Although the administration 
understood the strategic implications of OPEC for Iraq, Bush remained silent as the media 
remained fixated on Iraq.  
By July 26, Saddam had 30,000 Iraqi troops stationed on the Kuwaiti border, with 
ammunition and supplies to last 30 days. When Bush was pressed for an explanation the 
official response was that in the event that Kuwait was attacked the U.S. would condemn 
“such a move and would work diplomatically to force Iraq’s withdrawal.”185 However, the 
administration did deploy additional naval vessels to the Persian Gulf under the guise of 
conducting joint naval exercises with the United Arab Emirates to show solidarity, providing 
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adequate cover for the arrival of KC-135’s, U.S. aerial refuelling aircraft.186 Reports in the 
media were mixed as some journalists warned that “Unless the Western and Arab nations 
react firmly and quickly [Saddam’s] bullying could ignite another war in the fragile Middle 
East.”187 Alternatively, in the Wall Street Journal, it was argued that the naval exercises did 
not send a clear enough message, and Bush was seen as “not simply having answered a 
friend’s call for help, but rather as having intervened militarily to encourage overproduction of 
oil to drive down prices for the U.S.’s own imports.”188 Some members of Congress, on the 
other hand, welcomed Saddam’s open aggression, and it was used as an opportunity to 
press for trade sanctions that had been continually opposed by the administration. Senator 
Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY), who had pressured Bush to respond to Iraq, was now particularly 
critical and called Saddam “a butcher, a killer, a bully – some day we’re going to have to 
stand up to him. Why not now?”189 Secretary Baker, later reflecting on the invasion, 
remained unconvinced that Bush could have deterred Saddam Hussein from annexing 
Kuwait earlier. Although there was a Congressional push to sanction Iraq, Secretary Baker 
argued that “shifting a policy away from cooperation toward confrontation is always a more 
difficult proposition – particularly when support for the existing policy is as firmly embedded 
among various constituencies and bureaucratic interests as was the policy toward Iraq…I 
continue to believe that if the President had said prior to August 1990 that we were willing to 
go to war to protect Kuwait, many members of Congress would have been muttering 
impeachment.”190 As Congress and Bush traded rhetorical barbs over the effectiveness of 
unilateral sanctions, Saddam increased the troops stationed at Kuwait’s border from 30,000 
to 100,000. Two days later, on August 2, Iraq invaded Kuwait. 
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Domestic Politics During an International Crisis 
As Iraqi troops crossed the Kuwaiti border, Bush was meant to unveil the new U.S. defense 
policy in Aspen, Colorado.191 Richard Haass, who was an adviser on the National Security 
Council, explained that “improvisation was the order of the day. There was no playbook and 
no contingency plan for dealing with this scenario or anything like it.”192 The first formal 
National Security Council meeting went the extra step to invite media representatives into 
the cabinet room so that Bush could recite an official statement regarding the Iraqi invasion. 
Bush reiterated what Ambassador Thomas Pickering had said at the United Nations Security 
Council meeting earlier that morning, stressing “we call for the immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal of all Iraqi forces. There is no place for this sort of naked aggression in today’s 
world, and I’ve taken a number of steps to indicate the deep concern that I feel over the 
events that have taken place.”193 Bush remained ambiguous when pressed if the U.S. would 
respond militarily to the invasion of Kuwait. Asked if intervention was an option, Bush replied 
“We’re not discussing intervention. I would not discuss any military options even if we’d 
agreed upon them.”194 Although the National Security Council meeting suggested the 
administration was taking the situation in the Persian Gulf seriously, all eyes turned to 
Bush’s address in Aspen. With the crisis in the Persian Gulf, any mention of defense policy 
was suddenly more relevant. Bush explained that “our task is to shape our defense 
capabilities to these changing strategic circumstances. In a world less driven by an 
immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war, in a world where the size of our 
forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime 
presence, we know that our forces can be small…I can tell you now, we calculate that by 
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1995 our security needs can be met by an active force 25 percent smaller than today’s.”195 
As an additional cause of the defense policy restructure were budget constraints impeding 
other domestic proposals, although Bush was quick to reassure his audience that the U.S. 
would spare no expense to ensure that the military was equipped with the best technology 
available. But, downsizing the military promised immediate benefits. Without much surprise, 
the press conference following the Aspen speech, which was also attended by Prime 
Minister Thatcher, focused on the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Thatcher took the lead and 
explained that the next step to confront Iraq was through the United Nations Security 
Council, depending on the collective will of the United Nations members. Bush, however, 
was pressed again over whether the U.S. would intervene militarily, and refused to entertain 
the question. In an attempt to elicit an answer, one reporter asked “isn’t Saddam Hussein at 
the root of this problem? Hasn’t he replaced Qadhifi [leader of Libya] as sort of the bad boy 
of the region? Would you like to see him removed? And what can you do about him?”196 
Bush maintained that he would like to see Iraq withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. When 
the reporter asked if Bush believed Saddam would remain a source of mischief in the region, 
he retorted “If he behaves this way, he’s going to be a constant source.”197 Saddam Hussein 
had cast a shadow over Bush’s promise of a new, peaceful tomorrow.198 
Richard Haass noted that among Bush’s advisers crafting a policy in response to the Persian 
Gulf crisis was tireless. Through a mixture of sleep deprivation and the weight of 
international affairs, Haass noted that “it is precisely during crises when those making policy 
are closest to their physical limits and in many ways not at their best.”199 On August 5, the 
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pressure was mounting on Bush as he curtly responded to a question as to how the U.S. 
hoped to prevent the imposition of a puppet government in Kuwait, with “Just wait. Watch 
and learn.”200 Bush refused to comment on the progress of Arab diplomacy, nor on whether 
the U.S. would assist its Arab allies in the region, but he did remark, off the cuff, that “this 
aggression will not stand.”201 The throwaway line was the first glimpse at how serious Bush 
was taking the Iraqi invasion. To Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, the statement 
was more than he expected from the president.202 How Bush planned to respond to Iraqi 
aggression became clear on August 8, when he announced to the nation the deployment of 
U.S. armed forces to Saudi Arabia in order to form a defensive shield on the border shared 
with Iraq. Bush reiterated that “a puppet regime imposed from the outside is unacceptable. 
The acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable. No one, friend or foe, should doubt our 
desire for peace; and no one should underestimate our determination to confront 
aggression.”203 Bush added that “the sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital 
interest to the United States,”204 and that “given the Iraqi government’s history of aggression 
against its own citizens as well as its neighbours, to assume Iraq will not attack again would 
be unwise and unrealistic.”205 In the press conference that followed, Bush stressed that the 
deployment was for defensive purposes, adding “I’m not preparing for a long ground war in 
the Persian Gulf. There’s not a war going on there right now…My military objective is to see 
Saudi Arabia defended. That’s the military objective. Our overall objective is to see Saddam 
Hussein get out and go back and to have the rightful regime of Kuwait back in place.”206 
Asked if the U.S. could contain Saddam Hussein in the long run, Bush responded that “I 
would think that if this international lesson is taught well that Saddam Hussein would behave 
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differently in the future. And that’s what has been so very important about this concerted 
United Nations effort.”207 Despite the pressing nature of the Persian Gulf crisis, one reporter 
returned Bush’s attention to the impending budget crisis and fears of a recession. Ensuring 
that the two crises remained apart, Bush carefully answered that “I don’t want to mix it [a 
response about the budget agreement] into this briefing that is largely dominated by the 
world concern about the Middle East.”208 Not everyone in the audience believed in Bush’s 
insistence to keep the two crises apart. 
In the absence of any official rationale for the U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
past and present policymakers rushed to fill the gaps. James Schlesinger, former Secretary 
of Defence, Secretary of Energy, and Director of the CIA under former President Jimmy 
Carter, argued that in the wake of the Iraqi invasion energy security was imperative, and that 
“With Saudi Arabia and the entire Arabian Peninsula at risk, there is at least the possibility of 
much of the Persian Gulf’s oil reserves being under the domination of a single, not entirely 
friendly, power.”209 According to Schlesinger, much of Bush’s success would depend on how 
well he could articulate an energy policy that reduced dependence on Persian Gulf oil and 
separated the United States economy from the political instability of the region. 
Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), on the other hand, was more aggressive than Schlesinger, 
and argued that “the bottom line boils down to ridding the world of Saddam Hussein or his 
army. We can tolerate Saddam Hussein without a million-man army; and we can tolerate 
Iraq’s army without Saddam Hussein.”210 It was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
who was most explicit in his appraisal of the Persian Gulf crisis. Kissinger explained that the 
Kuwait crisis was a watershed for Bush as “success will boost world morale and the world 
economy. It will strengthen the President’s domestic leadership. Failure will blight all future 
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domestic and international efforts.”211 The president had passed the point of no return when 
he deployed the U.S. military to Saudi Arabia, a decision that Kissinger supported, as no 
Arab state had the ability to counter a belligerent Saddam and his war hardened army. But, 
Kissinger warned Bush that “if sanctions prove too uncertain and diplomacy unavailing, the 
United States will need to consider a surgical and progressive destruction of Iraq’s military 
assets - especially since an outcome that leaves Hussein in place and his military machine 
unimpaired might turn out to be only an interlude between aggressions.”212 And there were 
some in Congress who took the opportunity to push the topic of Bush’s handling of the Iraqi 
invasion in the media. Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY), building on his campaign to 
unilaterally sanction Iraq for previous chemical weapons violations, argued in the New York 
Times that Bush had to elaborate plans to attack Iraq. Senator D’Amato stressed that Bush 
could not “settle for anything less than [Saddam’s] removal from power.”213 According to 
Senator D’Amato, Bush would be eliminating a potential nuclear threat by cutting Saddam 
from Iraqi leadership. Senator Terry Stanford (D-NC), a member of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, added that Bush risked repeating mistakes made in Vietnam if he 
chose to militarily intervene in the Persian Gulf. Senator Stanford explained that the most 
effective weapon the U.S. could utilise was “the embargo that will cut off Iraq’s revenue.”214 
Bush had options, but it was unclear where he was heading. 
Despite the overwhelming nature of the Iraqi invasion, Bush still had to confront a budget 
crisis that risked blowing out of proportion as his attention was elsewhere. Faced with a 
Democrat majority in Congress, Bush’s budget promises were at risk of being derailed. At a 
press conference on August 14, Bush lamented that one hundred days “after I called on 
Democrats and Republicans in the Congress to work with me toward a bipartisan solution, I 
note, frankly in sadness, that after 3 full months the Democrats have yet to offer one single 
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proposal at the budget summit. I’ve been reluctant to go public in this manner. We’ve dealt in 
good faith with the leaders. We have played by the rules. Now it is up to the Democrats who 
control Congress.”215 In response to questions about whether his negotiation strategy with 
Congress should change, Bush answered that “I’m still here in a nice, tranquil mood wanting 
to discuss it with them.”216 Bush had until September before any counterproposals would be 
forthcoming because Congress was in recess. However, the administration’s willingness to 
work with the Democrats in Congress upset a subsection of Republicans who, led by 
Representative Newt Gingrich (R-GA), leaked a budget package that ran counter to Bush, 
yet was in stark opposition to the Democrat’s proposals.217 Despite the political tussle that 
was developing over the Budget, Bush, according to the polls, had overwhelming support for 
his actions so far in the Persian Gulf, and the budget crisis was yet to damage his approval 
rating. From a survey conducted in the middle of August, the New York Times reported 74% 
of Americans approving Bush’s response to the Iraqi invasion. This added to a 60% overall 
approval rating as president.218  
Bush had found a balance in his approach to the Persian Gulf crisis by August 28. 
Addressing Members of Congress, Bush stated that “the basic elements of our strategy are 
now in place. And where do we want to go? Well, our intention, and indeed the intention of 
almost every country in the world, is to persuade Iraq to withdraw, that it cannot benefit from 
this illegal occupation, that it will pay a stiff price trying to hold on and an even stiffer price by 
widening the conflict.”219 In response, Congress was largely supportive of Bush’s stance. 
House majority leader Representative Richard Gephardt (D-MO) clarified that although some 
questions surrounded Bush’s response to the Persian Gulf crisis, “There is tremendous 
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support in Congress and among the American people.”220 In another address before 
Congress on September 11, Bush attempted to arrest that support and divert it towards a 
resolution to the domestic budget crisis, conflating the two issues despite his insistence 
throughout August that they remain apart. Reiterating, again, the objectives agreed at the 
United Nations Security Council, Bush added that “the crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as 
it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of 
these troubled times, our fifth objective – a new world order – can emerge: a new era – freer 
from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for 
peace.”221 Despite Bush’s confidence toward resolving the Persian Gulf crisis, he 
acknowledged that the budget crisis was a threat to domestic stability. Bush explained that 
“For America to lead, America must remain strong and vital. Our world leadership and 
domestic strength are mutual and reinforcing.”222 It was therefore imperative that Congress 
find a solution to the budget crisis so that the United States could resolve the Persian Gulf 
crisis. Bush added, “Most Americans are sick and tired of endless battles in the Congress 
and between the branches over budget matters. It is high time we pulled together and get 
the job done right.”223 And to see that a solution was found over the budget crisis, Bush set 
October 1 as the deadline for a suitable budget proposal. 
According to Richard Haass, Congress’ main concern about the Persian Gulf crisis was in 
regards to burden sharing. Haass recalled Representative Les Aspin (D-WI) wondering 
whether too much multilateral commitment would constrain the freedom of United States to 
act.224 However, Senator Claibourne Pell (D-RI), who had been a staunch and vocal 
opponent of the United States’ relationship with Iraq since 1988, criticised Bush for a lack of 
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consultation with Congress before committing U.S. armed forces to Saudi Arabia. Senator 
Pell warned Bush, as Congress had warned presidents in the past, that he did not have 
authority to engage in a war without invoking the War Powers Act. Senator Pell complained 
that “The Administration has not been tolerant of any meaningful congressional role in 
foreign affairs,” and that Bush and his advisors “seem oriented to nothing less than restoring 
the arrogance of power.”225 However, Senator Pell’s criticism appeared in the context of the 
Democrat’s political campaign for the mid-term Congressional elections in November that 
had been leaked from the Democratic National Convention. The plan insisted that Democrat 
candidates pursue the domestic initiative, arguing that although Bush had to “stop (Iraqi) 
aggression in the Persian Gulf,” he was yet to “start fighting a recession at home.”226 Despite 
the political grand-standing, the House of Representatives passed a bill that supported 
Bush’s actions in the Persian Gulf, even expressing approval for the deployment of troops to 
Saudi Arabia in August. The bill stopped short of granting Bush the authority to conclude the 
crisis by any means, adding that the U.S. remained committed to the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions and finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis.227 
Bush emerged from a summit with Congressional leaders on September 30, with a budget 
agreement that was hoped to break the economic deadlock in the U.S. Bush praised the 
bipartisanship that had consolidated as a result of the summit, and pledged that the entire 
budget package would be signed into law by October 13, hoping to put to rest the domestic 
crisis that threatened to fracture the precarious diplomatic structure that surrounded Iraq. 
Bush freely admitted that the agreement had required compromise and explained that “there 
will be some tough fights ahead but I have pledged…that I will do everything I can to lay 
aside partisanship here and to take the case for this deal to the American people in every 
way I can. Sometimes you don’t get it just the way you want, and this is such a time for 
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me.”228 Bush continued to call for a rally of support around the budget package in an address 
to the nation on October 2. Bush added that “our nation is standing together against Saddam 
Hussein’s aggression. But here at home there’s another threat, a cancer gnawing away at 
our nation’s health. That cancer is the budget deficit.”229 Bush appealed to Americans to 
show their representatives that they approved of the budget agreement, asking to “tell your 
Congressmen and Senators you support this deficit reduction agreement. If they are 
Republicans, urge them to stand with the President. Urge them to do what the bipartisan 
leadership has done: come together in the spirit of compromise to solve this national 
problem. If they’re Democrats, urge them to stand with their congressional leaders.”230 But, 
by October 6, there remained detractors in Congress who refused to support the agreement, 
and it was blocked in the House of Representatives. Clearly annoyed, Bush held a news 
conference where he announced his intention to veto the budget proposal in order to force 
negotiation on the agreement in Congress. When asked why Congress, including 
representatives from his own party, opposed the agreement despite Congressional leaders 
agreeing to compromise, Bush answered that “it’s easy when you don’t have to be 
responsible for something. It’s easy to just get up and say, hey, I’ve got an election in 3 
weeks, and I’m going to stand up against this particular package – Medicare, the taxes, the 
home heating oil, or the fact there’s not enough growth or not enough incentive. Any 
individual member can do that.”231 By now, the budget crisis had taken its toll on the polls, 
even threatening the handling of the Persian Gulf crisis. The New York Times reported that 9 
out of 10 Americans were not ready for the United States to start a war with Iraq in order to 
solve the Persian Gulf Crisis,232 and Bush’s approval rating dived from 76% in August to 
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55% in October.233 In the media it was argued that no matter how adept Bush appeared at 
handling foreign policy “the intellectual, political and ideological underpinnings of his 
domestic policy are fragile straws.”234 Domestic politics had finally breached Bush’s authority 
over foreign policy. 
Bush conceded defeat and compromised on a budget deal by October 27. The agreement 
was a blow to his domestic agenda as the budget did not contain vital savings, and 
introduced new taxes that Bush had promised to avoid. Bush later explained at a press 
conference that “All political points of view have sacrificed to bring this agreement about. 
And, needless to say, I don’t like raising taxes and never will, but there is a price to divided 
government, and that means that I have had to compromise on items that I feel strongly 
about in order to do what I think is best for the country.”235 Although Bush tried to emphasise 
the best elements of the agreement, and stressed that it contained compromises from all 
political parties, the media remained fixated on the broken promise of Bush’s election 
campaign, the negative effects of the capitulation on Bush’s credibility, and, more pressing, 
on the mid-term elections in early November. Bush refused to state that the budget deal was 
a good one, and tried to stress that he did not support the new taxes despite the 
compromises he had made. When asked what he thought of the Republican Congressional 
Campaign Committee recommendation that Republican candidates distance themselves 
from the administration, Bush could only reply “No, I want everybody right with me on 
everything I do.”236 With the conclusion of the Budget crisis, Bush had the opportunity to 
focus and reinforce the United States’ response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
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Taking the United States to War 
The likelihood of an armed intervention become more obvious throughout October as Iraq 
remained firmly embedded in Kuwait, with economic sanctions doing little to force Saddam 
Hussein to withdraw. At meetings with Congressional leaders during October, the position 
had emerged that Congress would oppose any move from sanctions to armed force. Richard 
Haass recalled that “this position was held by virtually everyone else, with only a clear 
minority prepared to support the use of force and then only if specifically authorized by the 
U.N. Security Council...[Bush] rejected having policy dictated by public opinion yet 
understood how important public and congressional support would be if he took the country 
to war.”237 Despite the latent congressional opposition, in an exchange with reporters in San 
Francisco on October 29, Bush made it clear when asked if he felt he needed Congress to 
approve any U.S. military action against Iraq that “History is replete with examples where the 
President has had to take action. And I’ve done this in the past and certainly – somebody 
mentioned provocation – would have no hesitancy at all.”238 Bush’s assertion that he would 
act as any president would was backed up by Secretary Baker, who, at a speech at the Los 
Angeles World Affairs Council on the same day, stressed “let no one doubt: We will not rule 
out the possible use of force if Iraq continues to occupy Kuwait.”239 With Bush and Secretary 
Baker stressing in two separate addresses their willingness to use force, Congressional 
members immediately took to the media to add their opposition to the administration’s 
stance. Senate Majority Leader Senator George Mitchell (D-ME) warned, “Only the 
Congress can declare war. The President has no legal authority to commit us to war.”240 
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Despite Senator Mitchell’s vocal opposition, Bush, on October 31, quietly approved the 
reinforcement of troops in Saudi Arabia to double what had already been deployed.241  
With the mid-term elections in full swing, Bush did his best to shift attention back to his 
handling of the Persian Gulf crisis on November 1, in order to buttress any domestic 
backlash for a diplomatic push in the United Nations Security Council that would authorise 
the use of force. At a press conference in Orlando, Florida, Bush stressed that “I believe it is 
essential that the American people fully understand the objectives of the United States and 
the United Nations as well as the magnitude of the outrage perpetrated by the Government 
of Iraq.”242 The timing of the news conference, however, led to accusations that Bush was 
politicising the Persian Gulf crisis in order to assist Republican candidates in the mid-term 
elections. In response, Bush asserted that “what I try to do is separate out the foreign affairs, 
the Iraq question, from domestic politics.”243 However, it was difficult to see past Bush’s 
efforts to introduce a militant posture toward Iraq. In one instance, a line of questioning 
brought up the comparison Bush had made between Saddam Hussein and Hitler, and in 
response Bush stretched the comparison further, stating “I see many similarities by the way 
the Iraqi forces behaved in Kuwait and the Death’s Head regiments behaved in Poland. Go 
back and take a look at your history, and you’ll see why I’m as concerned as I am.”244 On 
November 8, Bush made it clear that the U.S. was prepared to use force, reiterating the 
United Nations Security Council objectives and explaining “after consultation with king Fahd 
[of Saudi Arabia] and our other allies, I have today directed the Secretary of Defense to 
increase the size of U.S. forces committed to Desert Shield to ensure that the coalition has 
an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common 
goals.”245  When pressed if that meant that the U.S. was now at war with Iraq, Bush argued 
that the offensive posture was “just continuing to do what we feel is necessary to complete 
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our objectives…that have been clearly stated.”246 But, for all the justification that Bush could 
massage into a press conference to help explain the increase in troops, it was clear that the 
administration was losing the battle for domestic support. Richard Haass recalled that during 
meetings with the congressional leadership more than one member stressed that “we should 
not turn to using force unless we were provoked.”247 Haass explained that Bush faced a 
dilemma in his attempts to increase Congressional support, as “if we repeated what we’d 
been saying, people would get tired of hearing it and turn us off. If we added new arguments, 
the papers would be filled with articles that the administration had changed its policy.”248 This 
meant that Bush had to reinforce the objectives that had been established since August from 
the United Nations Security Council, conflated by his insistence that Iraqi aggression would 
not stand, and he could not afford to deviate. 
At the conclusion of the mid-term elections, the Republicans underwent a loss of seats in 
both houses, albeit less than was initially assumed, and Bush officially acknowledged the 
deployment of additional troops to Saudi Arabia that had been completed on November 8. 
Bush explained to Congressional leaders that “the deployment will ensure that the coalition 
has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common 
goals.”249 Despite having initially supported Bush’s decision-making throughout August in 
order for the U.S. to successfully implement international sanctions against Iraq, 
Congressional Democrats were now emboldened by the mid-term election results and were 
finding it difficult to now interject in the Persian Gulf crisis. This change in attitude was 
exemplified by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), head of the Armed Services Committee, who 
publically stated that Bush had “made a very good case for sending troops to defend Saudi 
Arabia and to enforce the United Nations economic embargo against Iraq.” But, Nunn 
insisted that Congress would not determine if Kuwait was worth going to war over. Senator 
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Nunn stressed that Bush had to make the case first.250 In an effort to influence the 
Administration, Senator Nunn used his position as head of the Armed Services Committee to 
push for a committee hearing to better determine Congress’ stance on the Persian Gulf 
crisis. The resulting testimonies were heavily stacked against the Administration, and were in 
favour of maintaining sanctions as opposed to armed intervention. Two former Joint Chiefs 
testified that the U.S. military could logistically wait for sanctions to work, even for another 
eighteen months if it was required.251 Kissinger was the only divergent voice at the hearing 
and was left to explain that “The Issue in Arabia is not American staying power but the host 
country’s domestic stability.”252 Although sanctions might be a sensible option on a timescale 
that assumed infinite time and patience, the reality was that Saudi Arabia would not tolerate 
the presence of foreign troops indefinitely and without the reversal of Iraqi aggression the 
entire effort would be in vain.  
In an effort to counter the rising criticism from Congress, Bush addressed an open letter to 
the American people on November 26, under the title “Why we are in the Gulf,” in which he 
restated why the U.S. had deployed 200,000 armed service members to Saudi Arabia. First, 
Bush explained that “the world must not reward aggression,” therefore the international 
community had to make a stand against Iraq in order to create an example for the post-Cold 
War world.253 Second, U.S. national security was at stake so long that Saddam Hussein 
threatened the world’s oil supplies.254 Again, Bush did not hesitate to elaborate on the threat 
posed by Saddam Hussein, restating the atrocities that Saddam Hussein had committed 
against his own people and Kuwaitis. Bush added, “The fact that Saddam is developing the 
most sophisticated weapons of mass destruction known to man – nuclear and biological 
weapons – is ominous indeed.”255 For these reasons it was imperative that the United States 
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remain strong when confronting this dangerous leader.256 The United Nations Security 
Council, on November 29, reinforced Bush’s intentions to use armed force against Iraq when 
it approved resolution 678, and the use of “all necessary means” to ensure Iraq withdrew 
from Kuwait. Central to the resolution was the inclusion of a deadline on January 15, 1991, 
for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. The pursuit of a United Nations Security 
Council resolution while Congress was still mired in committee’s searching for a position on 
the Persian Gulf enraged Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), who argued “the President feels the 
need to obtain U.N. approval for a U.S. offensive but won’t commit himself to seeking 
congressional approval.”257 But, Bush was not so easily drawn into arguments with 
congressional members over the minutiae of the administration approach to the Persian Gulf 
crisis. After all, he now had international support for military action.  
Having secured United Nations Security Council authorisation to use force, and having 
published an open letter reinforcing why the U.S. was in Saudi Arabia, Bush held a press 
conference to stress the importance of supporting the Administration’s approach to the 
Persian Gulf crisis. Bush explained that “We’re dealing with a dangerous dictator all too 
willing to use force who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones and who 
desires to control one of the world’s key resources – all at a time in history when the rules of 
the post-cold war world are being written.”258 For all Bush’s explanations and statements, the 
press was more interested in his unwillingness to recall Congress from its winter 
adjournment and make them debate the approval of the United Nations Security Council 
resolution. After being asked if he believed an American life was worth sacrificing for an end 
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to the Persian Gulf Crisis, one journalist launched a tirade at Bush, adding that they wanted 
to remind Bush that “when Foley speaks as Speaker of the House, he may be Speaker of 
the House, but he sure as hell doesn’t represent Florida and Texas.”259 Bush retorted that if 
Congress “want to come back here and endorse what the President of the United States has 
done and what the United Nations Security Council has done, come on, we’re ready. I’d like 
to see it happen. But what I don’t want to do is have it come back and end up where you 
have 435 voices in one House and 100 on the other saying what not to do and saying – kind 
of hand-wringing operation that would send bad signals.”260 The journalist, clearly annoyed 
by Bush’s response, added “Sir, you have a majority rule in this country, and you seem to be 
afraid of it…you and Jim Baker give the other countries a chance to talk, and you give the 
United Nations a chance to talk, but you won’t give the United States people a chance to 
debate with you.”261 The exchange in the press conference spilled over into the editorial 
pages that followed. The New York Times, unconvinced by Secretary Baker’s own rationale 
for the war, explained “Iraq has been deterred from moving against Saudi Arabia and suffers 
economic punishment rather than reward for grabbing Kuwaiti oil fields.”262 Whereas the Los 
Angeles Times added that Bush’s escalation of the troop deployment in Saudi Arabia had 
echoes of Lyndon Johnson’s decisions after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. However, the 
editorial added that Bush “is still groping for a rallying cry to get teenagers and their parents 
to believe it is worth risking their lives to free Kuwait, save gulf oil or topple Saddam.”263 
Within Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began to consolidate opposition 
and accused Bush of an “indecent rush toward war against Iraq,” asserting “that woefully 
inadequate thought had been given to the consequences of such a war.”264 According to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for the first time in recent history “an American 
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Administration has more comprehensive support abroad for a major foreign-policy position 
than it has at home.”265 Despite the initial backlash, Bush remained undeterred. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee continued to add pressure on the Administration 
by hearing a testimony from former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who 
criticized Bush’s decision-making process by observing that “I don’t have a sense that in this 
Administration the decision-making circle is very wide…I think it’s basically confined to four 
people, and I don’t have a sense that there are fundamental disagreements. There are 
strengths in that, but there’s also the danger that you begin to have a situation in which 
views are reinforced rather than examined.”266 The bi-polarity in the support and dissent 
Bush was receiving in the press continued when former Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
wrote in the New York Times that Saddam was not yet a Hitler, but was on his way to 
becoming one. Haig explained that although a peaceful resolution to the Persian Gulf Crisis 
was preferable, if force had to be used in Kuwait then it had to be used decisively and for a 
clear purpose.267 It was becoming obvious that the publicised exchange between the 
Administration, Congress, and outside experts was distorting the understanding of the 
Persian Gulf Crisis. In one particular instance, when Secretary Baker was attempting to 
explain foreign policy to reporters, it was noted that “however one weighs the televised give-
and-take over the Administration efforts to rally the nation for war, it confirms the difficulty of 
expounding policy calculations through the medium that immediately translates them into 
human costs.”268 The human costs of the occupation were compounded when, on December 
13, American hostages were released by Saddam Hussein. In a short exchange with 
reporters on the same day, Bush was asked if Iraq should be granted some leeway now that 
they had released the hostages, to which Bush responded “Hell, no! Not one thing! You don’t 
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reward a kidnapper.”269 Bush’s steadfastness was reflected in the polls, despite the 
Congressional hearings, that showed his approval rating rose to 61%, while 45% to 54%, 
depending on the poll and question, supported the use of force against Iraq.270  
Although Bush had come under immense domestic pressure toward the end of 1990, 
Richard Haass believed that “we had done all right overall. We had won the debate over the 
stakes and why this was a vital national interest. Where we were still falling short was on 
debate as to why we could not just wait longer for sanctions to work.”271 This was not for lack 
of trying. Throughout December, Bush had attempted to orchestrate a diplomatic meeting 
between the U.S. and Iraq for one last chance to resolve the crisis peacefully. After having 
every suggestion rejected, Bush, on January 3, offered one last chance for a meeting to take 
place between Secretary Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva. Bush was 
adamant that although there would be the opportunity for discussions “this offer is being 
made subject to the same conditions as my previous attempt: no negotiations, no 
compromises, no attempts at face-saving, and no rewards for aggression.”272 The Iraqis, 
understanding that they had pushed their luck as far as they could, took the offer and agreed 
to meet with Baker in Geneva on January 9. With the promise of one last diplomatic meeting 
to find a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf Crisis all that remained was consolidating 
domestic support and confronting opposition in Congress. The additional benefit of the 
meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Aziz was that Bush could honestly 
say he had gone the extra mile for peace. According to Richard Haass, receiving support 
from Congress “was desirable not just politically but also philosophically. Conservatives are 
meant to use traditional procedures and institutions not just when they prove to be 
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convenient.”273 But, the Administration was careful to ask for approval from Congress, not 
authorisation.  
On January 5, Bush addressed the nation in a final opportunity to prepare Americans for a 
possible war against Iraq. In the address, Bush stressed that the U.S. had gone the “extra 
mile” to secure a peaceful solution, but all efforts had been in vain. The economic sanctions, 
although they had contained Saddam Hussein, had not forced Iraq from its occupation of 
Kuwait, and Saddam Hussein would remain a threat unless he was confronted. Bush added 
“we have seen too often in this century how quickly any threat to one becomes a threat to all. 
At this critical moment in history, at a time the cold war is fading into the past, we cannot 
fail.”274 Bush did have one promise for the American people, adding, “there will be no more 
Vietnams.”275 Former President Richard M. Nixon, after the address, wrote in the New York 
Times that Bush was justified for intervening in Kuwait, but not because “Saddam is a cruel 
leader,” nor because it would become a “war for democracy.”276 Nixon explained that 
Saddam Hussein “has unlimited ambitions to dominate one of the most important strategic 
areas in the world,” and if Bush did not take a stand against Saddam now “we will have to 
stop him later, when the cost in young American lives will be infinitely greater.”277 Nixon 
supported Bush’s actions toward Iraq and dismissed those who were calling for more time 
for sanctions to work, arguing “the most critics can claim is that it is possible sanctions might 
work. It is certain military force will work.”278 Congress, dominated by Democrats, added 
Nixon’s support to Kissinger’s, and ignored both. 
On January 11, Congress opened debate over two resolutions in both the House and the 
Senate that would approve the use of force against Iraq in order to fulfil the conditions of the 
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United Nations Security Council resolutions. Although Bush understood the necessity of 
consolidating domestic support in order to present a credible use of force to end the 
international crisis, the debate was still emotional and was fought out over several days. 
Congress had divided itself over the decision to support Bush going to war not only along 
party lines, but by ideological and moral lines. In the Senate, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) 
argued that the rush to war was unnecessary and explained that “a superpower has claws 
and has teeth. A superpower, as against this Third World power, does not have to be 
impatient or impetuous. A superpower does not have to feel rushed. We can afford to be 
patient and let sanctions work.”279 According to Senator Byrd, the U.S. had witnessed the 
dismantlement of the Soviet Union through the application and dedication to sanctions and 
containment for forty years, and the Senator could not understand why, after only several 
months, sanctions against Iraq were already deemed a failure. Senator Claibourne Pell (D-
RI), who had long attempted to restrict U.S. relations with Iraq because of human rights 
violations, shirked at the opportunity to confront Saddam Hussein. Now that the United 
Nations Security Council had implemented the sanctions that he had been calling for in the 
Senate, Senator Pell argued: 
I believe sanctions will force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait or, in the 
alternative, would eventually force the Iraqi people to replace Saddam Hussein. I 
concede, however, that sanctions might not produce an Iraqi withdrawal. If force does 
become necessary, I want our servicemen and women to enter battle facing the best 
possible odds. That is not the case now. But over time, I believe, sanctions will improve 
the odds in favor of our Armed Forces as compared with the degrading Iraqis military 
machine.280  
                                                          
279
 Senator Robert Byrd, United States Policy to Reverse Iraq’s Occupation of Kuwait, Congressional Record, 
January 12, 1991, S359. 
280
 Senator Claibourne Pell, War in the Persian Gulf, Congressional Record, January 10, 1991, S125. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Three      Chapter Three 
95 
 
Senator Pell and Senator Byrd’s attitudes were opposed by Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-
N.Y), who had already publically stated his commitment to Bush’s stance on the Persian Gulf 
Crisis, and retorted:  
I do not know when the United States needs its credibility more than now. It is not too 
late for us to give to our President that authority. I believe when he has that authority, we 
have a much better opportunity for ending this deadly undertaking without the use of 
force. If we want peace, let us give our President the ability to sustain and to make it 
known that he has the ability to carry out those promises and those undertakings, that 
he has made those assurances that he has given our allies and those warnings that he 
has given to our enemy.281  
As opposed to Senator Byrd, who argued that the U.S. could wait, and Senator Pell, who 
believed the United Nations Security Council had found a solution to the crisis, Senator 
D’Amato argued that the U.S. did not have the luxury to wait, and had to present a credible 
intention to use force.  
In the House, the debate was just as fierce, and a second resolution appeared that 
demanded the president seek a Congressional declaration of war. However, the second 
resolution disappeared, despite the endorsement from house speaker Representative Tom 
Foley (D-WA).282 Despite the efforts of some Congressional members to impact Bush’s 
trajectory toward war, there were testaments of support, such as Representative Henry Hyde 
(R-IL), who explained that the first resolution, calling for Congress to support the president, 
would give Bush credibility, and that “This infusion of credibility is needed now, not 6 months 
from now. To abandon the U.N. resolution, to abandon the President now, erodes, 
undermines, subverts any credibility we might have. It is backing down, it is retreat. It is like 
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paying a blackmailer. When does it end? It never ends.”283 Representative Richard Schulze 
(R-PA) added in his own statement that “Twenty years from now, we may look back upon 
this crisis as the turning point toward world peace: where for the first time, the United 
Nations was truly united against aggression, murder and greed. We may remember this 
resolution as the day America proved its resolve to secure freedom for all the peoples of the 
world. The choice today is clear. We either vote to allow aggression and terrorism to go 
unchecked, or we vote for a new world order.”284 The results of the debates were not 
resounding, but they were affirming. The Senate passed the resolution 52-47, while the 
House voted 250-183. The vote was an indication of the schism that had developed between 
Bush and his domestic audience because of his response to the budget crisis and mid-term 
elections.  
Upon reflection, the trepidation with which Congress approached the vote to approve the use 
of force reinforced the pressure of domestic politics on foreign policy. Richard Haass 
explained that “those in the executive and legislative branches alike had their reasons for 
avoiding formal declarations of war: no president wanted to have his hands tied, and many in 
Congress did not want to give the president all the powers that accrue to him if war is 
formally declared. But neither did Congress want to give presidents a free hand.”285 In the 
media, Charles Krauthammer offered a popular reflection of the consternation in Congress 
when he explained that the ideal solution to the Persian Gulf Crisis was impossible – “Stay 
out of war – and achieve our vital objectives.”286 Even Bush admitted that “in truth, even had 
Congress not passed the resolution I would have acted and ordered our troops into 
combat.”287 However, the domestic origins of Bush’s decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 
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showed uncertainty in the conduct of foreign policy when it was played out in a domestic 
context. 
As has been illustrated, domestic politics were not among Bush’s strengths, and the early 
approaches of the administration to moderating Saddam Hussein’s questionable behaviour 
quickly yielded to the requirement for a firm response that Bush believed would emerge the 
strongest from diplomacy. The bitter and divisive debate over the direction and application of 
American foreign policy reached its crescendo only months into Persian Gulf crisis when it 
became clear Bush would not openly discuss the administration’s decisions regarding Iraq. 
As a result, although Bush was prepared to battle for domestic authority until the last 
possible moment, he delays a debate in Congress to show domestic unity until only days 
before the beginning of hostilities against Iraq. Bush’s domestic hesitancy emerged from his 
primary concern that Saddam Hussein’s capabilities matched his intentions, and that by 
prolonging a domestic campaign to convince Congress, U.S. national interest would be put 
unnecessarily at risk. Therefore, the domestic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 
1991 were protracted and divisive, resulting in a decision that cracked Bush’s domestic 
authority and threatened his domestic standing as president.  
 
 





The Diplomatic Origins of the Decision to Go to War with Iraq, 1989-1991 
 
“January 13th [1991]: It is my decision to send these kids into battle, my decision that may 
affect the lives of innocence. It is my decision to step back and let sanctions work. Or to 
move forward. And in my view, help establish the New World Order…This man is evil, and 
let him win and we rise again to fight tomorrow…”288 
 
Not since President Dwight Eisenhower had the American people been able to vote for a 
president with the foreign policy credentials as George H. W. Bush. This chapter will explore 
the diplomatic origins of Bush’s decision to go to war by considering the inherited 
relationship with Iraq that emerged from Reagan’s administration. Assigning a low priority to 
the Persian Gulf, and believing the relationship with Saddam Hussein to be stable enough to 
continue building trade opportunities, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie can be seen 
moderating the relationship from Baghdad. However, as the retreat of the Soviet Union 
creates a vortex of revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe, Saddam Hussein took the 
opportunity to test the limits of friendship with the U.S. and, in the act of consolidating 
regional power, annexed Kuwait. This aggression in a region dense with vital resources 
forced Bush to shift U.S. policy in the Middle East to a high priority, and the inherited 
relationship with Iraq was redefined by an approach that incorporated the international 
community, embracing a new internationalism that had emerged from the Cold War. With 
help from his advisers, Bush was able to corral and maintain an international consensus on 
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the Persian Gulf crisis for long enough to successfully implement international sanctions and 
deploy a defensive contingent of U.S. military forces to Saudi Arabia. Through the careful 
application of coercive diplomacy, both toward Iraq and toward other members of the United 
Nations for cooperation, Bush was granted United Nations authorisation for a military 
intervention in Kuwait to force out the entrenched Iraqi occupation. With the promise of 
forcing Iraq out of Kuwait by all means necessary, Bush approved one last diplomatic 
attempt to receive Iraqi capitulation. On January 15, Bush authorised the first airstrikes that 
began to force Iraq from Kuwait, the culmination of the diplomatic origins of the decision to 
go to war against Iraq in 1991.  
 
The Inherited Relationship with Iraq 
In the last few months of Reagan’s presidency, in 1988, there was a chance to revise the 
U.S. position toward to the Middle East to better prepare the incoming administration, 
something that Reagan declined to do. It took well into Bush’s first year as president to 
revise U.S. policy toward the Middle East, and for the incoming administration to build upon 
the inherited relationship the U.S. had with Iraq. However, Reagan’s reluctance to confront 
Iraq was not without its own controversy. Iraq and Iran had been at war since 1980 and, 
although Iraq had agreed to a ceasefire with Iran in 1988, Iraq had proceeded with the Anfal 
military campaign against its local Kurdish population in northern Iraq, where it was reported 
that chemical weapons had been used. These rumours were considered serious enough that 
the Department of State sent an urgent cable to Ambassador April Glaspie at the Baghdad 
embassy requesting clarification. The request noted that Iraq appeared undeterred by 
international opinion against chemical weapons, and wanted to reinforce that the U.S. 
understood “that the situation is complex, with deep historical roots, and that it involves an 
armed rebellion in which Kurds allied themselves with Iran against the Iraqi 
Government…The campaign the Iraqi army is conducting against the Kurdish insurgency, 
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including the reported use of chemical weapons, is of deep concern to us.”289 Ambassador 
Glaspie understood all too well that her role was to ensure Iraq maintained a suitable 
relationship with the U.S. because of its potential and strategic position in the Persian Gulf. 
However, this relationship depended on Iraq moderating its behaviour, so that it adhered to 
international norms of appropriateness. Ambassador Glaspie explained all this to Iraq’s 
Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Nazir Hamdun, and stressed that the U.S. desired to 
broaden and deepen its relationship with Iraq, but was held back by military expeditions such 
as the Anfal campaign. Under Secretary Hamdun, however, instead emphasised the 
importance of the Anfal campaign to Iraq, explaining that “there were areas of Kurdistan 
where the [Government of Iraq] had not extended its sovereignty,” and, therefore, the military 
campaign was an internal issue. One Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, had even “gone so far 
as to speak publically of disassociating the Kurds from the Iraqi state.”290 But, the question of 
whether Iraq had deliberately used chemical weapons remained absent from the 
conversation between Ambassador Glaspie and Under Secretary Hamdun. 
Congress, in an effort to assert itself on Persian Gulf policy, debated the Prevention of 
Genocide Act in September 1988 that demanded the administration cease its diplomatic 
relationship with Iraq and implement unilateral sanctions as a consequence of allegations of 
chemical weapons abuse. As the debate engulfed Congress, Ambassador Glaspie had to 
co-opt American broadcasts into her meetings around Baghdad. Ambassador Glaspie 
explained to Under Secretary Hamdun on September 10 that if the legislation were to 
successfully pass through Congress, the U.S. would require Saddam Hussein to certify that 
Iraq would not use chemical weapons, in order for the U.S. to continue a trade relationship. 
Although Hamdun avoided allegations that Iraq had used chemical weapons, he explained 
that he believed the Iraqi government “had said in the past it had not and would not use 
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[chemical weapons] in Kurdistan,” and it was entirely possible that “civilian Kurds could 
easily mistake smoke bombs and other weapons for [chemical weapons].”291 The muted 
response from Hamdun surprised Glaspie, who, in a brief cable to the State department, 
explained that “Hamdun stating that Iraq has not used and is not using lethal chemical 
weapons against the Kurds, and the remarkably moderate and mollifying mode of its 
presentation, leads us to conclude that Saddam Hussein has got the message and put a halt 
to the use of chemical weapons in Kurdistan.”292 However, Ambassador Glaspie stressed 
that any moderate Iraqi attitudes were fleeting, and “Saddam is quite capable of losing his 
cool and authorising the kind of statements which will assuage his prickly pride but not serve 
Iraq’s own interest (and ours).”293 It took only two days for Saddam to respond angrily, and 
publically, to the debate over the Prevention of Genocide Act that was played out in the U.S. 
Glaspie recorded that Saddam had given a fiery speech in which he explained the “uproar 
caused by the Americans” would not frighten him. Glaspie added, “[Saddam] warned that 
‘the Senate may imagine that Iraq lives on the United States,’ but he strongly implied, as the 
press has suddenly begun to do, that Iraq can do without the United States altogether.”294 
Saddam, comfortable with his position in the Persian Gulf, was unfurling his intentions for the 
region. 
It soon became clear to Ambassador Glaspie that there was a degree of truth in Saddam’s 
statements that Iraqi industry could function independently of U.S. assistance. In a meeting 
with representatives from the American engineering firm, Bechtel, Glaspie reported that 
Hussein Kamil, Saddam’s son-in-law and Minister of Industry, had told them that “a clear 
pattern of ‘Zionist undermining of Iraqi-U.S. relations’ is now apparent,” and “bemoaned the 
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fact that the U.S. would ‘mix politics with business’.”295 Glaspie explained that Kamil’s 
attitude was a good indication of Saddam’s because of their close relationship. Therefore, it 
could be tentatively concluded that Saddam was worried about any potential fallout that 
would affect U.S. and Iraqi business. The Bechtel representatives, however, were adamant 
that these political disagreements would not affect their business in Iraq. Although unilateral 
U.S. economic sanctions might inhibit American sources for their supplies, the Bechtel 
representatives explained that their multi-billion dollar construction projects in Iraq would 
continue, despite the sanctions, through international suppliers.296 The meeting with the 
Bechtel representatives only confirmed Glaspie’s previous thoughts that unilateral sanctions 
would be largely ineffective and only serve to damage U.S. interests.  
In a meeting with Muhammad Mahdi al-Salih, Iraq’s Minister for Trade, Ambassador Glaspie 
was inclined to search for any indication that the debate in the U.S. was having a deeper 
effect on the Iraqi government. Minister Salih, after blaming Israel for the debate in the 
Senate, stressed that there was a commitment from Iraq to the U.S. for an improved trading 
relationship, pointing to a three-year-old Iraqi government decision to improve U.S. relations 
as an example of Iraq’s sincerity. According to Salih, “the rising trade statistics show that 
[government of Iraq] ministries and organisations implemented the decision.”297 Glaspie later 
noted that she was surprised at the change in Iraqi behaviour over the Prevention of 
Genocide Act. Glaspie described that when stripped of the threats, rhetoric, and public 
diatribes, the meeting with Minister Salih had occurred non-confrontationally and non-
publically, a significant change from past Iraqi diplomatic behaviour.298 Approaching Under 
Secretary Hamdun later in September, Glaspie was assured that despite whatever shift she 
had detected in Iraqi diplomatic behaviour there would be no more discussion over the issue 
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of chemical weapons beyond the private assurances that Hamdun had already given. 
Instead, Hamdun criticised the U.S. for the mixed message conveyed by its public and 
diplomatic conduct, complaining that “[United States Government] demarches to the 
[Government of Iraq] focus on assurances, yet the [United States Government] is clearly 
centering its public diplomacy on ‘punishment of Iraq’ for alleged past use.”299 However, 
Hamdun’s criticism fell away, and Ambassador Glaspie moved on to different matters, as 
Reagan threatened to veto the Prevention from Genocide Act, citing the ineffective nature of 
unilateral sanctions for confronting international issues, and putting an end to the public 
debate. 
Iraq wasted no time moving on from the agitation stirred by Prevention of Genocide Act and 
hurried to conclude hostilities with Iran in order to divert precious resources towards 
reconstructing Iraq’s industrial capacity. Ambassador Glaspie had the opportunity to witness 
this commitment first hand when she attended a presentation of the current and future 
potential of Iraqi industry aimed at diplomatic representatives in October. Glaspie noted that 
although the majority of goods were mostly assembled from imported materials, the viewing 
was impressive, and there were indications “that Iraq may be establishing a solid industrial 
base for post-war military and civilian production.”300 Iraq continued to display its investment 
potential the following month at the Baghdad international trade fair, where “Minister of 
Trade Salih, responsible for both the fair and the Agricultural negotiations, initiated a 
sustained positive series of public messages of Iraq’s satisfaction with the course of our 
bilateral relationship.”301 With the debate in Congress swept aside, Minister Salih was 
hopeful for “the establishment of broad commercial relations” through “burgeoning Iraqi 
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construction contracts.”302 Glaspie noticed the convenient timing of Iraq’s overtures for U.S. 
investment, explaining that “There is a genuine desire for a closer working relationship with 
the [United States Government], not least to remind the Soviets that the Iraqis have other 
political options.” It was obvious that Iraq was strategically positioned in the Persian Gulf 
and, although Iraq was attempting to twist relations in their favour, any U.S. engagement 
with Iraq meant that Glaspie was in a better position to moderate Iraqi behaviour towards 
chemical weapons long term.303 A first step of this new, moderated relationship was Iraq’s 
attendance at a conference in Paris in December condemning the use of Chemical 
weapons. 
Bush’s inauguration as president in January 1989, only increased Iraqi efforts to promote the 
relationship between the U.S. and Iraq, showing its potential industrial capacity in order to 
secure greater income to pay off its considerable international debt racked up over eight 
years of escalating war production. It was apparent to Ambassador Glaspie, however, that 
no matter how much investment Iraq gained, much of its economic recovery was based on 
the predictions of stabilised oil prices.304 That did not deter U.S. businesses from looking for 
opportunities in Iraq. Two prominent U.S. firms, Lummus and Kellogg, had both lodged 
significant bids in large Iraqi petrochemical contracts,305 and Saddam Hussein had 
personally encouraged more U.S. investment in an address at the U.S.-Iraq Business forum 
in June. Glaspie noted that the chairman of the First City Bank of Texas, A. Robert Abboud, 
pointed out that the U.S. business delegation “represented U.S. banking, oil, construction, 
and food production sectors, and their total worth would make them the third largest 
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economy in the free world.”306 Basking in the reflection of gathered wealth, Saddam assured 
the business representatives that he was personally committed to improving the relationship 
with the U.S., and “that no matter what may occur (a reference to the sanctions issue) we 
[have] personally made a decision to ‘cooperate with you’, and this decision ‘will not be 
shaken’.”307 Glaspie, remaining sceptical of Saddam’s positive gestures, noted that the 
Soviet Union had also recently decided to sell arms to Iran and that “pleased as we are, and 
pleased as many private and public Iraqis were (Tariq Aziz being among the most pleased) 
at the success of the visit, we believe an important factor in Saddam’s decision to roll out the 
Ba’athi red carpet for American bankers and capitalists was the [Government of Iraq’s] 
mounting anger at Soviet arms sales to Iran.”308 Glaspie also noted that although Saddam’s 
decision-making was heavily weighted in his favour, there were no doubts that Iraq had a 
fertile industrial base that was alluring to U.S. investors. According to representatives from 
Volvo and General Motors, who were competing for a contract to manufacture heavy-duty 
vehicles in Iraq, they were astounded to find an industrial capacity far more advanced than 
their estimates. Both companies had been granted access to a number of factories in 
Southern Iraq and had been impressed “not just [with] the acquisition of sophisticated 
technology, but [also] the ability to absorb it.”309 Despite how obvious it was that Saddam 
was attempting to consolidate Iraq as a regional power, and that the U.S. would fund such 
an endeavour, it was equally obvious that there was the potential for a lucrative relationship 
with a stable Iraq.  
Reflecting on the U.S. relationship with Iraq in 1989, Secretary of State James A. Baker III 
admitted that Iraq was not an urgent priority, as the new administration was grappling with 
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revolution occurring in Eastern Europe.310 This meant that Ambassador Glaspie was left to 
ponder, in August, the current political status of Iraq and what could be expected in the 
immediate future. Concerned about Iraq’s ability to repay its international debts, Glaspie 
reported that Deputy Prime Minister and economic/financial supervisor, Sadoun Hammadi, 
had explained to her that “Iraq should have substantially paid its debts and be ready to 
return to cash on the barrel head ‘in five or six years, we hope’.”311 Glaspie was assured that 
the U.S. would retain its preferential payment status, and that would mean Iraq would never 
renege on its debt repayments to the U.S. This same assurance, however, was not given to 
other foreign investors, leaving open the possibility that should Iraq feel the U.S. was 
inhibiting a healthy trade relationship the repayments might be rescheduled. In a moment of 
hopeful prescience, Glaspie stressed to the State department the importance of maintaining 
a beneficial economic relationship with Iraq as it provided the necessary diplomatic leverage 
to moderate Iraqi behaviour should Saddam attempt to cause trouble in the Persian Gulf. 
According to Glaspie, the economic relationship was in the U.S. favour, as “Reneging on 
existing debt to the [United States Government] would run counter to the major effort, 
publically sponsored by Saddam himself, to establish an ongoing working relationship with 
the new American administration.”312 The unpredictable, and ongoing, concern for Glaspie 
was the unstable price of oil that dictated how quickly Iraq could repay its debts and rebuild 
its industrial capacity. This meant that Iraq’s economy was intrinsically connected to price 
fluctuations in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) pricing index, set 
by the oil-producing Persian Gulf nations. Glaspie had already seen the potential signs of a 
confrontation in the region as Iraq’s Minister for Finance had “strongly hinted to the 
ambassador…that debts to Arabs will not be paid.”313 In the opinion of Saddam Hussein Iraq 
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had held off a Persian expansion into the Persian Gulf by waging war against Iran for eight 
years. Therefore, any debt that was owed to Arab states, particularly Kuwait, was regarded 
by Iraq as protection money. Despite what had been promised from a continuing relationship 
between the U.S. and Iraq, Saddam would soon test the limits of U.S. diplomacy. 
 
Saddam Tests His Friendship 
National Security Directive 26, published on October 2, 1989, added little to the relationship 
between the U.S. and Iraq that Bush had inherited from Reagan. The directive reaffirmed the 
U.S. commitment to “defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate 
through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power 
with interests inimical to our own.”314 The directive added that the Secretary of Defence 
would have approval to reduce military deployments if required, and that the U.S. would sell 
military equipment to allies in the region so long as those sales did not present a threat to 
Israel. On Iraq, the directive specified that “the United States Government should propose 
economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behaviour and to increase our 
influence with Iraq,” stressing that Iraq was on notice for its alleged use of chemical and 
biological weapons. This did not, however, inhibit suggestions that the United States should 
sell Iraq non-lethal forms of military assistance.315 According to National Security Council 
Adviser Richard Haass, the document was “a classic case of constructive engagement, a 
policy of trying to build bridges with a country that was an adversary or at least a problem in 
the hope of moderating its behaviour. But it was also an example of conditional engagement, 
since it emphasized that normalization would not go ahead if Iraq acted in ways contrary to 
U.S. interests.”316 Secretary Baker added, “It was well worth exploring the possibility that 
better relations might stem nuclear proliferation, bring economic benefits, and enhance 
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prospects for Arab-Israeli peace.”317 More broadly, the status quo in the Middle East 
remained. 
It was a surprise when, coinciding with the newly revised position of the United States in the 
Persian Gulf, allegations surfaced suggesting that the Banca Nacionale Del Lavro (BNL), a 
state-owned Italian bank, had extended a line of non-approved loans to Iraq through an 
American branch of the bank. The allegations were enough to influence debate in Congress 
over the extension of agricultural loans to Iraq through the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) that guaranteed the export of American agricultural 
equipment to Iraq. With the economic relationship between Iraq and the U.S. threatened by 
allegations of financial fraud, Secretary Baker was quick to assure his counterpart in Iraq, 
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, that there was no deliberate effort by the U.S. to destabilize Iraq, 
and the impending investigation would not threaten established CCC credit guarantees. In 
response, Aziz quickly refuted any complicity in the scandal.318 Ambassador Glaspie noted 
that the BNL allegations had sent shockwaves through the Iraqi trade community and 
reported that Minister Salih, at a diplomatic convention in October, had stressed that “Iraq is 
not in any way culpable in the [BNL] scandal.” Salih warned that stalled CCC negotiations 
risked creating the impression that “the [United States Government] has decided or suspects 
that Iraq is in some way involved. Such a perception will be damaging for Iraq.”319 Glaspie 
did her best to salve the wounds that were opened as a result of the BNL scandal, and 
assured Salih that “there is no intention on the [United States Government] side to infer Iraqi 
involvement in the BNL issue.”320 Despite the BNL allegations, Secretary Baker advised the 
Department of Agriculture to approve the full CCC credit program, adhering to the conditions 
of the economic relationship between the U.S. and Iraq stressed in National Security 
Directive 26. On November 29, any sign that the BNL scandal had affected U.S.-Iraq 
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relations was almost non-existent as the Joint Chiefs circulated a proposal extending non-
lethal military assistance to Iraq. Adding to National Security Directive 26, the Joint Chiefs 
believed that through training schemes and exchange programs, the “implementation of low-
level, non-lethal military assistance would greatly facilitate developing an improved dialogue 
with and access to the senior military leadership and the government of Iraq.”321 However, 
Congress was proving to be an inconvenience in the diplomatic exchange between Iraq and 
the U.S., moving to suspend the remaining CCC loans to Iraq pending a final review of the 
BNL investigation. Glaspie was immediately bombarded with arguments that the suspension 
of the loans would destabilise Iraq, and that “forces within the [Government of Iraq] who seek 
to undermine improving U.S. – Iraq relations may use this offending legislation as leverage 
with President Saddam.”322 The State Department was already aware that the suspension of 
loans was problematic, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Edward Gnehm, admitted 
to Glaspie that the U.S. had unwittingly diminished Iraq’s international economic credibility. 
Glaspie was told that Secretary Baker had already agreed with Aziz in October that “our 
agricultural policy must not be hostage to other problems; since there is no evidence that the 
[Government of Iraq] was involved in wrongdoing on BNL, a full program of CCC in the 
billion dollar range should be offered to Iraq.”323 It was imperative that the U.S. resumed its 
only meaningful economic connection to Iraq in order to maintain some semblance of 
influence. On January 17, 1990, Bush, in an effort to correct the imbalance in the economic 
relationship with Iraq, ignored Congressional opposition to sign almost $200 million of 
Export-Import Bank credit for agricultural loans to Iraq, marking the administration’s 
commitment to its relationship with Iraq. 
The Iraqi response to the Export-Import Bank loans, despite the intended purpose of 
reassuring Iraqi industry, was not positive. Iraq’s central bank director, talking with 
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Ambassador Glaspie, argued that the loans had been significantly lowered, and that “We 
should be talking billions, not millions and it [the credit] should be medium term.”324 The 
director could not believe that the administration would bend before Congressional 
opposition and blamed Israeli pressure for blocking loans to Iraq, explaining to the 
ambassador that “I was there and I could feel it.”325 According to Glaspie, the meeting was a 
good example of Iraqi grievances in the wake of the BNL scandal and she wrote that “the 
current official carrot-and-stick line…you want to be friends; you want to be partners, 
medium-term exim loans would generate a high volume of trade and goodwill.”326 Despite 
the importance of a stable economic relationship with Iraq, Congressional negotiations over 
the loans crawled through March because of the lingering doubts over the Iraqi 
government’s complicity in the BNL scandal.327 The negotiations faced another setback 
when, at the end of March, Iraqi exporters were uncovered attempting to smuggle items into 
Iraq that were on an export control list. The electronic triggers that had been seized were 
believed to have a dual-use in nuclear weaponry. When Glaspie met with Under Secretary 
Hamdun to explain the U.S. concerns, she was met with immediate renunciations of Iraqi 
complicity. Hamdun explained that “a group of people, not Iraqi citizens, were running an 
unwise or illegal operation in the hope of pleasing someone in Iraq; although the 
[Government of Iraq] knew nothing, it smelled something was wrong and suspected 
entrapment.”328 Iraqi excuses were becoming familiar to Glaspie. 
Under Secretary Hamdun further argued that the banned items were inconsequential, and 
that those who were arrested were not technically Iraqi, reassuring Ambassador Glaspie that 
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there were intercepted telexes that proved Iraqi innocence and showed that Iraq had been 
framed. However, on April 2, Saddam Hussein gave an address to the General Command of 
his armed forces that scuttled Hamdun’s efforts at mediation with the U.S. Saddam 
confirmed that he had chemical weapons and vowed that if Iraq were attacked by Israel, 
then “By God, we will make fire eat up half of Israel.” According to Secretary Baker, it was at 
this point that the strategic calculation involving Iraq was irrevocably changed.329 Worrying 
that the U.S. was on a collision course with Iraq, a Senate delegation that was in Iraq to 
meet with Saddam was used as an intermediary and barometer for the viability of any 
continuing relationship. Despite being briefed on Iraq’s recent behaviour by the State 
Department, the meeting was deemed a success. The Senators all returned to the U.S., 
announcing “that Saddam was a leader with whom the United States could work with.”330 
Secretary Baker, however, remained concerned of the accumulating Iraqi transgressions, 
and after recounting every issue that had developed since the U.S. and Iraq first expressed 
their desire for a mutually beneficial relationship in late 1989, to Glaspie, pointed out that 
“Iraq is now a major regional power and should act in the responsible way such a role 
requires.”331 It was becoming clear that the Administration was losing influence in Iraq. 
Making matters worse in April was the interception of engineered pipes by British authorities 
that were assumed to be part of the construction of a large gun barrel. In response, the 
state-owned Iraqi media immediately claimed, “the latest British charges are part of the 
British-American-Zionist campaign against Iraq and reflect a fear in the west of technological 
development in Arab countries.”332 However, the public broadcast was seen by Ambassador 
Glaspie to be an appeal to Arab support as it referred to “Iraq as the surrogate for the Arab 
nation and as the innocent and wronged object of a western-Zionist conspiracy to withhold 
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high technology (read progress), it has given voice to a deep Arab resentment.”333 Glaspie, 
in a cable briefing Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs John Kelly before he testified before a Congressional sub-committee that was 
exploring the U.S. relationship with Iraq, stressed that “Iraq is too big and too dangerous to 
ignore.”334 Jaw, jaw, went on Glaspie, is better than war, war. However, Glaspie admitted 
that Iraqi negotiations had been affected by the hardening relationship between Washington 
and Baghdad. Glaspie explained that Iraq was taking each negotiation to the edge, and that 
they would “make no concessions unless it is apparent that there is an imminent breakdown 
in the negotiations.”335 On May 1, in his testimony before a Senate Foreign Relations 
subcommittee, Secretary Baker added his own opposition to unilateral sanctions suggested 
by various Congressional representatives because of the detrimental effects they would 
have on diplomatic conduct. However, Secretary Baker’s efforts would lead to nought, and 
by May 29, after updates on the CCC and BNL investigations, there was unanimous 
agreement among the deputies committee to suspend all economic credit programs with 
Iraq.336 
Responding to the suspension of loans, Iraq removed the U.S. from preferential payment 
status for debt repayments, and Saddam Hussein personally denounced the U.S. decision, 
declaring that all U.S. agricultural imports would be suspended immediately.337 Ambassador 
Glaspie attempted to salvage what little remained of the economic relationship between the 
U.S. and Iraq by reassuring Minister Salih that the decision to defer credit loans not did stem 
from a general U.S.-Iraq dispute.338 It was because of legal, not political, concerns that the 
programs had to be suspended. Salih, in response, explained that even a deferment had to 
                                                          
333
 Cable from Baghdad Embassy to State Department, “Iraq’s ‘Super Gun’ Response: Denial and Counter 
Accusations,” April 23, 1990, paragraph 7. 
334
 Cable from Baghdad Embassy to State Department, “Hamilton Subcommittee,” April 25, 1990, paragraph 3. 
335
  Ibid. paragraph 2. 
336
 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 271. 
337
 Cable from Baghdad Embassy to State Department, “Public Iraqi Gesture toward the USG,” July 3, 1990. 
338
 Cable from Baghdad Embassy to State Department, “Iraq Minister of Trade/Finance Discusses USDA GSM 
Credit Guarantee Program,” July 9, 1990, paragraph 13. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Four      Chapter Four 
113 
 
be understood as a decision regarding the extension of loans, and that meant Iraq would 
have no choice but to renegotiate debt repayments. In the wake of Saddam’s threat to 
suspend U.S. agricultural imports, international exporters rushed to fill the gaps and, on July 
12, Glaspie reported that Australia and Canada had increased wheat exports as a result of 
the U.S. absence, while rice imports were sourced from Thailand and Vietnam, eliminating 
the largest U.S. export market for rice.339 However, Iraq’s financial situation hit a crisis point 
on July 25 at an OPEC meeting to set oil prices among the Persian Gulf States. The focus of 
the meeting was an argument between Iraq and Kuwait regarding the overproduction of oil 
and claims to oil wells along their shared, disputed border. It was apparent that Iraq had 
committed to securing concessions from Kuwait by demanding a pledge not to overproduce 
oil and a cash advance.340 A public information campaign was also conducted by Iraq to 
coincide with the meeting that appealed to Arab support by attempting to link Kuwait to an 
imperialist plot conducted by the U.S.341 Amidst the noise created by Iraq in the lead-up to 
the meeting, embassy observers reported a troop deployment along the Kuwaiti border that 
was initially ignored, believed to be limited in scope, and “for the political purpose of keeping 
the heat on Kuwait and…the pressure on Arab mediators in the run up to the July 25 OPEC 
meeting.”342 Kuwait did not help diplomatically when, on July 22, reports suggested that 
there had been negotiations between Kuwait and Iran to open a direct sea-lane while 
ignoring Iraqi attempts at opening an air corridor with Basra.343 Kuwait understood all too 
well that it was dangerous to overtly cooperate with Iran, and Glaspie noted that 
“neighboring posts, including Riyadh and Amman, are emphasising the general Arab support 
for Saddam’s goals, but not, of course, for his methods.”344 On the eve of the OPEC talks the 
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Iraqi public information campaign became more audacious, casting the Kuwaiti foreign 
minister as an American agent. The silence that descended over the Arab diplomatic 
community gave no indication of any further efforts to mediate Iraq.345  
Saddam Hussein took a break from negotiations with OPEC in July and invited Ambassador 
Glaspie to a meeting to discuss the Iraqi relationship with the U.S. Saddam told Glaspie, in a 
one-on-one meeting, that Iraq wanted friendship with the U.S. However, Saddam claimed 
that there were some within the U.S. government that were set on disrupting Iraqi 
reconstruction, and Iraq needed a Marshall plan to aid its recovery rather than a vendetta 
against himself and his country.346 Saddam Hussein stressed to Glaspie that the economic 
situation in Iraq was exacerbated by other Persian Gulf states who had been flouting oil 
prices at the expense of Iraq’s national income. According to Saddam, “Those who force oil 
prices down are engaging in economic warfare and Iraq cannot accept such a trespass on 
its dignity and prosperity.”347 Saddam then complained that the U.S. had implicitly aided 
those states in their unfair oil pricing tactics by agreeing to perform naval manoeuvres in the 
Persian Gulf with the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. Saddam left no doubt that he would 
act to protect Iraq’s integrity and security should they be threatened, warning Glaspie “that 
the [United States Government] not force Iraq to the point of humiliation at which logic must 
be disregarded.”348 Despite these grievances, Saddam conceded that although Bush had 
been a friend, he was worried by the serious effects the over production of oil was having on 
the Iraqi economy. In response, Glaspie explained that her role was to strengthen and 
deepen the U.S. relationship with Iraq. She stressed “President Bush, too, wants 
friendship,”349 and this was evident in Bush’s continued opposition to Congressional 
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demands for unilateral sanctions on Iraq. Glaspie explained that there had to be a peaceful 
solution to the disagreement between the Persian Gulf states regarding oil prices for the 
sake of regional security, something that was a vital interest to the U.S. However, Iraqi 
troops at Kuwait’s border and public broadcasts accusing the Kuwait government of 
aggression compelled Glaspie to ask “is it not reasonable for us to ask in the spirit of 
friendship, not confrontation, the simple question: What are your intentions?”350 Saddam 
responded that everything had already been tried in order to settle the price of oil, but 
because Kuwait was non-cooperative and the United Arab Emirates had endorsed “bad 
statements,” there were not many options remaining.351 At this point the meeting was 
interrupted by an urgent phone call from Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. When Saddam 
returned, Glaspie inquired as to what the phone call was about, and Saddam explained that 
the Kuwaitis were willing to negotiate, but no later than July 30. Saddam said “I told Mubarak 
that nothing will happen until the meeting, and nothing will happen during or after the 
meeting if the Kuwaitis will at last give us some hope.”352 Glaspie replied that this news 
would be reported immediately to Bush. 
The State Department had already sent a brief to all Middle Eastern embassies on July 19 
updating the policy regarding the U.S. position on Iraq-Kuwait affairs. Secretary Baker 
recalled that “American diplomats were instructed to stress two points. First, ‘disputes should 
be settled by peaceful means, not intimidation and threats of use of force. Second, the 
United States takes no position on the substance of bilateral issues concerning Iraq and 
Kuwait. However, U.S. policy is unchanged. We remain committed to ensure the free flow of 
oil from the Gulf and to support the sovereignty and integrity of the Gulf states…we will 
continue to defend our vital interest in the Gulf.’”353  Although Ambassador Glaspie had 
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followed her brief, she noted after the meeting that Saddam was worried.354 In Glaspie’s 
opinion, Saddam understood that the U.S. was the only superpower in the Middle East, and 
“he needs at a minimum a correct relationship with us for obvious geopolitical reasons.”355 
Although U.S. naval exercises with the UAE had worried Saddam, Glaspie had assured 
Saddam that the U.S. was not in the Middle East to take sides. In fact, Glaspie reiterated the 
new U.S. policy on Iraq-Kuwait affairs by stating that “she had served in Kuwait 20 years 
before; then, as now, we took no position on these Arab affairs.”356 According to Glaspie: 
It was progress to have Saddam admit that the [United States Government] has a 
‘responsibility’ in the region, and has every right to expect an answer when we ask 
Iraq’s intentions. His response in effect that he tried various diplomatic/channels before 
resorting to unadulterated intimidation has at least the virtue of frankness. His emphasis 
that he wants peaceful settlement is surely sincere (Iraqis are sick of war), but the terms 
sound difficult to achieve.357 
Despite Iraqi troops mobilised at the Kuwaiti border and the bellicose language from the Iraqi 
regime, Ambassador Glaspie had done all that was diplomatically possible in her meeting 
with Saddam, and as a result the consensus was that Iraqi behaviour was a minor regional 
dispute between Kuwait and Iraq. Richard Haass later admitted that “statements by various 
administration officials that we had no formal alliance commitment to Kuwait were 
unfortunate and may have reinforced [the perception that the United States would not get 
involved]. And nearly all of us were wrong in discounting the possibility that Saddam might 
invade Kuwait as he did.”358 On August 1, intelligence reports updated their warnings from 
“warning of war” to “warning of attack,” and it was now obvious that Saddam would make 
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good on his threats toward Kuwait. On August 2, 1990, the Iraqi military crossed the Kuwait 
border. 
 
Changing the Approach to Iraq 
With the breakdown of the relationship between the U.S. and Iraq a diplomatic response was 
required from Bush, and his first reaction was to freeze all of Kuwait’s assets in the U.S. The 
worst case scenario was confirmed when, at the behest of the U.S., the United Nations 
Security Council convened at 4:45am in New York City to denounce the act of aggression in 
a hope that it might dissuade Saddam Hussein from remaining in Kuwait. Kuwait’s 
Ambassador, Mohammad Abdullah Abulhasan, took the opportunity to detail the extent of 
the crisis, explaining: 
Iraq occupied Kuwait at dawn today. The Iraqi forces have penetrated and occupied 
ministries, and the headquarters of the Government has been shelled. Crossroads have 
been occupied. A short time ago, Baghdad Radio announced that the aim of the 
invasion of Kuwait is to stage a coup d’état to overthrow the regime and establish a new 
regime and a Government friendly to Iraq.359 
Ambassador Abulhasan warned that “No country will be safe after this,”360 and demanded 
that the Security Council take action to ensure the peace and security of a region that 
contained vital resources. However, Iraq’s deputy Ambassador, Sabah Kadrat, was 
dismissive of Abulhasan’s claims, warning the Security Council not to intervene. Working 
through a list of reasons that clarified the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Kadrat explained that the 
matters in Kuwait were internal, Iraq had no ulterior motives in Kuwait, and that if the U.S. 
felt it was necessary to intervene it would be used as evidence of collusion with Kuwait to 
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influence politics in the Persian Gulf. Although Iraq expected the U.S. to intervene in some 
way because of its commitment to the Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein was confident that this 
would emerge in the shape of unilateral action because of the established ineptitude of the 
Security Council when faced with a decision. More important, Saddam assumed that his 
annexation of Kuwait was a non-issue. This time, however, things were different. United 
States Ambassador Thomas Pickering was scathing in his denunciation of the Iraqi invasion 
and dismissed Kadrat’s explanation by noting that “Instead of staging their coup d’état and 
installing this so-called free provisional government before the invasion, they got it the wrong 
way around: they invaded Kuwait and then staged the coup d’état in a blatant and deceitful 
effort to justify their action.”361 Pickering was clear that the U.S. condemned the use of force 
by Iraq and that any response would reflect United Nations Security Council consensus, 
despite admitting that “The Security Council has seldom faced a more blatant use of force.” 
However, it was imperative that “the Council…accept its full responsibilities and to support 
Kuwait in its hour of need…The world is now watching what we do here and will not be 
satisfied with vacillation or procrastination.”362 Bush had made a clear stand in the United 
Nations Security Council in opposition to Iraq’s actions. 
All five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, in an unprecedented 
step, agreed to condemn Iraq’s use of force. Where disagreement remained was not in the 
process of condemning Iraqi aggression but in the substance. France’s Ambassador Pierre-
Louis Blanc, explained that France “welcomed the efforts at Arab mediation and the holding 
of a first-round meeting at Jiddah between the two parties. In fact, we believe that dialogue is 
the only possible means for resolving the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait.”363 Whereas the 
United Kingdom’s Ambassador, Sir Crispin Tickell, sided with Ambassador Pickering to 
argue that Saddam’s expansion in a region that was dense with a vital resource echoed the 
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steps of totalitarianism in the past. Tickell suggested, contrary to Ambassador Blanc, that 
“The Security Council represents the focus of world opinion,” and unified action was 
necessary. Ambassadors from the Soviet Union and China both agreed that Iraq should 
unconditionally and immediately withdraw their forces from Kuwait, but added that this would 
have to be achieved by resuming regional dialogue between Iraq and Kuwait, preferably lead 
by the Arab states. However, all the permanent members agreed that Iraqi aggression had 
to be reversed in order to restore stability to the Persian Gulf. The result of the emergency 
session on August 2 was Security Council resolution 660, enshrining the international 
demand that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait. According to 
Secretary Baker, securing United Nations Security Council consensus was central to the 
crisis response planning of the administration. Secretary Baker explained that there were 
three stages to rectifying Iraq’s invasion that shifted from coalition building to coercive 
diplomacy - “We would begin with diplomatic pressure, then add economic pressure, to a 
great degree organized through the United Nations, and finally move toward military 
pressure by gradually increasing American troop strength in the Gulf. The strategy was to 
lead a global political alliance aimed at isolating Iraq.”364 The immediate reaction of 
condemnation by the U.S. of Iraqi aggression rewrote the relationship between the U.S. and 
Iraq, and a different approach had emerged that relied on the international community. 
With the condemnation of Saddam Hussein’s decision to annex Iraq enshrined in a United 
Nations Security Council resolution, the U.S. pushed for a more nuanced response to the 
crisis in the Persian Gulf. After a series of National Security Council meetings, Richard 
Haass noted that U.S. policy was consolidating on a direction to take in the Persian Gulf, 
despite some initial reluctance to confront Saddam from Chairman Powell, who had 
questioned, in an early National Security Council session, if it was worth going to war over 
Kuwait.365 Haass had been unimpressed by the attitude of the initial National Security 
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Council meetings and, in a memo drafted for Bush at the request of National Security 
Adviser Brent Scowcroft, concluded that “the strategic price of allowing Iraq to keep Kuwait 
would be enormous, and that evicting Iraq would likely require the use of military force on 
our part.”366 In the memo, Haass explained “I am aware as you are of just how costly and 
risky such a conflict would prove to be. But so too would be accepting this new status quo. 
We would be setting a terrible precedent – one that would only accelerate violent centrifugal 
tendencies – in this emerging ‘post-cold war’ era.”367 This meant building on the consensus 
in the United Nations Security Council to develop measures that would pressure Iraq, and on 
August 6, the United Nations Security Council reconvened to draft sanctions to be imposed 
on Iraq under resolution 661. Ambassador Pickering was predictably emphatic that the 
Security Council implement a strong sanctions regime.368 The sanctions were justified, 
according to Pickering, because “Thirty percent of the region’s oil production is now under 
Iraqi control, thus threatening international economic health and stability.”369 At this point 
Pickering took the opportunity to expand the U.S. vision for the United Nations Security 
Council, stressing that the implementation of sanctions would “reflect a new world order of 
international co-operation in the Council and elsewhere.”370 More important, the sanctions 
would have more success if applied multilaterally, as opposed to unilaterally. 
Of course, the sanctions regime was a reflection of the practical steps that were already 
being taken in the White House to ensure Iraq would leave Kuwait. In the interlude between 
resolution 660 and 662, Secretary Baker had already moved to ensure that Saudi Arabia 
would allow a preliminary 100,000 American troops to form a defensive barrier on its border 
with Iraq in preparation for the possibility that military force might be used to push Iraq from 
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Kuwait.371 Indeed, the rush to secure the defensive line across Saudi Arabia’s shared border 
with Iraq was formed almost immediately after the invasion of Kuwait. Saudi Ambassador 
Bandar Bin Sultan was personally assured by Bush, after rushing back from London to the 
U.S. after hearing the news of the Kuwaiti invasion, that the U.S. would do whatever was 
necessary to protect Saudi Arabia. Bush promised “I give my word of honor…I will see this 
through with you.”372 The implications of this troop deployment was obvious to the smaller 
states at the Security Council, and Cuba’s Ambassador Alarcon de Quesada expressed his 
scepticism toward the proposed sanctions, arguing that they would “facilitate the 
interventionist actions taking place in the region and openly promoted and proclaimed by the 
United States Government.”373 Alarcon warned that the Security Council was being used to 
legitimate the unilateral actions of the U.S., and wondered “whether anyone really believes 
that what we have here is also the expression of a change, of something new in international 
life.”374 Yemen’s Ambassador Abdullah Saleh al-Ashtal agreed with Alarcon, reassuring the 
Security Council that Yemen had taken steps to correct the crisis in the Persian Gulf “within 
the framework of the one Arab family in a way that would consolidate Arab solidarity, keep 
the region free from foreign intervention, guarantee the consolidation of national Arab 
security, and spare it from danger.”375  
Ambassador al-Ashtal stressed that the crisis would be resolved through a regional solution, 
and that this could not be imposed from outside the Persian Gulf because “In the normal 
course, this conflict will eventually come to an end, and we hope that the confrontation in the 
area will also.”376 Despite these concerns, the Security Council agreed to implement 
sanctions on Iraq that were based on the condition of immediate and unconditional 
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withdrawal from Kuwait. Secretary Baker recalled that it was thanks to the coercive 
diplomacy of the U.S. that consensus was achieved, explaining that there were two steps to 
securing Security Council approval on resolutions. First, was to play hardball with the 
permanent five states that held veto powers. Second, was to corral the smaller states that 
had votes up for grabs. Secretary Baker went straight to the point, explaining that “As 
communism collapsed, America’s status as the preeminent superpower was magnified. As a 
result, everyone wanted to get closer to the United States. This gave us formidable leverage, 
which we didn’t hesitate to wield throughout the crisis.”377 The crisis in the Persian Gulf, 
however, was far from resolved. 
There was one additional milestone necessary for the coercive diplomatic approach toward 
Iraq to be codified through the United Nations Security Council, and this required an 
agreement on an enforcement mechanism for a breach in the sanctions regime. Richard 
Haass noted that diplomatic manoeuvring had produced a suitable short-term plan, but that 
plan was not politically sustainable as “the consensus was that we needed some mechanism 
or new development to use force and that we couldn’t just one day announce we’d grown 
tired of waiting. What this trigger would be was not clear, especially as Saddam played it 
smart and did not do something that provoked outrage.”378 This meant a return to the United 
Nations Security Council on August 25 to confer on a resolution that would add an 
enforcement mechanism to the sanctions. The proposal incorporated a naval embargo of 
ships destined to and from Kuwait and Iraq, taking advantage of the U.S. naval forces that 
were already in position in the Persian Gulf. The resolution called upon those “co-operating 
with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such 
measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the 
authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping.”379 
Ambassador Pickering was adamant that “the authority granted in this resolution is 
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sufficiently broad to use armed force – indeed, minimum force – depending upon the 
circumstances which might require it. This is a significant step.”380 And this indicated that the 
Security Council was prepared “to confront Iraq’s wanton aggression and to preserve the 
principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. History will judge us by our resolve in the 
face of Iraq’s threats to international peace and security.”381 Despite U.S. confidence in its 
understanding of the resolution, China’s Ambassador Li Daoyu was not convinced by 
Pickering’s observations, and stated that China would “hold that measures must be taken 
within the framework of resolution 661 (1990), which does not provide for the use of force, 
and will naturally not allow force to be used for its implementation.”382 Despite the different 
interpretations, the Security Council gave a majority vote in favour of the resolution. 
China’s interpretation of the resolution remained in the minority as the Soviet Ambassador 
Valentin Lozinsky reaffirmed the Soviet Union’s commitment to confronting Iraq’s 
aggression, and warned that “the use of force to redraw State frontiers and annex a 
sovereign country can start a chain reaction that threatens the entire world community.”383 
However, Iraq’s Ambassador al-Anbari read the resolution as a declaration of war. It was a 
plan “aimed at using force against Iraq and serving the interests of the United States and the 
expansionist interests of Zionism in the region, as well as United States hegemony over the 
wealth of the region, shipping in the Gulf and the destiny of the peoples in the Gulf.”384 
Consolidating a consensus on resolution 665 was the first test of the United Nations Security 
Council in the wake of the Cold War. Although the Security Council had met and reiterated 
on four separate occasions the importance of a unified and unequivocal stance against 
Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait throughout August, the addition of an enforcement mechanism 
was the largest step toward reversing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Richard Haass stressed how 
                                                          
380
  United Nations Security Council Meeting, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, Document Number 
S/PV.2938, August 25, 1990, 26. 
381
  Ibid. 31. 
382
  Ibid. 53. 
383
  Ibid. 41. 
384
 United Nations Security Council Meeting, Document Number S/PV.2938, 25 August, 1990, 73-5. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Four      Chapter Four 
124 
 
important resolution 665 was to the U.S., as he explained that “we were about to be faced 
with the awful choice of having to let them [shipments destined for Iraq] go through, which 
would break the embargo and set a terrible precedent, or use force without a U.N. blessing, 
which could lead to the loss of support from the Soviets and possibly others not just for 
sanctions enforcement but for the entire effort to undo what Saddam had done.”385 Secretary 
Baker’s final efforts to secure support in the Security Council vindicated his coercive style of 
diplomacy. However, despite Security Council demands that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait, and 
the sanctions now being enforced on Iraq, Saddam showed no indication of leaving Kuwait. 
This left Bush and his advisors to ponder where to take this unprecedented level of 
international solidarity.  
 
Maintaining the International Coalition 
It had taken until August 20, well into the second year of his presidency, for Bush to sign off 
National Security Directive 45 that updated U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf. Although the 
directive had helped to propel resolution 665 through the Security Council, it also committed 
the U.S. to finding a diplomatic solution to the Persian Gulf crisis, or at least a diplomatically 
supported solution. The directive insisted that “the Secretary of State should continue to 
work bilaterally with our allies and friends, and in concert with the international community 
through the United Nations and other for a, to find a peaceful solution to end the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait’s legitimate government.”386 Although the 
Security Council had responded to the crisis in the Persian Gulf, there was still no solution, 
and the U.S. military build-up in Saudi Arabia continued. Powell described what he saw as 
he flew into Saudi Arabia in early September as “the beginnings of a formidable force 
gathering as our allies started to arrive, the British first. The Gulf states committed forces, 
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along with France, Canada, Italy, Egypt, Syria, and others eventually totalling twenty-eight 
nations. Countries unable to contribute troops helped finance the buildup.”387 Adhering to the 
national security directive, Secretary Baker left in early September for an eleven-day trip that 
would see him visit nine countries and include a summit in Helsinki with Bush and the Soviet 
Union Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev. The impetus of the journey, dubbed the “tin cup trip”, 
was to reinforce diplomatic support and extract any financial contributions to help offset the 
cost of the military build-up. As a result, the trip was a major success. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and Egypt all pledged assistance, and Egypt enjoyed its foreign debt slashed by $7.1 billion. 
The Helsinki conference also heralded an unprecedented level of agreement between the 
U.S. and Soviet Union for a solution to the Persian Gulf crisis.388 In early September, the 
initial stages of consolidating international action against Iraq were coming together.389  
In the Security Council there were signs of opposition to U.S. leadership. On September 14, 
Cuba introduced a revision to resolution 661 that would rescind what they believed to be an 
overreach of authority by the Security Council. With the support of Yemen and China, the 
revision sought to specifically exclude foodstuffs and medical supplies from the embargo that 
was believed to be exacerbating the suffering of Iraqi citizens. Ambassador Li Diaoyu, 
explaining China’s support for the revision, added that the revision was “proposed by Cuba 
entirely in the spirit of humanitarianism.”390 The revision, however, was rejected by the 
Security Council, and a counter draft resolution was introduced that promised to tighten the 
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restrictions on humanitarian aid flowing into Iraq and Kuwait. Whereas Cuba had suggested 
that items that were deemed necessary for humanitarian purposes be excluded outright from 
the sanctions, the draft resolution proposed to delegate on a case-by-case basis the 
provision of humanitarian goods. The increased monitoring of humanitarian aid proved a 
source of offence for Ambassador Alarcon, who launched into a tirade against the U.S. for 
what he saw as irony. Alarcon explained that Cuba was well aware of the effects of a 
blockade as the U.S. had held Cuba under embargo for thirty years, which had included “a 
total denial of any possibility of access to the markets of foodstuffs, medicine or medical 
supplies of the country that is illegally imposing that blockade.”391 Arguing that the Security 
Council was inconsistently applying moral standards, Alarcon stated that “it is justifiable to 
take such drastic measures and be cold in the face of human suffering to ensure that 
measures are taken and objectives reached. But east Jerusalem was also occupied and 
annexed by an occupying power. The Golan Heights was and continues to be annexed by 
an occupying Power.”392 Despite Cuba’s protest, resolution 666 passed with no opposition 
from the permanent members. Even China voted in favour of resolution 666, despite 
supporting Cuba’s revision, Ambassador Li Diaoyu explaining that resolution 666 
“guarantees the integrity of United Nations efforts to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait by 
peaceful means.”393 China’s fickle position in the Security Council was of no surprise to 
Secretary Baker, who later explained that the Chinese loathed being isolated more than they 
feared losing out to resolutions. Therefore, the Chinese could be counted on in most cases 
for support when put under coercive diplomacy.394 
As the Security Council debated resolution 666, Ambassador Abulhasan took the opportunity 
to describe in detail, for the first time, the atrocities that were presumably being committed 
by the occupying Iraqi forces. Abulhasan claimed that “Iraqi soldiers are so brutal and so 
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arrogant that even premature babies have been left to die because the medical equipment 
they need has been stolen and taken to Iraq.”395 The accusation by Abulhasan was part of a 
deliberate public relations campaign that emphasised the social costs of the invasion, and 
hoped to provoke an emotional reaction against the occupation of Kuwait. Iraq only made 
matters worse when, on September 14, Iraqi forces raided several diplomatic residencies in 
Kuwait City and besieged a number of embassies, apprehending third-party nationals as 
hostages. The Security Council immediately convened to condemn the actions of Iraq, and 
France tabled resolution 667 to ensure the Security Council was unified. Despite a few 
concerns over the appropriate response should there be any harm inflicted to third-party 
nationals, the Security Council unanimously condemned Iraq. Deputy Ambassador Kadrat 
attempted to clarify Iraq’s position by stating that technically “these instructions stipulate that 
these residences should not be entered, although they no longer have diplomatic 
immunity,”396 and assuring the Security Council that all third-party nationals would be cared 
for in Iraq. However, Kadrat warned France that they were “fully responsible for the 
escalation of the situation, with all its ramifications and consequences.”397 Ambassador 
Pierre-Louis Blanc was curt with his response that the facts were clear and “the truth cannot 
be camouflaged. The Council…has, quite rightly, just unanimously condemned the new act 
of aggression committed by Iraq.”398 The moral outrage that was being fanned by the public 
campaign by Kuwait, and Iraq’s hostage taking, began to take a toll on Bush who wrote 
privately that Saddam was attempting to make “an oasis into a wasteland.” With intelligence 
reports reiterating Abulhasan’s accusations of brutality, Bush explained that “this just 
hardens my resolve. I am wondering if we need to speed up the timetable.”399 Bush later 
clarified that he did not have a personal grudge against Saddam Hussein, “but I had a deep 
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moral objection to what he had done and was doing. It was unprincipled, and we could not 
permit it to go on.”400 And despite emotions threatening to overtake reason, Bush stressed 
that he was “equally determined to keep our efforts multilateral, and to emphasize that our 
policy was based on principle, not personalities.”401 However, Bush’s patience was not 
indefinite, and Powell was asked persistently whether a solution could not come sooner. 
Powell understood Bush’s impatience because “he did not think he could hold the 
international coalition together indefinitely.”402 With American troops deployed in Saudi 
Arabia, the pressure was on Bush to find a solution sooner, rather than later. 
On September 25, as a show of solidarity in the United Nations Security Council, and for 
only the third time in its history, a session was convened at the ministerial level in order to 
debate the situation in the Persian Gulf. This underscored the importance of the crisis and 
the international attention that was focused on the Persian Gulf. The ministers voted 
unanimously on resolution 670 that extended the embargo against Iraq to contain aviation 
traffic, alongside the restriction of maritime traffic. However, the ministers themselves were 
more optimistic as to what the solidarity meant to the United Nations. Secretary Baker 
explained that “For international society to permit Iraq to overwhelm a small neighbour and, 
in effect, simply to erase it from the map would send a very disastrous message. The hopes 
of our world for a new, more peaceful, post-cold-war era would be dimmed, if not dashed.”403 
Secretary Baker stressed that there could be no economic exchanges with Iraq as it would 
dismantle the sanctions regime that had been built around Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 
remarking that the consensus of the Security Council was unprecedented. The United 
Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was equally forthcoming with praise for the 
Security Council, stating that “On the debris of the Iron Curtain we are now building a new, a 
better international order. We have to entrench this new habit of co-operation if we are to be 
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spared the hatred, the bloodshed which have scarred the history of this century so far.”404 
However, China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen took the opportunity to curb talk of a new 
world order, reiterating that despite the consensus within the Security Council, the “use of 
force in any name is unacceptable to us.”405 Beneath the façade of solidarity in the Security 
Council were gaps in the diplomatic postures of the major powers. The U.S. and U.K. were 
united in their demand that the status quo be restored in the Persian Gulf, and the Soviets 
and Chinese were persistent in their search for a diplomatic solution. But, France was 
caught expressing a dislike for restoring the absolutist government in Kuwait. Francois 
Mitterrand stressed, in a letter sent to Bush, that although Security Council demands were 
non-negotiable the implementation of a democratic government in Kuwait should be a 
condition for international support. The immediate response back from the U.S. was that 
solidarity was important, and that there could not be any conditions that might be utilised by 
Saddam to his own ends.406 France accepted the rebuttal, but the tension underscored that 
patience was wearing thin for a solution to the crisis. 
The diplomatic position of the U.S. hardened throughout October as the Soviet Union made 
several attempts at securing a pre-emptive diplomatic victory by appealing to their contacts 
in Baghdad. However, the Soviets were not to find any success, and Powell requested a 
meeting with Secretary Baker to discuss their options. Secretary Baker recalled that the 
meeting stressed a consensus between the military and the State Department as they 
agreed “both a more aggressive military and diplomatic policy was required if there was any 
hope of getting Iraq out of Kuwait.” Secretary Baker explained that Powell “recognized that 
sanctions were having no substantial effect on Saddam, and understood that the President 
would soon have to decide whether sterner options were necessary.”407 As the situation in 
the Persian Gulf continued, with no likely solution in sight, Bush pondered the advice and 
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agreed, on October 24, to increase the military deployment in the Persian Gulf to a level that 
would guarantee an offensive capability. It was believed, within the White House, that this 
offensive capability would not be politically viable without United Nations Security Council 
authorisation. On October 27, the U.S. took the chance to push for a more militant solution 
when Kuwait requested a meeting of the Security Council, in the hope for a proactive and 
explicit resolution of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, and the guarantee of restitution from Iraq 
for the damages incurred during the occupation. Ambassador Abdulhasan was hopeful that 
the Security Council could impose a suitable remuneration from Iraq for the pain and 
suffering inflicted on the Kuwaiti people. However, he specified that “the Security Council is 
expected to set out promptly to consider what additional measures are needed to achieve its 
ultimate goal, that of dislodging the aggressor and restoring all the law abiding party’s rights 
to it.”408 Although Kuwait was within its rights to be impatient, and the U.S. was growing 
impatient behind closed doors, not all members of the Security Council appreciated the 
audacious push towards a confrontation with Iraq. The Soviet Union was particularly critical, 
and forced the Security Council to deliberate on the reparations requested by Kuwait. 
Ambassador Lozinsky explained that the Soviet Union was opposed to any military solution, 
and a diplomatic solution was the preferred method for settling the dispute. Ambassador 
Lozinsky went on, “as the Council knows, the special representative of the President of the 
Soviet Union, Mr. Primakov, is currently in Baghdad, and we have great hopes for the 
success of his mission there.”409 As a result of the Soviet Union’s delaying tactics, the 
Security Council ceased debate for two days while diplomatic meetings with Iraq took place. 
In the end, the Soviet effort was in vain, and when the Security Council resumed seating on 
October 29, Ambassador Anbari chose to clarify Iraq’s position in the Persian Gulf. Anbari 
denounced the Security Council, claiming that at no stage did any member “consult with Iraq 
on any of the eight resolutions adopted since 2 August 1990 or any paragraph therein, 
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despite the fact that all those resolutions concern Iraq and affect its independence.”410 
Anbari likened the resolutions to ultimatums demanding capitulation, “rather than a form that 
urged peace.”411 According to Anbari, Saddam had already proposed a solution to the crisis 
in the Persian Gulf in August when had sought a regional conference on issues in the Middle 
East, explaining:  
All those who really want to promote and consolidate the rule of law in international 
relations, which, we hope, is what is meant by all that talk of the so-called “new 
international order”, must have hoped that the Council would take the opportunity 
provided by President Saddam Hussein’s initiative and, at long last, draw up the 
necessary rules and arrangements for resolving all the problems of the region.412 
 Ambassador Abulhasan retorted that the Security Council remain focused on the atrocities 
committed against Kuwait, adding that “the league of Arab states met in Cairo from the very 
beginning of the aggression and adopted a resolution condemning it and calling on Iraq to 
withdraw unconditionally and fully before the meetings of the Security Council.”413 There was 
no linkage to be made between Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait and any other issue in the Middle 
East. Furthermore, Iraq’s diatribe came as no surprise to Abulhasan as he explained that the 
Soviet Union’s representative, Yevgeny Primakov, who had attempted to reach a diplomatic 
solution in Baghdad, was very objective when he left Iraq as “he said that his meeting with 
the Iraqi leadership was disappointing.”414 The Security Council reinforced its support of 
Kuwait by unanimously voting on reparations from Iraq for their occupation of Kuwait. But, 
instead of capitulation, Anbari took one last shot, addressing Abulhasan directly and stating 
“I would like to make it clear that I have the highest respect personally for my friend Mr. 
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Abulhasan. However, I will not reply to his misleading, I might say abusive, statement. It 
goes without saying that my Government does not recognise him as the representative of 
anyone.”415 It went without saying that throughout the entirety of Anbari’s lecture to the 
Security Council, he had not referred to Kuwait once. 
 
All Necessary Means 
With the growing impatience not only of Kuwait but also Bush to see the Persian Gulf crisis 
resolved there was an added emphasis on securing authorisation for the use of force. 
Secretary Baker had to work his diplomatic connections in order to guarantee the majority of 
votes necessary to see a resolution pass through the Security Council, a process that he 
undertook throughout November. In a transnational effort Secretary Baker spent eighteen 
days traveling to twelve countries on three continents, meeting “personally with all my 
Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and 
occasionally buying votes.”416 This effort was assisted by the Security Council rotating 
presidency that was held by the U.S. in November, and meant the agenda could be set 
according to Secretary Baker’s success and schedule. On November 27, the Security 
Council reached the deadline for hearing the resolution that would authorise the use of force 
in the Persian Gulf, and the first of three meetings was convened. Ambassador Abhulhasan, 
wasting no time, played for the Security Council a number of audio and video clips that 
shared witness accounts of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The intent was to 
enable these witnesses to “report the truth in a direct and spontaneous manner and to allow 
their message to reflect the truth of current events in Kuwait, and in order for Council 
members to keep that message in their hearts and minds and in the records of the council, in 
                                                          
415
 Ibid. 94-95. 
416
 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 305. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Four      Chapter Four 
133 
 
the hope that it may prompt the Council to respond.”417 So far, Kuwait’s public relations 
campaign was working. 
In amidst the carefully orchestrated display of emotion, Ambassador Abulhasan stated 
directly to the Security Council members that the only way forward “lies in your historic 
resolutions which must be scrupulously implemented and complied with in the interest of the 
new world order, in which the spirit of human brotherhood, love and peace would reign 
supreme.”418 After a brief interlude for private consultations, a succession of representatives 
from Middle Eastern states voiced their united denunciation of Iraqi aggression. In a sign that 
Secretary Baker’s regional diplomacy had been successful, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the 
Saudi Arabian ambassador, explained that the Iraqi invasion “makes every Arab feel 
ashamed and want to reject being historically associated with it.”419 Egypt’s Ambassador 
Amr Moussa, quoted President Hosni Mubarak saying “In the coming difficult weeks, we will 
spare no effort to reach a peaceful solution to the Gulf Crisis. However, Kuwait must be 
liberated and the wrongs and injustice against it must be righted.”420 The following day, even 
the Iranian Ambassador Sirous Nasseri, shared a similar sentiment, agreeing that “The only 
way to achieve peace and the return of normalcy to the region is through the total withdrawal 
of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.”421 Nasseri admitted that outside assistance would be required, 
but under the proviso of “the total withdrawal of foreign forces from this sensitive reason.”422 
It was clear that from a regional perspective, an immediate resolution to the crisis was 
needed, and support would be given for any measures that would expedite that process. 
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In order to underline the importance of the vote on November 29, foreign ministers 
represented their states at the Security Council for the fourth time in the history of the 
Security Council, and the second time during the Persian Gulf crisis. Ambassador Pickering 
utilised his position as president of the Security Council to set the tone with his opening 
remarks, stating: 
History has given us another chance…we have the chance to make this Security 
Council and this United Nations true instruments for peace and for justice across the 
globe. We must not let the United Nations go the way of the League of Nations. We 
must fulfil our common vision of a peaceful and just post-cold-war world…if Iraq does 
not reverse its course peacefully, then other necessary measures, including the use of 
force, should be authorized. We must put the choice to Saddam Hussein in 
unmistakable terms.423  
The proposed resolution asked for the authorisation of “all necessary means” to enforce the 
resolutions that had been imposed on Iraq since August 2, adding a deadline for the 
complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Predictably, 
Ambassador Anbari declared that Iraq was unmoved by the resolution, and demanded that 
“No individual Member state may be authorised to lynch a particular country for any 
reasons.”424 In an effort to divert the blame for regional instability toward the U.S., Anbari 
complained that the Security Council had simply mimicked the will and want of the U.S., as 
“the Council’s resolutions would not have been adopted with such alacrity had it not been for 
American pressure, pressure in which the American politicians take pride to the point that 
theirs has been the only voice that we hear.”425 Anbari remained defiant in his closing 
remarks, warning the U.S. that if they were to impose war on Iraq “then that will be our 
destiny, and I assure you that our people will not kneel down and will measure up to its 
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responsibilities, for it is demanding its right and defending that right against injustice and 
tyranny.”426 Iraq found some support from Yemen, who opposed the resolution because it 
used United Nations authority to justify the preponderance of U.S. military force in the 
region, arguing that it was “authority without accountability.”427 Ambassador al-Ashtal added 
that “in the annals of the United Nations this will long be remembered as the ‘war 
resolution’.”428 On the other hand, Cuba’s refusal to vote in favour of the resolution was 
based on opposition to the unprecedented nature of the resolutions being passed through 
the Security Council. Cuba had been, from the outset, particularly sensitive to any resolution 
that authorised the use of force, and in meetings with Secretary Baker, who stressed that he 
was conferring as President of the Security Council and not Secretary of State, Cuba’s 
Foreign Minister Sidoro Malmierca Peoli clarified that Cuba believed the crisis would be 
resolved in time without the need for military intervention.429 Peoli related the situation in 
Kuwait to that of Korea in 1950, and argued:  
The case of Korea is an example of how the use of force under the flag of the United 
Nations can after three years of war, hundreds of thousands of victims and enormous 
material destruction, end in an armistice which keeps that country divided as it was 
before the conflict broke out, and with foreign military bases and tens of thousands of 
soldiers in the southern part of the territory.430 
If force was the chosen method to respond to the ills of the world, then “there can be no 
denying that the procedure is uncivilised to say the least and it will cause the international 
community enormous frustration and show that the United Nations and the principal 
statesmen of today’s world are unable to solve problems politically and peacefully.”431 
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Secretary Baker, noting that Cuba was a small state on the Security Council, dismissed 
Peoli’s consternation. 
Yemen and Cuba’s opposition was not enough to stall the passage of the resolution, and the 
true test of the Security Council consensus rested with the remaining permanent members 
who had veto powers. Secretary Baker focused his diplomatic efforts on the Soviet Union 
and China in order to ensure that the U.S. could count on their support, or at least abstention 
from the vote. During November, Secretary Baker had visited his Soviet counterpart Eduard 
Shevardnadze in Moscow in an effort to secure the Soviet Union’s support. It would take 
thirteen hours of negotiations with both Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, a highly classified 
brief about the projected military success, and the reassurance from Secretary Baker that 
Bush was prepared, with reluctance, to use force against Iraq, before the Soviets gave any 
indication that they would support the U.S. in the Security Council. Secretary Baker, after his 
meeting, explained in a cable to Bush just after the meeting that he was confident that the 
Soviet’s would follow the resolution.432 Shevardnadze clarified the Soviet’s position at the 
Security Council on November 29, adding “today we have started the count-down of the 
‘pause of goodwill’. We are confident that before the time is up events will take a turn 
towards peace and that the pause will usher in a transition to a political settlement.”433 The 
Soviet position looked toward the future, and incorporated Gorbachev’s idea of a new 
international order, as Shevardnadze finished by stating that “the world will not enter a more 
lucid, calm and stable phase unless it can meet the residual challenges of the past and rise 
to the new challenges of the present and the future.”434 On the other hand, the Chinese 
proved to be an obstacle for Secretary Baker. In his preliminary meeting with his counterpart 
Qian Qichen, Secretary Baker noted that the Chinese appeared unlikely to use their veto 
because of the potential political repercussions. However, it was obvious that their 
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opposition to the resolution would not be toned down. Secretary Baker worried what effect 
the Chinese opposition would have to the tenuous international coalition. China used this to 
their diplomatic advantage and pressed for the U.S. to concede a diplomatic visit from Bush 
to Beijing, on the condition of support for the resolution. The diplomatic back and forth 
between Baker and Qian Qichen went on until just before the vote, and, understanding that 
China would not veto the resolution, Secretary Baker settled on the Chinese abstaining from 
the vote. The U.S. did capitulate to some Chinese demands to ensure that a veto did not 
appear. Secretary Baker explained that “the Chinese would get their presidential meeting. 
But they didn’t get what they really wanted: a presidential visit to China, and a commitment 
to press for the removal of economic sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen Square 
massacre. They would have won us a yes vote on the resolution, but at a terrible cost to 
principle.”435 In the debate, Qian Qichen restated China’s five principles for state relations as 
“mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, 
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
coexistence; and that international disputes should be settled through dialogue and 
consultations.”436 Because the resolution authorised external interference, China rationalised 
that it could not vote in favour of the resolution. But, because the resolution allowed for a 
pause of goodwill, China did not veto the resolution as it adhered to the Security Council 
commitment to reverse the occupation of Kuwait. Therefore, China abstained from the vote. 
After the successful passage of the resolution, Secretary Baker was blunt in his final 
remarks, stating “the words authorize the use of force.”437 There was no doubt that the 
Security Council had authorised a military intervention to force Iraq to withdraw from 
Kuwait.438  
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The U.S. had secured a considerable diplomatic victory, and resolution 678 granted authority 
for the military to intervene in Iraq. However, Bush wanted to ensure that all peaceful options 
were exhausted. This prompted Bush to announce, more to his domestic audience, that 
Secretary Baker was prepared to meet Saddam Hussein in Baghdad if Tariq Aziz was 
prepared to meet with Bush in Washington, sometime in December. Secretary Baker later 
recalled that the decision to pursue a meeting with Saddam was an effort “to go the extra 
mile for peace.”439 More candid, Bush wrote in his diary that he did not expect much from 
any meeting between Secretary Baker and Aziz, however “the failure of the Baker-Aziz talk, I 
think, will help us with the Congress.”440 Proposals were sent back and forth between the 
U.S. and Iraq all through December, as one group of officials refused the other’s request. It 
was becoming more likely that the U.S. would not have talks with Iraq after fifteen alternative 
meetings were proposed between December 20 and January 3, including Christmas day, but 
not one could be confirmed.441 At the very end of December, Bush rescinded any flexibility 
and offered one final choice of a meeting between Baker and Aziz in Geneva on January 9, 
1991. Understanding that this was the very last chance of a diplomatic encounter before the 
deadline, the Iraqis agreed to the meeting. However, Secretary Baker had to assure Kuwaiti 
Foreign Minister al-Sabah privately that the U.S. had “no intention of wavering…his anxieties 
were somewhat relieved when I confided that, despite our desire for a peaceful outcome, 
‘my own sense is that we will probably have to use force’.”442 Secretary Baker’s personal 
understanding of the meeting was kept predictably quiet. 
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In preparation for the meeting, Bush drafted a letter to be delivered by Secretary Baker to 
Minister Aziz, with the expectation that it be passed on to Saddam. The letter restated the 
commitment to implement the United Nations resolutions, and stressed that Iraq would be to 
blame for any foreseeable conflict. Its language was brusque but necessary to stress the 
seriousness of the impending deadline.443 Upon landing in Geneva, it was clear to Secretary 
Baker’s delegation that the Iraqi’s were not in a flexible mood. Secretary Baker recalled that 
the U.S. advance team had “negotiated with the Iraqis until 3:00AM over protocol issues, 
including the size of the flags that would be on the table.”444 Despite the importance of the 
meeting, the core objective to deliver Bush’s letter to Saddam remained incomplete. Minister 
Aziz refused to accept the letter and left it on the table between the two diplomats. Secretary 
Baker had made sure to hand a second copy to Aziz to be read alongside the sealed 
envelope containing a copy for Saddam in order to stress upon Aziz that “It’s important that 
we clearly understand each other. I can’t make you take this letter with you, nor will I try. 
However, you should know that we may or may not publish it. You are the only person on 
your side of the table who knows what is in it. That seems a large responsibility for one to 
take on oneself.”445 Aziz assumed every inch of the Iraqi defiance that had characterised 
their approach to the international community since the invasion of Kuwait. Dismissing 
Secretary Baker’s description of a vast and powerful military presence ready to force Iraq 
from Kuwait, Aziz retorted that “we have outlasted coalitions like yours in the past, and we 
will last longer than your coalition will last. We are not afraid of being attacked by a superior 
force. Our people not only support us, but they love us. Our population of nineteen million is 
convinced that once war breaks out between us, we will be victorious.” There appeared 
nothing Secretary Baker could do to change Aziz’s mind as there was no mandate for 
compromise in the Security Council resolutions that stipulated Iraq must withdraw from 
Kuwait unconditionally. Both letters were left discarded on the table as the meeting was 
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concluded and the two diplomats left the room. Secretary Baker later remarked that he pitied 
the fatalistic trajectory Aziz had embraced. 
After the meeting, and with a moment to collect his thoughts, Secretary Baker called Bush to 
inform him that Iraq did not accept the United Nations Security Council resolution, and the 
deadline remained intact. According to Secretary Baker, the decision to intervene in Iraq had 
been made at the end of November, and this meeting with Aziz had served a different 
purpose. After the official press conference, Secretary Baker wrote that “I knew we would 
win the war with Iraq but the battle with Congress and the public was still very much in 
doubt.” He added that his “press conference was primarily aimed at the domestic audience 
and was yet another example of diplomacy via television.”446 Secretary Baker was right in 
that the domestic audience were hanging on his every word, and that the decision to 
intervene was yet to be fought out in Congress. However, Secretary Baker concluded that, 
diplomatically, “what made the invasion of Kuwait inevitable – and the war to redress it - was 
the decline of Soviet power, the ascension of American power, and the fear that this caused 
in Saddam – fear that while America might not react now to his power grab, it would be more 
and more likely to do so as the unipolar world took shape.” Saddam had seen an opportunity 
as the world emerged from the Cold War and had decided to grasp it.447 Where Saddam had 
failed was in his underestimation of Bush, and the united response of the international 
community that created the necessary conditions for cooperation over reversing Iraq’s 
aggression. 
As this chapter has illustrated, the diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq 
reassured Bush that he had embraced the correct response to Saddam Hussein’s 
annexation of Kuwait. Despite Bush’s neglect of the Persian Gulf when he was elected 
president, the administration was satisfied with the developing relationship between the U.S. 
and Iraq and ignored suggestions of Iraqi intransigence. Only Saddam Hussein acting out 
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aggressively and threatening the status quo in the Persian Gulf could force a change in 
policy. It was here that Bush had the opportunity to exercise his strengths as a diplomat, and 
the response that was cultivated ultimately embraced the role of the international community 
in responding to acts of violence, while quietly reinforcing the role of the U.S. as an 
international leader. Unlike the domestic origins of the decision to go to war, Bush was 
confident that U.S. diplomacy could secure the support for armed intervention. And, with the 
benefit of experience, Bush ensured that the decision to go to war was legitimate. Saddam 
Hussein, through the annexation of Kuwait, demonstrated to Bush that Iraqi capabilities were 
evidence of Iraqi intentions, and through the diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war 
with Iraq it can be seen that Bush was adamant Saddam Hussein would not reach his 
presumed potential. 




The Domestic Origins of the Decision to Go to War with Iraq, 2001-2003 
 
“The argument for the war is one of solidarity with the oppressed. These ought to be the 
principles of the left. The people in the antiwar movement have fallen into confusion. They 
should be protesting Bush – but make sure that a genuine democracy rise in Iraq.”448 
 
In the image of his father, Time chose George W. Bush as person of the year in December 
2000, amid controversial circumstances.449 There was a focus on Bush’s domestic 
leadership as he denounced the Clinton administration’s domestic indiscretions and pushed 
aside the Supreme Court challenge that had threatened his election victory. Bush’s 
presidency also meant that the Republicans, who had been exiled from the White House in 
1992 when George H. W. Bush lost his re-election bid to Bill Clinton, had returned to the 
national stage, bolstered by the Republican majority that had been swept into Congress. 
Therefore, as Bush settled into the presidency in 2001, foreign policy earned a lower priority 
ahead of domestic initiatives. Lingering foreign policy issues, such as continuing sanctions 
against Iraq and the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Iraq that had led to periodic airstrikes, 
were acknowledged as areas that required the administration’s attention but were pushed 
aside as Bush focused on proving himself to his domestic audience. Despite Bush’s efforts 
to focus on anything other than Iraq, the continued fascination with Saddam Hussein 
ensured the Iraqi leader remained firmly in the public imagination. On September 11, 2001, 
foreign policy took a dramatic shift as threats that were thought only to exist beyond the 
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borders of the United States materialised in terrorist attacks that killed thousands of 
Americans on American soil. The fear of another attack changed the priorities of the 
administration. National security became paramount, and foreign policy underwent a 
reformation to reflect the militant posture of the U.S. as Bush pursued those who were 
believed responsible for the terrorist attacks. During the aftermath of September 11, issues 
regarding with Iraq were distorted into the spectre of an imminent threat, and Bush, 
embracing the domestic pressure that his administration was now under, set about 
eradicating from the international community the presence of terror. It is in this context that 
the domestic origins of the decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003 emerged. Bush 
interpreted Saddam Hussein’s past intentions to pursue weapons of mass destruction to 
mean that he had the capabilities to use them against the U.S., and therefore posed an 
unacceptable risk to U.S. national security.  
This chapter will illustrate the domestic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq. 
Beginning with the election of George W. Bush as president in 2001, the domestic agenda of 
the administration was justified in contrast to the outgoing Clinton administration. It was 
shown that Bush’s strengths were not in foreign policy, and the administration lacked a 
foreign policy direction. This transitioned on September 11, 2001, when foreign policy 
immediately shifted from the review and contrarian posturing of previous foreign policies to a 
reactionary stance in order to secure U.S. national security. The culmination of the 
transformation shown by Bush in the aftermath of September 11 was seen in January 2002, 
when Bush gave his State of the Union address referring to Iraq, alongside Iran and North 
Korea, as part of an axis of evil poised against the U.S. The elevation of the threat posed by 
Iraq, specifically towards the U.S., was the result of a reactionary process within the 
administration that emphasised the inconclusiveness of past action toward Iraq, and the 
potential threat that the state continued to pose toward the U.S. Bush made it clear 
throughout 2002 that the war on terror, now well underway, would evolve from the pursuit of 
individuals and focus on states. By the end of 2002, Bush went to Congress with a 
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proposition to authorise the use of force against Iraq should the Iraqi government fail to 
comply with international demands for renewed weapons inspections. The overwhelming 
support from Congress reassured Bush that he had clearly rationalised the necessity of the 
use of force to disarm Iraq. By the State of the Union address in 2003, the decision to go to 
war with Iraq was firmly established and, with the backing of Congress, Bush demanded the 
international community to side either with him, or with the terrorists. 
 
The 43rd President of the United States 
George W. Bush was elected president in 2001, after being awarded the electoral vote 
through a Supreme Court ruling and despite losing the popular vote. Bush’s campaign had 
focused on his personality to the detriment of policy, and it was said that he had run “on 
character and a promise of change, themes that resonated with many Americans given the 
scandals and controversies that reverberated throughout eight years of two Clinton 
administrations.”450 The emphasis on the character of the leader, as opposed to the policies 
put forward by the leader, meant that Bush quickly had to reconcile his administration after 
the Supreme Court challenge and vindicate his election victory. Addressing Congress on 
February 27, Bush was adamant that the administration would leave its mark on U.S. history, 
stating “In the end we will be judged not only by what we say or how we say it, we will be 
judged by what we’re able to accomplish.”451 And it was in foreign policy that Bush sought to 
exert U.S. power. According to Bush, “America has a window of opportunity to extend and 
secure our present peace by promoting a distinctly American internationalism.” This meant 
confronting “terrorists who threaten with bombs to tyrants in rogue nation’s intent upon 
developing weapons of mass destruction.” However, Bush did not announce any intention to 
seek out those who threatened U.S. national security. Remaining true to his earlier 
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commitment against the futility of nation building, Bush instead announced the return of a 
proposed anti-ballistic missile system that would protect the U.S.452 The anti-ballistic missile 
system received a lukewarm reception in Congress where Republicans were hoping for a 
more proactive U.S. foreign policy. Coincidently, Baghdad’s airport reopened its international 
terminals and reports were showing that the “air traffic, from about 20 nations so far, is a 
testament to a seismic shift in Iraq’s international status.” This was despite the United States 
launching airstrikes across Iraq in February for breaches of the no-fly zone.453 The 
incongruities of Bush’s foreign policy planning towards existing foreign policy problems led to 
demands from Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), supported by Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Paul Wolfowitz, for Bush to immediately address the problem of Saddam Hussein. According 
to Senator Brownback, “we’re saying we don’t like this man in power, but we’re then not 
willing to go ahead and take steps to remove him.”454 Indeed, Bush had inherited a system of 
punitive airstrikes that Clinton had embraced, and he appeared reluctant to change. 
The February airstrikes were a sign that Bush could not ignore Iraq. The airstrikes were 
approved while Bush was in Mexico, attempting to reinvigorate the U.S. relationship with 
Latin America. Although the airstrikes were justified because of breaches in the no-fly zone 
over Iraq, they were a distraction from Bush’s other priorities. Richard Haass, now Director 
of Policy and Planning in the State Department, was disappointed that Iraq had again 
upstaged a meaningful foreign policy announcement in Mexico. Haass argued that “the new 
administration was looking for a chance to signal that it was not going to be business as 
usual,” but criticised “a weak NSC process that should have made sure the administration 
did not step on its own story.”455 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice understood the 
February airstrikes differently to Haass, instead describing Iraq as a “festering problem.” 
Rice explained that the 1991 Gulf War had “ended inconclusively with Iraqi forces expelled 
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from Kuwait but the regime still in power,” and the assumptions of the George H. W. Bush 
administration that Saddam Hussein would fade away, or remain contained, were proving to 
be wrong. According to Rice, Iraq was a “preoccupation of the national security team” from 
the very beginning of the administration. However, Rice was quick to clarify that the 
preoccupation was about how to contain Iraq, not overthrow Saddam Hussein. In 2001, 
according to Rice, Bush’s main mission was not to confront Saddam Hussein but, instead, to 
confront “the new and rising threat in al Qaeda and its extremist kin, full of bravado and 
revolutionary zeal, and to lead at the beginning of a new and dangerous historical epoch.”456 
Despite inopportune timing, the airstrikes had their supporters within the administration. Vice 
President Dick Cheney reassured Bush that “from his point of view it had been a good 
message, showing that we’d be tough on Saddam Hussein.”457 Such words of confidence 
from the vice president reassured Bush’s decision making.458 
On May 1, Bush detailed the defense policy of his administration in a speech before the 
National Defense University in Washington. The speech helped to clarify the international 
presence of the U.S. that Bush wanted to portray to the American people. The thrust of the 
speech highlighted an evolution in military policy that had occurred since the end of the Cold 
War. Bush explained, “This is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one. 
More nations have nuclear weapons, and still more have nuclear aspirations.”459 In order to 
confront these nuclear threats Bush announced a proactive stance, offering “To maintain 
peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security 
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based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us.”460 
This would mean creating a new framework “that allows us to build missile defense to 
counter the different threats of today’s world. To do so, we must move beyond the 
constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty.”461 This was one of only a few foreign policies 
that Bush’s team had announced during the election campaign. It was a hoped that the 
administration could “push to get nuclear weapons and missile defense out of a ‘Cold War 
mentality.’ To do this they hoped to arrange, with Russia, quick moves to allow both 
countries to work more on national missile defense and make large, further cuts in the old 
Cold War nuclear arsenals.”462 However, there were repercussions for a policy that required 
dismantling the anti-ballistic missile treaty that had been signed by the U.S. and Soviet 
Union in 1972, ostensibly to curtail an arms race in missile technology. Nevertheless, Bush 
was adamant that the ABM had become obsolete. Richard Butler, former chairman of the 
United Nations Special Commission to Iraq (UNSCOM), disagreed. According to Butler, the 
assumption that the threat to the U.S. in the 21st century was conventional was flawed. 
Butler explained, “The threat presently posed to the United States by rogue states is 
recognised as being remote, if it exists at all, in the field of ballistic missiles carrying nuclear 
warheads or other weapons of mass destruction.” The real threat was not a missile being 
launched at the U.S. by another state. It was, instead, a biological or chemical weapon 
attack by a rogue state “delivered on their behalf by terrorists, in a briefcase or a truck, to an 
American city. Iraq, for example, possesses such weapons, and now that its programs go 
uninspected Iraq is developing more of them.”463 According to Butler, Bush was relying on 
populist policies that granted the president favour at home, but ignored more practical 
concerns. On this measure, Butler was correct. Bush’s focus was on vindicating his domestic 
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leadership, and any foreign policy that encouraged support of the administration at home 
took precedence over practicality.464  
Bush had created diplomatic waves in his first six months in office because he lacked 
cohesive foreign policies. By the end of June, Bush had refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol, 
begun the process of dismantling the ABM treaty, resurrected missile defense as a proactive 
policy option, approved airstrikes in Iraq, and supported the expansion of NATO. Despite 
some criticism of the openly unilateral U.S. movements, often in opposition to multilateral 
consensus, there were others who commended the renewed U.S. international leadership. 
Charles Krauthammer, in the Washington Post, praised Bush, stating, “the best unilateralism 
is velvet-glove unilateralism.”465 This support was alongside a hardening of defense policy 
that was encouraged by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Although Bush was winning 
support domestically for what was portrayed as strong international leadership, Secretary 
Rumsfeld was quick to reinforce that there were threats that required action: 
Imagine what might happen if a rogue state were to demonstrate the capability to strike 
the U.S. or European populations with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass 
destruction. A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations could give this 
state the power to hold us hostage. This scenario leaves us with three choices in the 
face of aggression: acquiesce and allow the rogue to invade its neighbours; oppose it 
and put Western population centres at risk; or pre-empt its action.466  
According to Rumsfeld, “the only thing we know for certain is that it is unlikely that any of us 
knows what is likely.” Despite Secretary Rumsfeld’s concerns over rogue states and their 
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threat capabilities, there was some early opposition within the media to what was seen as a 
campaign to artificially inflate international threats. Shibley Telhami, in the Washington Post, 
explained, “Saddam Hussein will continue to pose a threat to U.S. interests, but his spectre 
in Washington is much larger than the man himself. Inflating a third-rate power is self-
defeating; it limits policy options and sets aside more important priorities.”467 Secretary 
Rumsfeld had made it clear that the administration was working on a new definition of what 
constituted a threat to the U.S. 
By July, Bush was ready to state U.S. international goals in a speech at the World Bank. 
There were three goals that were vital to Bush’s administration. First, there was the 
movement away from the ideas of the Cold War, and towards confronting new threats posed 
by rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and cyber-terror. Second, there was promoting global 
economic growth “through a world trading system that is dramatically more open and more 
free.” And, third, was to “remove the huge obstacles to development,” and fight illiteracy, 
disease, and unsustainable debt. According to Bush, these goals made up “compassionate 
conservatism” on a global scale, an outgrowth of his domestic agenda for “compassionate 
conservatism” at home.468 The goals, however, were ambiguous, and there were some calls 
for Bush to be more specific in regards to what constituted a rogue state. In the Wall Street 
Journal, Bush was encouraged to revisit U.S. policy towards Iraq, and “take swift and serious 
measures to remove Saddam Hussein from power.”469 The calls for a more aggressive 
stance toward Iraq were in contrast to renewing sanctions, a policy that had been 
encouraged by Secretary of State Colin Powell, and regarded by Richard Haass as one of 
only a few viable options. The other policies included “more intense military strikes when 
Saddam’s behaviour warranted [or the] prosecution of Saddam for war crimes.”470 In the Wall 
Street Journal, however, it was reported that Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary 
                                                          
467
 Shibley Telhami, “Time for realism on handling Iraq”, Washington Post, June 20, 2001. 
468
 Zelikow, “U.S. Strategic Planning in 2001-02”, 100. 
469
 “Smarting over Iraq”, Wall Street Journal, July 5, 2001. 
470
 Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice, 181. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Five 
150 
Wolfowitz had already devised a plan of regime change in Iraq.471 The plan supported “the 
provisional and insurrectionary government of Iraq, the restoration of a safe haven in 
northern Iraq, the release of $1.6 billion in frozen Iraqi assets to assist the insurrection, a 
systematic air campaign to assist the insurrection and the positioning of U.S. ground forces 
to protect the insurrection ‘as the last resort’.”472 The mixed messages from State and 
Defense, in conjunction with Bush’s ambiguous foreign policy footing, meant that Bush’s 
approval ratings were fluctuating between 51-53%, with a majority of respondents stating 
that they disagreed with almost every major policy decision made by Bush.473 In the hope 
that the Democrats might wield some influence from a minority position in Congress, House 
minority leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) warned Bush of isolating the U.S. from the 
international community, arguing that the trend of rejecting treaties outright had weakened 
the U.S. “ability to pursue a broad range of global interests.”474 Representative Gephardt 
added Bush, “one nation, acting alone, cannot possibly build a lasting strategic framework to 
which all other nations submit.” It had been a long eight months for Bush in foreign policy. 
However, thanks to the Republican majority in Congress, Bush was confident that progress 
with his domestic agenda would ensure foreign policy could take a backseat. 
 
An Attack on the United States 
In an effort to diminish the criticism surrounding Bush’s foreign policies, Secretary Powell 
gave an interview with the Los Angeles Times on September 9. Powell explained that the 
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U.S. had not neglected any of its international responsibilities. Instead, Bush had embraced 
straight-forward, no-nonsense decisions that had hastened diplomacy and enabled more 
suitable policy options. According to Powell, this was effective policy making. However, 
Saddam Hussein remained a central preoccupation for the interviewer, and Powell was 
asked “Do you really believe [Saddam] can be toppled, especially by the current opposition 
groups?” In response, Powell put the lingering issue of Iraq into historical context, explaining 
“Eleven years later Kuwait is safe. Iraq is a sad, desperate place; its infrastructure is 
collapsing. I do know that he will pass in due course, because he is on top of a failing way of 
running a country. Whether or not he can be toppled is not something I can predict.” The 
absence of policy directed at Iraq, and specifically Saddam Hussein, was exposed as the 
interviewer pressed Powell for the administration’s stance on Saddam Hussein’s leadership. 
Powell, retorting with an answer that was to the best of his knowledge, replied “It is the U.S. 
goal to see change in the regime.”475 Despite Powell’s insistence that Bush had made moves 
toward consolidating positions on foreign policy, there was still criticism from former U.S. 
diplomats over the fickle diplomatic manoeuvring of the administration. One former diplomat 
argued, on the dawn of September 11, that this dialogue was “only a beginning of 
understanding, not a discussion of policy. The public needs to know where the president 
intends to take the country internationally. He has told us much of what he is opposed to; he 
needs to lay out with some specificity what we are for besides missile defense and trade 
expansion.”476 The administration did not have long to find its foreign policy stance once 
reports that a civilian airliner had crashed into one of the World Trade towers in New York 
reached Bush.  
A domestic shift was evident, and criticism of Bush was dispelled, after September 11 when 
terrorists hijacked civilian aircraft and crashed the planes into the World Trade Centre towers 
in New York, the Pentagon in Virginia, and a field in Pennsylvania. Amidst the repeated 
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footage of the planes colliding with the towers, and collapsing buildings, whatever reasoning 
Secretary Powell had hoped to convey in his interview evaporated as it became clear the 
U.S. was under attack. The impact of September 11 on the administration could not be 
understated. Rice later admitted, “I have always felt as if I operated in a king of fog, a virtual 
state of shock, for two days after 9/11.”477 As for Bush, he was informed of the attacks while 
sitting in a classroom reading to a group of school children and his response was to present 
a calm president finishing his task and collecting his thoughts in preparation for a response 
that was broadcast to the nation. Talking into the camera and reading from some scribbled 
notes, Bush explained that the U.S. had suffered from an apparent terrorist attack, declaring 
that “terrorism against our nation will not stand.” Bush later recalled that the line echoed his 
father’s denouncement of Iraqi aggression in 1990, writing “Dad’s words must have been 
buried in my subconscious, waiting to surface during another moment of crisis.”478 However, 
the media response was to speculate over who was responsible for the attacks and to focus 
on retribution.  
Diplomat L. Paul Bremer III demanded that Bush use this moment as an opportunity to take 
a stand. For too long the U.S. had “contented itself with merely identifying states which 
support terrorism without their facing any serious consequences. The U.S. must deliver a 
clear ultimatum to those states: Either you destroy the terrorist operations on your territory or 
we will.”479 There were already inferences that Iraq was involved with the terrorist attacks, 
academic Laurie Mylroie stating that it was unfathomable that the suspected terrorist 
organisation al-Qaeda could have undertaken the attacks alone. It was “far more likely [bin 
laden] operated in conjunction with a state – the state with which the U.S. remains at war, 
namely Iraq.”480 Mylroie was reiterating a discussion that had taken place at Camp David on 
September 14, where Paul Wolfowitz had suggested to Bush that “the United States should 
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go after Iraq.”481 Although Wolfowitz’s suggestion was the elephant in the room, by the end 
of September it was determined that Osama bin Laden was responsible for the attacks and 
that he was based in Afghanistan, protected by the Taliban who were in control of the 
country. The media had picked up that there were diverging opinions within the 
administration about a response, and Secretary Powell reassured the nation that no decision 
had been made to confront particular states or regimes, explaining that “if there are states 
and regimes, nations, that support terrorism, we hope to persuade them that it is in their 
interest to stop doing that. But I think ‘ending terrorism’ is where I would leave it.”482 This did 
not stop pressure on the administration to establish war aims by the end of September. 
According to the Wall Street Journal, regardless of Iraq’s role “Saddam Hussein remains the 
greatest menace to the security of the civilized world [and] the prospect that he might use 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons in the future should concentrate the national mind. 
Deposing Saddam has to be considered as another war aim.”483 The lingering spectre of 
Saddam Hussein in the American imagination guaranteed his presence as a security threat 
to the U.S. 
Bush, on September 20, left no doubt who was responsible for the terrorist attacks on 
September 11 when he addressed Congress. The attack was an act of war committed 
against the U.S. by the “enemies of freedom.” Singling out the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
for harbouring the leaders of al-Qaeda, Bush gave the ultimatum “deliver to the United 
States authorities all of the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land.” However, Bush was 
also clear that the terrorist attacks were the beginning of a new direction in U.S. foreign 
policy. There would be no negotiation with any nation over terrorism as “every nation in 
every region now has a decision to make: either you are with us or you are with the 
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will 
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be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”484 The aggressive posture of the 
administration well-satisfied those who had been calling on Bush to make a move against 
Saddam Hussein. William Safire, who had been vocal during the 1991 Gulf War about 
George H. W. Bush’s failure to confront Saddam Hussein, admired that the U.S. was now 
targeting terrorists in Afghanistan, but blamed Secretary Powell for preventing the 
administration from turning its attention to Iraq. Safire was adamant that “Iraqi scientists 
today working feverishly in hidden biological laboratories and underground nuclear facilities 
would, if undisturbed, enable the hate-driven, power-crazed Saddam to kill millions.”485 The 
consensus that was consolidating around Bush meant that he would have the domestic 
support for whatever response he deemed necessary. With support rallying around the 
president, the polls showed that Bush was at an 89% approval rating, with eight out of ten 
respondents admitting that they “will have to forfeit some of their personal freedoms to make 
the country safer.”486 In the wake of great tragedy, Bush had finally found a purpose on 
which to base his presidency. 
In the weeks after the terrorist attacks Bush’s domestic agenda faded into the background as 
U.S. national security became the primary concern. Rice described the new daily routine 
post-9/11 as “we began each morning with the President’s Daily Briefing. The session was 
now more operational, with both the CIA and FBI reporting on threats and efforts to disrupt 
them. This, in fact, complicated decision making, because the President had a tendency to 
ask policy questions that were prompted by intelligence information…I found myself 
constantly reminding the President that it would be up to his national security team to give 
him answers to the policy dilemmas raised by what he was hearing.”487 Brent Scowcroft, 
former National Security Adviser to George H. W. Bush, offered his own advice to 
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complement what Rice had already given the president privately. Scowcroft warned the 
president to be wary of all the voices that were advising him to act on emotion rather than 
planning. Scowcroft explained that in order to confront international terrorism the president 
needed an international coalition. Scowcroft was adamant that “Success means a coalition, 
a broad coalition, a willing and enthusiastic coalition. That will take unbelievable effort and 
entail endless frustrations. But we did it in 1990 and we can do it again.”488 Despite 
Scowcroft’s advice to build a sustainable response to terrorism, former CIA Director James 
Woolsey championed the Wall Street Journal’s campaign to see Iraq included as a target in 
a war on terror. Woolsey explained that “the degree of complexity and the sophistication of 
the attacks against us suggest that we have enough indications of possible state 
involvement for the government to be carefully and vigorously investigating.”489 Furthermore, 
Saddam Hussein had “a festering sense of revenge for his humiliation of the Gulf War, and 
our conduct at, and after, the war’s end has given him added hope, he believes, for 
vengeance.” It was becoming apparent that Bush could not confront terrorism without also 
confronting Saddam Hussein.  
Although Bush struck a confident figure as he addressed Congress in September, detailing 
his intentions to pursue terrorists around the world, the administration underwent another 
crisis when anthrax was discovered in letters delivered to government representatives in the 
beginning of October. As the news broke, pandemonium ensued as the U.S. reverted back 
to the fear and panic that had enveloped the nation in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 
September 11. Bush later recalled that “millions of Americans were afraid to open their 
mailboxes. Office mailrooms shut down. Mothers rushed to the hospital to order anthrax 
tests for children suffering from the common cold. Deranged hoaxsters mailed packages 
laced with talcum powder or flour, which exacerbated people’s fears.”490 However, the 
question that could not be answered was where the anthrax had come from. Saddam 
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Hussein was once again considered a suspect, as in 1995 it was confirmed that the Iraqi 
regime had been in possession of anthrax. Former Chairman of UNSCOM Richard Butler 
was quick to discount Iraq as the origin of the anthrax, explaining that it was unlikely Iraq had 
refined anthrax into a more potent, resilient form required for the United States attacks. 
According to Butler, the anthrax was equally likely to have been retrieved from the ruins of 
the Soviet Union biological weapons laboratories.491 Preliminary testing also suggested that 
the anthrax was a similar strain to what had been researched in U.S. laboratories, leading to 
suggestions that the terrorist attack had a domestic origin.492 Despite the lack of intelligence 
information surrounding the origin, or even motive, of the anthrax attack it did not dampen 
the calls for Saddam Hussein to be immediately targeted. Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) 
demanded Bush detail plans for confronting Saddam Hussein, explaining: 
Whether or not Saddam is implicated directly with the anthrax attacks or the horrors of 
Sept. 11, he is, by any common definition, a terrorist who must be removed. A serious 
effort to end Saddam’s rule over Iraq should begin now with a declaration by the 
administration that it is America’s policy to change the Iraqi regime, and with greater 
financial and tactical support of the broad-based Iraqi opposition.493  
However attractive Lieberman’s plans were for Bush, who was himself seeking retribution for 
the attacks buffeting the U.S., the reality was that there was no real intelligence that could 
provide an answer for where the anthrax had emerged. Bush recalled that “we believed 
more attacks were coming, but we didn’t know when, where, or from whom.”494 But, Saddam 
Hussein remained the most credible threat to the U.S.  
Weighing into the domestic debate over foreign policy in the wake of September 11 was 
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who explained that a war on terror could not just 
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target certain people or ideals, and that it would have to target states as well. According to 
Kissinger, Afghanistan was just the beginning of a broader campaign and he warned 
“against the temptation to treat cooperation on Afghanistan as meeting the challenge and to 
use it as an alibi for avoiding the necessary succeeding phases.”495 The military model that 
was utilised in Afghanistan would have to evolve once Osama bin Laden was captured and 
the Taliban were deposed. Success would mean that “Preventive action is becoming 
imperative. States known to possess such facilities and to have previously used them must 
be obliged to open themselves to strict, conclusive international inspections with obligatory 
enforcement mechanisms. This applies to Iraq.”496 Whereas Kissinger believed Iraq should 
become a target in the war on terror because of strategic interests, exiled Iraqi academic 
Kanan Makiya argued that the U.S. had, indeed, an obligation to depose Saddam Hussein, 
as it was because of United States foreign policy that Saddam Hussein had retained power 
in Iraq.497 Makiya believed that “American policy, if redirected, can determine the future of 
that nation. It is, after all, a country that the United States went to the trouble of defeating 
militarily, only to stand aside as its citizens were slaughtered by the tyrant America had 
come to fight.”498 The intervention in Afghanistan gave Makiya hope that the U.S. would 
seriously consider an intervention in Iraq, explaining that Iraq could become a bastion for the 
U.S. in the Persian Gulf as “a new kind of westward-looking political order can, with help 
from the West, be set up in Iraq just as it was set up in Germany and Japan after World War 
II.”499 In a press conference on November 26, Bush was clear that Afghanistan was the 
primary focus of the war on terror, but articulated that it was just the beginning and that the 
mission would take as long as was necessary. However, Bush went to lengths to define who 
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the U.S. was at war against, explaining “Well, my message is, is that if you harbor a terrorist, 
you're a terrorist. If you feed a terrorist, you're a terrorist. If you develop weapons of mass 
destruction that you want to terrorize the world, you'll be held accountable.”500 Asked if this 
meant Iraq might be considered a target in a global war on terror, Bush stated “Afghanistan 
is still just the beginning,” and warned Saddam Hussein that he would be required to readmit 
weapons inspectors into the country to verify that he did not pose a threat to the U.S. 
The operation in Afghanistan, however, was achieving mixed results. Although there had 
been military victories as the Taliban government crumbled before the U.S. military, the 
objective of capturing Osama bin Laden remained elusive. In a press conference on 
December 10, Paul Wolfowitz explained that “we’ve created conditions now where, I guess, 
you could say we have accomplished one major objective, which is the defeat of the Taliban 
government…But it remains the case that large numbers of al Qaeda terrorists, including 
senior leaders, as well as senior leaders of the Taliban, are still at large in Afghanistan.”501 
Wolfowitz was confident that the success in Afghanistan was a positive step in the war on 
terror, refusing to acknowledge whether the operation had been stretched to incorporate 
more objectives, and stressed that the administration would remain focused on Afghanistan 
to ensure success. For the moment, this focus remained true. Richard Haass recalled that at 
no point was the Afghanistan operation purposely neglected in favour of shifting the war on 
terror to focus on Iraq. Haass noted that “the failure to capture or kill retreating al-Qaida and 
Taliban elements at the battle of Tora Bora was a failure born of tactics and overreliance on 
Afghan units and above all the ill-advised decision to limit the number and role of U.S. 
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forces.”502 However, this did not prevent rumours that Iraq was the next U.S. target. In both 
the Wall Street Journal and Los Angeles Times, Iraqi defector Khidhir Hamza, who had 
already been denounced by the CIA as a non-credible intelligence source, stated that 
Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction programmes and 
hidden them throughout the country. Hamza insisted that “If intelligence estimates are 
correct the first tests [nuclear] could happen by 2005.”503 In the public imagination, the threat 
presented by Saddam Hussein was now seen as credible, and inside the Pentagon, 
Secretary Rumsfeld was exploring possibilities for going to war with Iraq.504 
 
Iraq and the Axis of Evil 
Condoleezza Rice and speechwriter Michael Gerson expected Bush, in the State of the 
Union Address on January 29, 2002, to push the message that the U.S. was planning 
“beyond the war on terror.” However, with the inclusion of the axis of evil, the impact and 
meaning of the address took on a different direction.505 Any optimism that the U.S. had made 
progress in the war on terror because of some success in Afghanistan was dispelled as 
Bush explained “our Nation is at war; our economy is in recession; and the civilized world 
faces unprecedented dangers.”506 While confronting threats across the world, Bush 
maintained that the U.S. remained in pursuit of two objectives into the New Year – “First, we 
will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, 
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second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.” Attempting to paint a 
picture of a threat that was difficult to capture, Bush insisted that three states could be 
regarded as regimes of terror: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Bush argued that “States like 
these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the 
world.” In order to confront the threat posed by these states, Bush announced the largest 
increase in defense spending for twenty years. Secretary Rumsfeld, in a press conference 
on January 24, had already alluded to the increased defense spending by justifying the costs 
as a necessary measure to modernise the United States military.507 The increased spending 
only exacerbated an impending recession that threatened to engulf the U.S., and Bush 
promised that “our budget will run a deficit that will be small and short term, so long as 
Congress restrains from spending and acts in a fiscally responsible manner.” What was 
important was that the U.S., in the wake of September 11, had found a purpose. Bush went 
on, “In a single instant, we realized that this will be the decisive decade in the history of 
liberty, that we’ve been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced 
a choice more clear or consequential.”508 Unlike his father, Bush was able to weather the 
impending domestic budget crisis because of the majority Republican power in Congress 
and the domestic support he had consolidated in the wake of the terrorist attacks.  
The ‘axis of evil’ gave a clear indication that the administration had plans for confronting 
Saddam Hussein. Iran and North Korea, although posing their own strategic challenges, 
lacked the history that was shared between the U.S. and Iraq. Former Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher, recalling her role from 1990, added her support for Bush to confront 
Saddam. Thatcher suggested Bush do whatever was necessary to remove Saddam Hussein 
from power as he was a threat not only to the U.S., but to the world. According to Thatcher, 
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the only questions worth asking were “how and when, not whether, to remove [Saddam].”509 
There were even legal justifications emerging that legitimated a confrontation against 
Saddam Hussein as attorneys Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin Jr., former Justice 
Department staff under Reagan and George H. W. Bush, explained that Bush was able to 
legally depose Saddam. According to the attorneys, the 1991 Gulf War “has never ended 
and additional action against Iraq would be fully justified based on pre-existing U.N. 
authorization.”510 The United Nations had verified that Iraq had possessed weapons of mass 
destruction, and because the United Nations could not verify that those weapons of mass 
destruction had been destroyed the U.S. could invoke “anticipatory self-defence” and 
mitigate the threat posed by Saddam. The attorneys argued “these weapons clearly are for 
use, either by Iraq or by its terrorist surrogates, against the U.S. and its allies.”511 Despite 
this pressure, however, the administration gave no indication that Iraq was on the agenda. 
Vice President Dick Cheney, in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations, only 
stated that it was imperative for the U.S. to move against those who supported terrorism, 
promising that “we will work to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America 
or our friends and allies with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or allowing them to 
pass those weapons to terrorists.”512 Secretary Rumsfeld, in a Defense briefing on February 
12 about progress in Afghanistan, retorted when asked about evidence that suggested Iraq 
was involved with terrorists that “there are known knowns; there are things we know we 
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some 
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we 
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don’t know.”513 Secretary Rumsfeld’s answer covered all the strategic possibilities regarding 
Iraq, neither confirming nor denying that Saddam Hussein was a threat. 
In an effort to increase domestic support regarding the administration’s tilt toward Iraq by 
displaying international support, Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair, in a televised interview 
that echoed Margaret Thatcher’s support for George H. W. Bush in 1991,514 explained his 
support for Bush, adding that “Those who are engaged in spreading weapons of mass 
destruction are engaged in an evil trade, and it is important that we make sure that we take 
action in respect of it…the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq poses a 
threat, not just to the region, but to the wider world, and I think George Bush was absolutely 
right to raise it.”515 Blair intended to meet with Bush to discuss a plan of action that included 
Iraq as a second stage of the war on terror. With the declaration of support for action against 
Iraq from abroad, ostensibly targeted at an American audience, Congressional 
representatives asked where they stood in any plans from the administration that concerned 
military action. Senate majority leader, Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD), called on Bush to 
clarify what the next stage of the war on terror actually entailed, in the process earning the 
derision from other members of Congress.516 Despite Daschle’s sincerity in asking for 
clarification from the president, there was bi-partisan indignation that the senator might 
question the president’s actions in war. Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) explained in the Wall 
Street Journal that there was bipartisan support in Congress for the actions Bush had taken 
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in the war on terror. Lieberman reassured that “Less than six months after the Sep. 11 
attacks, our will to do what is necessary to protect our security must not start wavering. That 
certainly goes for Iraq, where we must deal decisively with the threat to America posed by 
the world’s most dangerous terrorist, Saddam Hussein.”517 Lieberman’s support was echoed 
by Bush’s approval ratings that were still at 82%, with seven out of ten respondents 
approving U.S. troops being used to confront terrorists overseas. This included a majority 
that approved of military force being used against Saddam on the condition of international 
support.518  
In a press conference on March 13, Bush told reporters that Iraq was included in discussions 
regarding what the administration considered to be a threat to international peace and 
security. Bush explained that “we will share our views of how to make the world safe. In 
regards to Iraq, we’re doing just that.”519 According to Bush, “I am deeply concerned about 
Iraq, and so should the American people be concerned about Iraq, and so should people 
who love freedom be concerned about Iraq… [Saddam Hussein] is a problem, and we’re 
going to deal with him.”520 However, part of the commitment to confronting Iraq rested on the 
promise of consultation with allies and Bush cultivated that image through an interview with 
the United Kingdom’s ITV television network. Iraq remained a central subject for 
conversation, and Trevor Macdonald inquired as to whether Bush had plans to attack Iraq. 
Bush explained that he had “made up my mind that Saddam needs to go.” There were no 
plans, however, on how to accomplish that goal. Bush stressed that U.S. policy was that 
Saddam Hussein should be removed from power and, further, it would be in the interest of 
the free world that this policy be supported.521 The open dialogue with the U.K. continued on 
April 6 when Bush met with Blair in Crawford, Texas. In the following press conference, and 
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after commenting on the importance of the relationship between the U.S. and U.K., Blair 
added that “you know it has always been our policy that Iraq would be a better place without 
Saddam Hussein.” Blair, much like Bush, refused to comment on how that would be 
accomplished, but insisted that “you cannot have a situation in which he carries on being in 
breach of the U.N. resolutions and refusing to allow us the capability of assessing how that 
weapons-of-mass-destruction capability is being advanced.” Bush added, “Maybe I should 
be a little less direct and be a little more nuanced, and say we support regime change.”522 
Although Bush and Blair had avoided questions regarding military planning, the questions 
were not misplaced. Since February, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks had 
been devising military options for confronting Iraq. A report leaked from the Department of 
Defense in the New York Times showed that preliminary conclusions were that a coup was 
unlikely to overthrow Saddam Hussein and a war waged through local proxies would be 
insufficient to change the regime. The report, however, stated that “senior officials now 
acknowledge that any offensive would probably be delayed until early next year.”523 A key 
part of the planning suggested that “other than troops from Britain, no significant contribution 
of allied forces is anticipated.” The report helped make sense of Bush’s pursuit of British 
support and suggested a timeframe for armed action against Iraq. 
The shifting attitude of the U.S. and U.K. toward a confrontation with Iraq was obvious to 
Hans Blix, the new chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection 
Commission (UNMOVIC). The beginning of 2002 had shown that Iraq was now a major U.S. 
focus, and by the end of March it was apparent that armed action was considered the only 
option to confront Saddam Hussein. Any proposed weapon inspections were just a vehicle to 
justify a military intervention.524 Secretary Rumsfeld had already explained in a press 
conference in April that “for the most part anything [the weapons inspectors] found was a 
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result of having been cued to something as a result of a defector giving them a heads-up.”525 
The administration’s scepticism surrounding the efficiency of weapons inspections was 
questioned further when it was reported that Paul Wolfowitz had encouraged a CIA 
investigation into Hans Blix’s role as director of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
throughout the 80s and 90s.526 Despite the leaks, Secretary Rumsfeld continued to 
emphasise the imminent threat posed by Iraq in June when, in a speech to allies in the 
Persian Gulf about U.S. military operations, he maintained that Iraq had weapons of mass 
destruction, and “they continue to develop them, and they have weaponized chemical 
weapons…they’ve had an active program to develop nuclear weapons. It’s also clear that 
they are actively developing biological weapons. I don’t know what other kinds of weapons 
would fall under the rubric of weapons of mass destruction, but if there are more, I suspect 
they’re working on them, as well.”527 Rice, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, added 
Iraq was a legitimate threat “not because you have some chain of evidence saying Iraq may 
have given a weapon to al-Qaeda…But it is because Iraq is one of those places that is both 
hostile to us, and, frankly, irresponsible and cruel enough to make this available.”528 
Congress, refusing to be left behind, added bipartisan support of an earlier presidential order 
that had authorised the CIA to take covert action to topple Iraq. House minority leader 
Representative Richard Gephardt (D-MO), explained that the order was “trying to bring 
about a change of regime, because they have continued to flout U.N. resolutions and 
international law. I think it is an appropriate action to take. I hope it succeeds in its quest.” 
House majority leader Representative Richard K. Armey (R-TX) added that the order was 
“justified by Iraq’s support for terrorist groups that threaten the United States and other 
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countries.”529 Politically, Bush was receiving the domestic consensus on Iraq that his father 
had failed to create. 
Even in the media there was implicit support for Bush’s evolving stance against Iraq. In an 
editorial in the New York Times in July the editors stressed that they were confident Saddam 
Hussein had hidden weapons of mass destruction and the that he had intent to use them. 
However, “what is urgently needed now is informed and serious debate.”530 Senator Joseph 
Biden (D-DE), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, took the opportunity to 
ask Bush to go into more detail about possible plans for military intervention in Iraq. 
However, it was not a question of whether to intervene in Iraq - it was a question of what 
should happen in the aftermath. Biden confided that Bush always joked with him “you agree 
with me on Saddam, why don’t you agree with my methods?” To which Biden would 
respond, “Mr. President, there’s a reason why your father stopped and didn’t go to Baghdad. 
He didn’t want to stay five years.”531 Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), the ranking Republican 
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, added his support behind Biden, as the pair 
published three questions in the New York Times. First, what threat was posed by Iraq and 
how immediate was the danger; second, what were the options to confront the Iraqi threat; 
and, third, when Saddam Hussein is gone, what would be the remaining American 
responsibilities. The pair explained “given Iraq’s strategic location, its large oil reserves and 
the suffering of the Iraqi people, we cannot afford to replace a despot with chaos. We need 
to assess what it would take to rebuild Iraq economically and politically.”532 Bush, however, 
remained quiet. He had added nothing more to the debate since a press conference on July 
8 when he maintained that “it’s the stated policy of this Government to have regime change. 
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And it hasn’t changed. And we’ll use all tools at our disposal to do so.”533 It was clear that 
Bush intended to pursue action against Iraq. 
Unlike the Congressional effort to question Bush’s plans regarding Iraq, Brent Scowcroft and 
former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, speaking from their experience confronting 
Saddam Hussein in 1991, used the media to try and convince Bush to reconsider 
confronting Iraq. Richard Haass described Scowcroft’s effort as “nothing less than a ‘throw 
yourself in front of the train’ effort to derail the momentum toward a war that Brent judged to 
be both unnecessary and ill advised.”534 In an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal, 
Scowcroft wrote that Saddam was “unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass 
destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use 
them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as the return address.” Scowcroft was 
concerned that a military intervention in Iraq would distract the U.S. from the war on 
terrorism, and that there was little evidence “that the United States itself is an object of 
[Saddam’s] aggression.”535 Baker expressed in an op-ed published in the New York Times a 
more understanding view of the administration’s desire to use force to depose Saddam. 
However, Baker believed that “we should try our best not to have to go it alone, and the 
president should reject the advice of those who counsel doing so. The costs in all areas will 
be much greater, as will the political risks, both domestic and international, if we end up 
going it alone or with only two other countries.” The political dimensions of any conflict that 
might develop between the United States and Iraq were of considerable concern, and Baker 
added that “we should frankly recognize that our problem in accomplishing regime change in 
Iraq is made more difficult by the way our policy on the Arab-Israeli dispute is perceived 
around the world. Sadly, in international politics, as in domestic politics, perception is 
sometimes more important than reality.”536 However, the diplomatic nuances of any possible 
                                                          
533
 George W. Bush, The President’s News Conference, July 8, 2002. 
534
 Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice, 216. 
535
 Brent Scowcroft, “Don’t attack Saddam”, Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002. 
536
 James Baker III, “The Right Way to change a regime”, New York Times, August 25, 2002. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Five 
168 
conflict between the U.S. and Iraq were obscured by the administrations campaign to justify 
the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. 
Although Scowcroft’s op-ed had earned the displeasure of Condoleezza Rice,537 it was Vice 
President Cheney who retorted in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 26. 
Cheney explained that “we now know Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear 
weapons. Among other sources, we’ve gotten this from first hand testimony from defectors, 
including Saddam’s own son-in-law, who was subsequently murdered at Saddam’s 
direction.”538 The reality was that “armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror and a 
seat at a top 10 percent of the world’s oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected 
to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s 
energy supplies, directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region and subject the 
United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail.”539 With our help, added Cheney, “a 
liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again.”540 Cheney ignored the advice offered by 
Baker and Scowcroft, choosing, instead, to go further with this confrontation with Saddam 
Hussein, unlike in 1991. 
Bush rode the momentum generated by Cheney’s speech, continuing to justify the militant 
U.S. posture in remarks during press conferences. One such occasion was on September 2, 
alongside Tony Blair, when Bush explained that “as you know, our Government in 1998 – 
action that my administration has embraced – decided that this regime was not going to 
honor its commitments to get rid of weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton administration 
supported regime change. Many members of the current United States Senate supported 
regime change. My administration still supports regime change. There’s all kinds of ways to 
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change regimes…we owe it to future generations to deal with this problem.”541 Bush 
connected his administration’s tilt toward Saddam Hussein to the precedents set by previous 
administrations, especially the 1998 decision by Clinton to declare that it was U.S. policy to 
support regime change in Iraq. Despite Bush’s confidence in his administration’s plans, his 
approval rating had been steadily decreasing throughout the year. By early September, Bush 
had an approval rating of 63%, with only 37% of respondents expressing confidence that 
Bush would make correct decisions. However, 61% supported a pre-emptive attack on 
Iraq.542 Increasing this domestic support was Bush’s address at the United Nations General 
Assembly on September 12. The speech was applauded for redefining U.S. international 
objectives, but was focused toward Iraq. James Baker, after the speech, wrote “the question 
is no longer why the United States believes force is necessary to implement resolutions 
involving Iraq, but why the United Nations, after years of inaction, does not now agree.”543 
However, Baker was also thankful that Bush had sought out assistance from the United 
Nations, adding “win or lose, going to the United Nations will also help the president win the 
support of the American people and, therefore, of Congress, which is politically desirable, if 
not legally necessary, for any major military action.”544 The appeal to the United Nations, 
however, was a move to secure further evidence of the presumed threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein.  
Baker’s optimism turned out premature as the Bush administration released on September 
17 the National Security Strategy of the United States. Just as the words ‘axis of evil’ had 
caught the attention of observers when Bush had given his State of the Union address in 
January, so too did the word ‘pre-emption.’ The reframing of the threat that Iraq posed to the 
U.S. was immediate, explained Phillip Zelikow, as “by introducing ‘pre-emption,’ the U.S. 
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government had, somewhat inadvertently, reframed the argument and shouldered a new 
burden, volunteering to prove that the outlaw posed an ‘imminent’ threat.”545 That Bush 
supported regime change in Iraq was beyond doubt before the National Security Strategy 
had been released. However, the National Security Strategy described how regime change 
might take place. Secretary Rumsfeld, testifying before the House Armed Services 
Committee, outlined the case against Saddam Hussein. Reciting the litany of resolutions that 
Iraq had ignored over a period of eleven years, Rumsfeld concluded that “no terrorist state 
poses a greater and more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of 
the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.”546 Rumsfeld’s testimony was 
reinforced by Secretary Powell, who had appeared before the House International Relations 
Committee. Powell added that “from the very beginning…we’ve viewing this as a 
liberation”547 and that the administration understood the implications of intervening in Iraq, 
promising that that United States “would have obligations to see it through.”548 Proving that 
the U.S. was not deterred from its militant posture toward Iraq, Bush dismissed reports that 
Iraq had accepted the United Nations demands to readmit weapons inspectors. Bush viewed 
the move as Saddam Hussein’s latest ploy to lead the international community astray, and 
promised that “one of the jobs of the United States has is to remind people about not only 
the threat but the fact that his defiance has weakened the United Nations.”549 By the end of 
September it was clear that Bush was moving toward a decision to confront Saddam. In a 
press conference, following a meeting with congressional leaders in late September and 
before a resolution was sent to Congress to authorise the use of force against Iraq, Bush 
explained that “Each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax 
or VX – nerve gas – or, someday, a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally. We refuse to live in 
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this future of fear. Democrats and Republicans refuse to live in a future of fear.”550 With 
Congressional approval, Bush could put in motion plans to confront the threat the Saddam 
Hussein was believed to possess.551 
 
Authorising the Use of Force 
The decision to go to war with Iraq was initiated in October when Bush approached 
Congress to vote on using force to confront Saddam Hussein. After a meeting with 
Congressional leaders on October 1, Bush was confident that a resolution would pass 
through both the House and Senate with little opposition. Bush explained to reporters that 
“We’ll continue to work with the Members of Congress. But I don’t want to get a resolution 
which ties my hands, a resolution which is weaker than that which was passed out of the 
Congress in 1998.”552 Bush continued the next day to build a bipartisan case for confronting 
Saddam Hussein when he announced the agreement between Congressional leaders on a 
joint resolution. Bush stressed that “We know the designs of the Iraqi regime. In defiance of 
pledges to the U.N., it has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons. It is rebuilding the 
facilities used to make those weapons,” and that “Countering Iraq’s threat is also a central 
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commitment on the war on terror. We know Saddam Hussein has longstanding and ongoing 
ties to international terrorists.” According to Bush, then, “America’s leadership and 
willingness to use force, confirmed by the Congress, is the best way to ensure compliance 
and avoid conflict.”553 In a final push to consolidate domestic support for the Congressional 
vote, Bush followed his earlier statements with an address to the nation on October 7, just 
before the joint resolution was introduced to Congress. In the address Bush stressed that 
Iraq stood alone from other international threats because “it gathers the most serious 
dangers of our age in one place. Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a 
murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. This 
same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has invaded and brutally occupied a 
small neighbour, has struck other nations without warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility 
toward the United States.” According to Bush, the U.S. knew “that the regime has produced 
thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve 
gas,” and that “surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had 
used to produce chemical and biological weapons.” Worth additional concern were Iraq’s 
ballistic missile capabilities, Saddam Hussein’s links to international terrorist groups, and 
Iraq’s unconfirmed nuclear weapons manufacturing capability. Bush, with certainty, 
addressed the nation that “Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, 
the smoking gun, that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” Bush explained that 
confrontation was necessary as a “failure to act would embolden other tyrants, allow 
terrorists access to new weapons and new resources, and make blackmail a permanent 
feature of world events. The United Nations would betray the purpose of its founding and 
prove irrelevant to the problems of our time. And through its inaction, the United States 
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would resign itself to a future of fear.”554 It appeared as though Bush had satisfied the 
domestic demands that Saddam Hussein be deposed.  
By the time Bush had addressed the nation on October 7, the Senate had already begun to 
debate the authorisation of the use of force to depose Saddam Hussein. Despite the 
confident statements of Congressional leaders that there was bipartisan support for the 
president, there still existed dissent in the Senate. Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), who had 
confronted George H. W. Bush’s similar decision in 1991 when he voted against using force 
against Saddam Hussein, spoke out against the consensus of the Senate, asking “why 
now?” Byrd wondered what had changed in the last year that had elevated Saddam Hussein 
into an imminent threat that required an immediate response from the United States, arguing 
that “When the President and his advisers are pressed for clarity, they have responded with 
evasive and confusing references to the dangers of terrorism which they now seem to think 
has more to do with Saddam Hussein than Osama bin Laden.” Byrd was appalled that 
Congress was willing to provide Bush with a blank cheque to conduct war despite the lack of 
substantiated evidence implicating Saddam Hussein in terrorism, and warned the Senate 
that “The President’s military doctrine will give him a free hand to justify almost any military 
action with unsubstantiated allegations and arbitrary risk assessments, and Congress is 
about to rubberstamp that doctrine and simply step out of the way.”555 However, despite 
Byrd’s measured appraisal of the resolution, he was very much in the minority. In the same 
session, Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) added that “as one who fought in China [during World 
War II] I see the next Hitler in Saddam Hussein.”556 Stevens’ experience justified his belief 
that the situation with Iraq was the most serious since the end of World War II.  
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On October 8, as the debate continued, Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) expanded his 
justifications for supporting the resolution to authorise the use of force. Referring to Byrd’s 
question, Lieberman retorted “Why not earlier? Why not over the course of the last decade, 
when Saddam Hussein, to our knowledge, continued to build up his weapons of mass 
destruction and the most dangerous and threatening means to deliver them on targets near 
and far, constantly ignoring and violating resolutions of the United Nations, growing more 
ominous a threat to his neighbors and to the world?” In fact, argued Lieberman, Bush’s 
insistence to confront Saddam Hussein was merely the realisation of a military conflict that 
the U.S. had been involved in since 1991.557 Senator John McCain (R-AZ) added to 
Lieberman’s rationalisation by stressing that Bush was not forcing the issue to confront 
Saddam Hussein, that it was Saddam Hussein himself who was forcing the U.S. into action, 
and Bush was not resorting to war as a first option, but as a last option.558 Senator John 
Kerry (D-MA), speaking the following day, summarised the position of the Senate succinctly 
when he added “When I vote to give the President of the United States the authority to use 
force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein, it is because I believe that a deadly arsenal 
of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat, to our security 
and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. I will vote yes because I believe it is the best 
way to hold Saddam Hussein accountable.”559 Unlike the situation in 1991, the support in the 
Senate for the use of force against Saddam Hussein was overwhelming. 
In the House of Representatives, the debate was just as broad. However, with the 
Republican majority, there was little chance that Bush would face much opposition to the 
joint resolution. The debate fell along the same lines as in the Senate, with some 
representatives arguing the merits of waiting for United Nations inspections to take place, 
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while others worried about the authority that was being given to the president to wage war. 
In one case, Representative Paul Ryan (D-WI) cited former intelligence analyst Kenneth 
Pollack’s The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq as definitive evidence as to 
why Bush should be authorised to use force against Saddam Hussein. Ryan described 
Pollack as “a former analyst on Iraq for the Central Intelligence Agency who served on the 
National Security Council during the Clinton Administration [and] one of the foremost experts 
on Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime.”560 As a result of the overwhelming pressure 
placed on Congress by both the administration and public opinion, Bush received a positive 
vote. In the Senate, the resolution was passed by a margin of 77 to 23. In the House, the 
margin was 296 to 133. In an announcement that marked the signing of the resolution, Bush 
remarked that it was the first step in eradicating an international threat as “confronting the 
threat posed by Iraq is necessary, by whatever means that requires. Either the Iraqi regime 
will give up its weapons of mass destruction, or for the sake of peace, the United States will 
lead a global coalition to disarm that regime.”561 Using the Congressional vote as a 
springboard, Bush detailed U.S. demands for Iraq in order to avoid a military confrontation 
that included the resumption of weapons inspections, adding that this time Iraqi scientists 
were to be allowed to leave the country for interviews with inspectors and Saddam Hussein 
had to cut all ties to international terrorists. These demands, stressed Bush, were non-
negotiable, and it was up to the United Nations Security Council to see them satisfied. 
Iraq’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammed Aldouri, responded to the 
Congressional debate by writing his own op-ed in the New York Times. Aldouri argued that 
Bush had not allowed adequate time for the United Nations to inspect Iraq, stressing that 
“we are not asking the people of the United States or of any member state of the United 
Nations to trust in our word, but to send the weapons inspectors to our country to look 
                                                          
560
 Representative Paul Ryan, Authorization of the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, House 
Congressional Record, October 9, 2002, Part Two, H7728. 
561
 George W. Bush, Remarks on signing the authorization for use of military force against Iraq resolution of 
2002, October 16, 2002. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Five 
176 
wherever they wish unconditionally…we could never make this claim with such openness if 
we did not ourselves know there is nothing to be found.”562 The chairman of the IAEA, 
Mohammed el-Baradei, was also prompted by the Congressional debate to question, in the 
Washington Post, how accurate Bush’s intelligence had been when he made the claims 
regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. El-Baradei explained that the International 
Atomic Energy Agency had, in the past, “neutralised Iraq’s nuclear program. We confiscated 
its weapon-usable material. We destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all its facilities 
and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production. And while we did not claim absolute 
certainty, we were confident that we had not missed any significant component of Iraq’s 
nuclear program.”563 However, claims that Bush had misled the American people were 
dismissed, and Senator John McCain reiterated his endorsement of military action to counter 
the op-ed of Ambassador Aldouri and el-Baradei. McCain explained that “The feckless 
pursuit of accommodation with regimes that scorn our reasonableness and revile our 
purpose is no substitute for a policy that matches the menace posed to America with the 
means and the will to confront it.” Driving home the argument, McCain more specifically 
addressed el-Baradei’s complaints, stating that “our determination to confront Saddam 
Hussein openly and with all necessary means demonstrates a freedom to act against an 
enemy that does not – yet – possess nuclear weapons.”564 In late October, the New York 
Times reported that Paul Wolfowitz was overseeing an intelligence unit in the Pentagon that 
was focusing its analysis on Iraq. Although the unit was not officially recognised, Wolfowitz 
justified the unit’s existence as “a phenomenon in intelligence work, that people who are 
pursuing a certain hypothesis will see certain facts that others won’t, and not see other facts 
others will…the lens through which you’re looking for facts affects what you look for.”565 
Richard Haass later wrote that intelligence had lost its way in regards to Iraq, explaining “not 
once in all my meetings in my years in government did an intelligence analyst or anyone else 
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for that matter argue openly or take me aside and say privately that Iraq possessed nothing 
in the way of weapons of mass destruction. If the emperor had no clothes, no one thought so 
or was prepared to say so.”566 Instead, as was seen by Wolfowitz’s intelligence unit at the 
Pentagon, the administration was searching for information that would support its decision to 
confront Iraq. 
The support Bush had received from Congress during the debate to authorise the use of 
force against Iraq helped the Republicans to secure mid-term elections in early November. 
Focusing on Congressional representatives who had challenged Bush over national security, 
and framed around the September 11 attacks, the Republicans maintained their majority 
throughout the Congress. In a news conference following the election result, Bush refocused 
his attention on pressuring the international community to fall behind the U.S. in the use of 
force in Iraq. Bush explained that “the only way in my judgement to deal with Saddam 
Hussein is to bring the international community together to convince him to disarm. But if 
he’s not going to disarm, we’ll disarm him in order to make the world a more peaceful 
place.”567 Bush stressed that the United Nations had to step up to its responsibilities and 
ensure that Iraq’s defiance did not go unanswered, stating “it’s very important the U.N. be a 
successful international body because the threats that we face now require more 
cooperation than ever.” However, reminded Bush, the key to upholding the United Nations’ 
responsibilities was that any resolution regarding Iraq had to agree on “serious 
consequences.”568 On November 8, a resolution passed through the United Nations Security 
Council and codified the demands of the U.S. into a new weapons inspection regime. Bush 
rationalised the resolution as a final test, stating that “Iraq must now, without delay or 
negotiations, fully disarm, welcome full inspections, and fundamentally change the approach 
it has taken for more than a decade.” However, Bush also warned that “The United States of 
America will not live at the mercy of any group or regime that has the motive and seeks the 
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power to murder Americans on a massive scale.”569 Although the resolution lacked explicit 
authorisation for the use of force and, instead, only warned that action would be taken in the 
case of ‘material breach’, Secretary Powell commented that it had given the weapons 
inspectors the regime they needed to verify Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction. 
According to Powell, “this is not just a matter between Iraq and the United States, but 
between Iraq and a united world.” However, Powell also warned Iraq that there should be no 
doubt that the U.S. would not “shrink from war if that is the only way to rid Iraq of its 
weapons of mass destruction.”570 At this stage, the decision to intervene in Iraq had already 
been made by Bush. 
In an effort to show that the administration had plans post-Saddam Hussein, Bush insisted 
that the sixty-five delegates who comprised of the exiled Iraqi government meet for a 
conference. The intended purpose of the meeting was to reach a consensus on support for 
Bush’s actions toward Iraq among Iraqi exiles. However, the conference was not a success 
as a number of delegates left the final session, claiming, “The conference had been ‘cooked’ 
from the start by the United States.” There were reports that “American officials [were] on 
hand to monitor the conference, cajoling its leaders in private to meet the goals set by 
Washington while ensuring that they did not overstep the American-drawn boundaries.” The 
only conclusion that the conference could agree upon was that “the United States leave 
governance of a post-Hussein Iraq to Iraqis and [reject] an American proposal to install a 
temporary United States military government.”571 Adding to the inconclusive conference was 
an op-ed by Representative Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Representative Chuck Hagel (R-NE), 
who warned that the U.S. would have to remain in Iraq to ensure stability. The 
representatives wrote that “coalition forces will remain in large numbers to stabilize Iraq and 
support civilian administration. That presence will be necessary for several years, given the 
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vacuum there, which a divided Iraqi opposition will have trouble filling and which some new 
Iraqi military strongman must not fill.”572 Despite any desire the Iraqi exiles had harboured to 
see the U.S. leave Iraq immediately after an intervention, it was unlikely to occur in reality.  
 
Going to War with Iraq 
Although there were protests against a war with Iraq in January, 2003, Bush’s decision to go 
to war was already made, evidenced by the escalating U.S. military presence in the Persian 
Gulf. The protests highlighted a grassroots discontent at the actions of both the 
administration and Congress. According to reports, “tens of thousands of protestors 
representing a diverse coalition for peace” had gathered for blocks in Washington DC.573 
The New York Times remarked in an editorial that “Mr. Bush and his war cabinet would be 
wise to see the demonstrators as a clear sign that noticeable numbers of Americans no 
longer feel obliged to salute the administration’s plans because of the shock of Sept. 11 and 
that many harbor serious doubts about his march to war.”574 Understanding that the 
administration might be losing support before hostilities even began, Rice wrote an op-ed in 
the New York Times titled “Why we know Iraq is lying.” Rice stressed that “There is no 
mystery to voluntary disarmament. Countries that decide to disarm lead inspectors to 
weapons and production sites, answer questions before they are asked, state publically and 
often the intention to disarm and urge their citizens to cooperate.” Iraq had been afforded 
ample opportunity to declare their weapons of mass destruction, and the documentation Iraq 
had provided to the Security Council failed “to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get 
uranium from abroad, its manufacture of specific fuel for ballistic missiles it claims not to 
have, and the gaps previously identified by the United Nations in Iraq’s accounting for more 
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than two tons of the raw materials needed to produce thousands of gallons of anthrax and 
other biological weapons.”575 Rice’s op-ed was part of a broader public campaign to 
invigorate support for Bush, a media strategy that Rice later described as a mistake. Rice 
recalled that “in support of the public case, the intelligence community began declassifying 
pieces of information in order to describe the emerging threat fully…as a result of this 
practice, these intelligence ‘nuggets’ became too much of the focus of the arguments about 
the dangers of Saddam. The entire case came to rest on those isolated intelligence 
statements about his program.”576 This became particularly obvious when Bush gave his 
State of the Union later that month. 
On January 28, Bush reinforced the case against Iraq. According the Rice, “the President 
knew that we were likely headed to war and wanted to give as detailed an assessment to the 
American people as possible.”577 Bush began by reciting the successes of the war on terror, 
explaining that “more than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries. 
Many others have met a different fate. Let’s put it this way: They are no longer a problem to 
the United States and our friends and allies.”578 Despite these successes, Saddam Hussein 
was still a continuing threat, “A brutal dictator, with a history of reckless aggression, with ties 
to terrorism, with great potential wealth [and] will not be permitted to dominate a vital region 
and threaten the United States.” Reciting a litany of intelligence ‘nuggets,’ Bush stated that 
the U.S. believed Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce biological and chemical 
weapons, and the technology needed to deliver them. Furthermore, “The British Government 
has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from 
Africa,” and “intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength 
aluminium tubes suitable for nuclear weapons productions.” The final intelligence ‘nugget’ 
was Bush’s assertion that “Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and 
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statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects 
terrorists, including members of Al Qaida.” Rice later regretted not intervening in the 
preparation of the State of the Union address, explain that “knowing the uncertainties that 
always attend intelligence and how it is especially true in intelligence that the whole is worth 
more than the sum of the parts, I should have resisted.”579 But, Bush went on confidently, 
ending his State of the Union with the promise that “if Saddam Hussein does not fully 
disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to 
disarm him.”580 Despite Bush’s assertions, there were still fluctuations in his domestic 
support. 
Bush’s approval rating was hovering around 56%. However, there was popular support for 
military action against Iraq, albeit under some caveats. Around 65% of respondents 
supported a military strike if the United Nations Security Council authorised the use of force, 
with only 30% supporting a unilateral attack. But, if Secretary Powell could produce definitive 
evidence that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction at the United Nations 
Security Council, then the support rallied up to 72%.581 On February 5, Powell did just that, 
presenting the U.S. case against Iraq to the United Nations. Richard Haass, who had been 
involved in the preparation of the presentation, argued that “by the end, all involved felt 
confident of what was in the text….People were exhausted, but the exhaustion was mixed 
with satisfaction, as the individuals I knew best believed they had prevailed in insisting on 
intellectual honesty, with the result that what Powell would say to the Security Council and 
the world would be accurate.”582 The result of the presentation to observers, both outside 
and inside the United States, was that it was a home run. Bush had no doubts as to the 
tenacity of Powell’s presentation, thanking him in a speech the following day for “his careful 
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and powerful presentation of the facts.”583 However, the purpose of Bush’s follow-up to 
Powell’s presentation was to demand an ultimatum of both the United Nations Security 
Council and Iraq. According to Bush, Saddam Hussein had not cooperated with weapons 
inspectors with his November declaration and had, therefore, made his decision not to 
cooperate. Bush explained “now the nations of the Security Council must make their own 
[choice]…Having made its demands, the Security Council must not back down when those 
demands are defied and mocked by a dictator.”584 Either the United Nations Security Council 
introduce a final resolution that would enforce its demands, or the United States would see 
that they were fulfilled unilaterally. 
There was an immediate reaction, both domestically and globally, to Powell’s presentation. 
Richard Haass, explaining the rationale as to why Powell was chosen to give the 
presentation, wrote “People around the country and the world trusted him, in part because of 
his record, in part because he was viewed as practical and reasonable rather than 
ideological. Many outsiders were clearly taking their lead from him.”585 Throughout the 
media, foreign leaders expressed their support for Bush to the American people. Angela 
Merkel, leader of the opposition party in Germany, expressed her support for the United 
States. This was despite Germany’s Prime Minister Joscha Schroeder’s apparent lack of 
support for Bush. Merkel declared that Germany was committed to the U.S. and explained 
that there were two factors apparent in Powell’s speech – “first, the danger from Iraq is not 
fictitious but real. Second, working not against but jointly with the United States, Europe 
must take more responsibility for maintaining internal pressure on Saddam Hussein.” 
According to Merkel, “peace is the supreme good, for the sake of which every effort has to 
be made. But it is also true that responsible leadership must on no account trade the 
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genuine peace of the future for the deceptive peace of the present.”586 Writing an equally 
supportive op-ed was East Timor’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Ramos-Horta, who had 
shared a Nobel peace prize in 1996. Contrary to the peaceful accolades, Ramos-Horta 
compared the situation in Iraq to that of East Timor’s fight for independence from Indonesia, 
and explained that “Many families were entirely wiped out during the decades of occupation 
by Indonesia and the war of resistance against it. The United States and other Western 
nations contributed to this tragedy. Some bear a direct responsibility because they helped 
Indonesia by providing military aid. Others were accomplices through indifference and 
silence. But all redeemed themselves.” In 1999, a global peace keeping force finally came to 
East Timor and helped establish independence. Ramos-Horta wondered why Iraq should not 
be offered the same chance at liberation, criticising the anti-war movement and explaining 
that if they succeeded in stalling the war they would have to accept that they “helped keep a 
ruthless dictator in power and explain itself to the tens of thousands of his victims.”587 Even 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard wrote of his support for Bush. According to Howard, 
intervening in Iraq was the correct decision as “the potential cost of doing nothing is clearly 
much greater than the cost of doing something.” Howard promised that Australia would be 
allied with the U.S. in eradicating the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.588 Despite pledges 
of international support there was a swelling of dissent. In New York, there had been 
between 100,000 - 400,000 demonstrators protesting against a war with Iraq, whereas in 
London there were 500,000 - 750,000 in Hyde Park. There were even more protests 
scattered among the capitals of the world.589  
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Just as there was an outpouring of international support in the American media, so too was 
there domestic support among the major newspapers. In the wake of Secretary Powell’s 
presentation at the United Nations Security Council, the Wall Street Journal wrote that “the 
Powell evidence will be persuasive to anyone who is still persuadable. It proves that Saddam 
is defying the will of the U.N. one more time, hiding his weapons in the hope that the world 
will again lose its will to stop him.”590 As a statement, the Wall Street Journal added that “we 
do not want to gamble – and no American President can afford to gamble – the future of 
U.S. security on the hope that Saddam will not link arms with al Qaeda or other terrorists.”591 
However, the New York Times was more hesitant to back Bush, adding that the newspaper’s 
support for military action was conditional. The New York Times explained that it was 
disconcerting that the United Nations Security Council could not find a consensus on the 
situation in Iraq. The newspaper believed that Bush should encourage other powers in the 
Security Council to “approve a resolution setting a date for Iraq to comply with disarmament 
demands or face the likelihood of united military action.”592 Commenting directly on Powell’s 
presentation, the New York Times was unpersuaded that Saddam Hussein posed an 
immediate threat to the U.S.  
By February 26, it was clear that Bush had settled on a military confrontation with Saddam 
Hussein and was now considering the benefits of a liberated Iraq in the Middle East. In a 
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speech at the American Enterprise Institute, reiterating that Iraq was a danger that had to be 
confronted, Bush added that “a free Iraq would [benefit] the Iraqi people themselves…their 
lives and their freedom matter little to Saddam Hussein, but Iraqi lives and freedom matter 
greatly to us.” Moving beyond the immediate objective of disarming Iraq, Bush went on to 
say that “the nation of Iraq, with its proud heritage, abundant resources, and skilled and 
educated people, is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom.” 
Therefore, according to Bush, confronting and deposing Saddam Hussein could help spread 
democracy throughout the Middle East, going so far as to say that “Success in Iraq could 
also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace and set in motion progress towards a truly 
democratic Palestinian state.”593 The American Enterprise Institute speech had been one 
last chance for Bush to justify the U.S. desire to confront Saddam Hussein. Rice admitted 
that by late February, “Steve Hadley and I realized belatedly that the President had not 
made the broader argument. Somehow all that Saddam had done and what he meant to 
stability in the Middle East was getting lost in the discussion.”594 Therefore, the reorientation 
of Bush’s speech to stress the liberation of Iraq was an attempt to illustrate the broader 
objectives of the U.S., objectives that went beyond the matter of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
Speaking with the press only days before inspectors reported to the Security Council on 
March 8, Bush tried to reassure reporters that the U.S. was still pursuing a diplomatic 
solution in the United Nations, but war appeared inevitable. Bush stressed that “Saddam 
Hussein has had 12 years to disarm. He is deceiving people…he’s trying to buy time.” The 
U.S. regarded Iraq a threat, and Bush insisted that his job was to protect the American 
people. However, there was an undercurrent of discontent about the lack of support from the 
United Nations. Asked if the U.S. would be seen as defying the United Nations should there 
be a confrontation without Security Council approval, Bush responded “I’m confident the 
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American people understand that when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we will 
act, and we really don’t need United Nations approval to do so…as we head into the 21st 
century, Mark, when it comes to our security, we really don’t need anybody’s permission.”595 
It was clear that Bush did not regard United Nations Security Council approval as a pre-
condition to act against Iraq. Mohamed el-Baradei, however, disagreed with Bush’s 
assessment, and took the time to clarify the progress of IAEA inspections in the Wall Street 
Journal. El-Baradei argued that the president had deliberately misrepresented the inspection 
process, explaining: 
The IAEA’s inspectors have systematically examined the contents and operations of all 
Iraqi buildings and facilities that were identified through satellite surveillance as having 
been modified or newly constructed since December 1998, when inspections were 
brought to a halt. They have determined the whereabouts and functionality of Iraq’s 
known ‘dual-use’ equipment – that is, equipment that has legitimate industrial uses, such 
as precision machining, but that could also be used for the high-precision manufacture 
of components relevant to a nuclear-weapons program. 
El-baradei added that “throughout the past three months, Iraqi authorities have provided 
access to all facilities without conditions and without delay and have made documents 
available in response to inspectors’ requests.” El-Baradei was confident enough to claim that 
“to date, we have found no substantiated evidence of the revival in Iraq of a nuclear-
weapons program – the most lethal of the weapons of mass destruction.”596 Although el-
Baradei’s op-ed was meant to cast doubt over the claims made by Bush about the 
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immediate threat posed by Saddam Hussein, it did not alter the decision to go to war with 
Iraq.  
By March 16, a joint press conference with Bush, Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao 
Barroso of Portugal, Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, and Prime Minister Tony 
Blair was held as the leaders met in Azores, Portugal, to discuss plans to confront Iraq. Bush 
stressed that “Iraq’s liberation would be the beginning, not the end, of our commitment to its 
people…Iraq has the potential to be a great nation…we’re committed to the goal of a unified 
Iraq, with democratic institutions of which members of all ethnic and religious groups are 
treated with dignity and respect.”597 Despite Bush’s confidence, Blair stressed that the 
decision to confront Iraq was made reluctantly. Blair, optimistically, stated that “we will do all 
we can in the short time that remains to make a final round of contacts, to see whether there 
is a way through this impasse. But we are in the final stages, because after 12 years of 
failing to disarm him, now is the time when we have to decide.”598 On March 17, Bush 
addressed the nation and officially declared that diplomatic efforts had failed to secure Iraqi 
disarmament. Bush stated clearly that “the United States of America has the sovereign 
authority to use force in assuring its own national security. That duty falls to me as 
Commander in Chief, by the oath I have sworn, by the oath I will keep.”599 Bush’s decision 
did not allow for any more time to be spent on diplomatic overtures, demanding that 
“Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will 
result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.” Bush emphasised that 
going to war with Iraq was a chief objective in the war on terror, and added that “terrorists 
and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations. And 
responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense; it is suicide. 
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The security of the world requires disarming of Saddam Hussein now.”600 Across the U.S., 
Bush was already experiencing increased support as Americans rallied around the 
president.  News poll figures showed that 61% of respondents agreed that the U.S. should 
attack Iraq, and Bush’s approval rating climbed from 54% to 62%, with six in ten Americans 
believing that Bush had adequately explained the risks involved.601 In the New York Times, 
another poll showed that 57% of Americans were under the impression Saddam Hussein 
“helped the terrorists in the Sept. 11 attacks.”602  
As this chapter has illustrated, the domestic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 
2003 began in earnest as Bush rebounded from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to 
rally the U.S. to the war on terror. However, Bush had to rely on a domestic campaign in 
order to propel his foreign policy. Before the terrorist attacks, Bush’s administration was 
earning a reputation for fickle foreign policy decisions. However, after the terrorist attacks 
Bush’s foreign policy found purpose. A war on terror was declared, and Afghanistan became 
the first target, supported by the international community and an American public searching 
for retribution. Within the rebirth of Bush’s foreign policy was Saddam Hussein. Domestically, 
Saddam Hussein was reviled and his continued leadership was a point of contention for 
Congress and the American people. Bush’s war on terror helped to legitimate the domestic 
derision of Saddam Hussein, and offered a policy solution to his undesirable leadership. 
Bush’s pursuit of terror, buttressed by the support from Congress, evolved into the decision 
to go to war with Iraq. To this end, Bush went to considerable lengths in order to establish 
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the reality of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and his emphasis that Saddam 
Hussein’s past intentions to acquire weapons of mass destruction were shown to indicate his 
capabilities to attack the U.S. and firmly consolidated public support for Bush’s decision to 
go to war.





The Diplomatic Origins of the Decision to Go to War with Iraq, 2001-2003 
 
“Iraq is a centrepiece of American foreign policy, influencing how the United States is viewed 
in the region and around the world…Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by 
American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and a moral interest 
in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy.”603 
 
George W. Bush, unlike his father, lacked the diplomatic acumen to rank among the great 
foreign policy presidents of the United States. However, events would dictate that Bush, just 
like his father, would face a shift in the international order that demanded an unprecedented 
diplomatic response. And in the middle of these events emerged Saddam Hussein as a 
threat to the U.S. The diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003 began 
well before Bush was elected president in 2000 and his administration had reviewed its 
policy priorities. As a result, the policy of the U.S. towards Iraq evolved in the wake of the 
war with Iraq in 1991. Thus, the diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq 
indicate that the decision was based on the precedent set by past administrations, especially 
the administration of George H. W. Bush. The impetus to confront Saddam Hussein was 
expedited by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. It was in the aftermath of these 
attacks that Bush embraced the opportunity to seek retribution and to confront those 
believed responsible. As the threat of terrorism to U.S. national security was conflated, so 
too were there evaluations of the threats that already confronted the U.S., in particular, Iraq. 
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As an illustration of how far the U.S. had evolved in its foreign policy since the end of the 
Cold War, Bush interpreted Saddam Hussein’s past intentions to pursue weapons of mass 
destruction to mean that the Iraqi leader had the capabilities to achieve his goals, and 
concluded that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the national security of the U.S. In the end, 
Bush decided to neutralise that threat by going to war with Iraq. 
In order to explore the diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq, this chapter 
will begin at the end of the war with Iraq in 1991 and establish the precedent of diplomatic 
conduct toward Iraq established by President George H. W. Bush and overseen by 
President Bill Clinton. The international weapons inspections and sanctions remained intact 
for several years before encountering difficulties and confronting changing political trends. 
As a consequence, the consensus that George H. W. Bush cherished in the United Nations 
Security Council changed, and the fundamental tenets of the international weapons 
inspections and sanctions, constructed around containing and dismantling any threat posed 
by Iraq, broke down as a humanitarian crisis emerged in Iraq throughout the 1990s.604 In 
2001, George W. Bush was elected president of the U.S. and embraced the evolving United 
Nations Security Council consensus toward Iraq, looking to exert U.S. influence. This effort 
was cut short on September 11, when terrorist attacks rocked the U.S. and a new threat 
emerged at the beginning of the twenty first century, presenting itself as a strategic 
challenge to U.S. superpower. Dismissing the pretences of ‘new world order’ diplomacy that 
encouraged consensus-driven leadership, Bush announced a war on terror that took the 
U.S. deep into Afghanistan in a military intervention that was supported, but not controlled, 
by the international community. After quickly dispatching the Taliban, who were the highest 
authority in Afghanistan, and dismantling Al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. was 
in a position to turn its attention to the potential threat of Iraq that had lingered since 1991. 
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By using its new war-footing to leverage dialogue with Iraq, the U.S. initially found 
international support for a renewed weapons inspection process that would establish the 
threat posed by Iraq to international peace and security. Weapons inspections, however, 
were found to be largely outside the influence of the U.S. and, resorting to diplomatic options 
that allowed for the U.S. to maintain control over strategic objectives, Bush leaned toward 
military intervention as it was stressed that the weapons inspection process could not 
definitively confirm, nor deny, U.S. intelligence that suggested Iraq was a threat. The 
diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq show that Bush, in an atmosphere of 
fear and insecurity, made the decision to resort to war with Iraq by utilising the diplomatic 
legitimacy that had been established by George H. W. Bush in 1991, and acting unilaterally 
when multilateral options did not favour the U.S. 
 
The New World Order in Practice 
After one hundred days of combat, Operation Desert Storm, which had made extensive use 
of airstrikes and a ground offensive, was declared a success. The international coalition led 
by the U.S. had achieved the United Nations Security Council’s objective of forcing a 
complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Faced with the decision to pursue the retreating Iraqi 
forces or to conclude the military intervention, George H. W. Bush chose the latter. National 
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Bush later rationalised the decision by claiming that it 
set a precedent for the benevolence of U.S. superpower post-Cold War. They wrote that 
“Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies, who now trusted us 
far more than they ever had. We had come to their assistance in their time of need, asked 
nothing for ourselves, and left again when the job was done.”605 Although the decision not to 
pursue the retreating Iraqi forces and confront Saddam Hussein in Baghdad would later 
receive criticism, Bush’s decision was supported. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 
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concluded in a press conference not long after the end of Desert Storm that the decision to 
fall back was the correct one, explaining that “If you’re going to go in and try to topple 
Saddam Hussein, you have to go into Baghdad. Once you’ve got Baghdad, it’s not clear 
what you do with it. It’s not clear what kind of government you would put in place of the one 
that’s currently there.”606 However, the conclusion of Desert Storm left the threat of Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction unchecked. In order to verify that Iraq no longer remained a 
danger to any states in the Persian Gulf, the United Nations Security Council agreed to an 
ongoing monitoring and verification programme that inventoried and destroyed Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction and its weapons manufacturing capabilities. To ensure Iraq 
complied with the United Nations Security Council demands for complete disarmament, 
sanctions that had been imposed on Iraq for the annexation of Kuwait were allowed to 
continue and were conditional, depending on Iraq’s disarmament status. The United Nations 
Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created under the executive chairmanship of Swedish 
Ambassador, Rolf Ekeus, to oversee the disarmament process and report to the Security 
Council regarding Iraq’s compliance. UNSCOM worked alongside the only other weapons 
verification mechanism in the United Nations - the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). Through UNSCOM and the IAEA, the United Nations Security Council maintained 
authority over Iraq, especially with the unprecedented range of UNSCOM’s new powers that 
allowed inspectors to “designate for inspection any site, facility, activity, material or other 
item in Iraq.” These inspections, according to the Security Council, “would be conducted 
unannounced and at short notice,”607 and included overhead surveillance so that inspectors 
could more aggressively search for weapons. In return, Iraq was expected to support all 
UNSCOM and IAEA efforts unconditionally.608  
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With their new authority, UNSCOM weapons inspectors dismantled and destroyed more 
chemical and biological weapons, and manufacturing facilities, than the ground offensive 
and airstrikes throughout operation Desert Storm. Judged by their initial reports, UNSCOM 
was making headway toward verifying Iraq as completely disarmed. Despite these 
successes, there were concerns that the weapons inspectors were becoming an 
enforcement arm of the United Nations Security Council. Mohammed el-Baradei, legal head 
of the IAEA, recalled that while travelling from one location to another, and glancing around 
at the bus full of predominantly American specialists, he was struck by the attitude of those 
who were inspectors, noting that “they were highly qualified technically, but they had no clue 
about how to conduct international inspections or, for that matter, about the nuances of how 
to behave in different cultures. From their brash conversation, it was clear they believed that, 
having come to a defeated country, they had free rein to behave as they pleased.”609 The 
difference in UNSCOM and IAEA inspection methods was also noticed by Hans Blix, who 
was head of the IAEA. Agreeing with el-Baradei, Blix added that in some cases inspections 
were more like intelligence gathering operations. In one case, David Kay, an American 
inspector, uncovered a cache of documents that concerned Iraq’s nuclear weapons 
programme. After a highly charged standoff in a car park that lasted several hours, where 
Kay refused to hand over the documents to Iraqi authorities and the Iraqi authorities refused 
to allow Kay to leave with the documents, the matter was resolved. The confrontational, and 
reckless, nature of Kay’s approach, which was a hallmark of the methods employed by 
UNSCOM, meant that Blix held reservations over the free-for-all information gathering that 
was being encouraged. After analysing the documents, Blix concluded that they had some 
use, but the process of finding the documents was flawed. First, to find the documents, you 
first had to know where to look. And, second, “the documents did not head to any weapons 
stores or, for that matter, to any weapons at all.”610 In an effort to create a more efficient 
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inspection process, UNSCOM and the IAEA turned toward intelligence agencies as a source 
of information that might aid weapons inspectors. Although there were benefits with 
intelligence agencies sharing what they knew about Iraq’s weapons programmes, Blix noted 
that “Gradually, ‘sharing’ came to mean that the intelligence partners ‘shared’ all the 
UNSCOM information they wanted, while information they obtained through piggybacking 
might not have been ‘shared’ with UNSCOM.”611 As the intelligence agencies became more 
entwined with weapons inspections, and progress on verifying Iraq as completely disarmed 
stagnated, it was only a matter of time before Iraq became frustrated by the lack of progress. 
After all, the sanctions that had been imposed since 1991 were still in full effect.  
By 1998, after seven long years of unrelenting sanctions and continuous inspections, there 
still remained unanswered questions and doubts over the status of Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction, despite Iraqi objections. In August, Richard Butler, who had replaced Rolf Ekeus 
as chairman of UNSCOM in 1997, met with Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, to 
devise a work schedule that satisfactorily addressed the remaining disarmament questions. 
According to Butler, there was a lack of documentation that verified the unilateral destruction 
of missile production facilities, the status of chemical munitions, and the movement of 
prohibited equipment in Iraq. These concerns were in addition to the unresolved status of 
missing mustard gas shells.612 However, it was in regards to biological weapons capabilities 
that Butler was adamant Iraq was refusing to cooperate with UNSCOM, explaining that “The 
experts recommended that no further verification and/or assessment of Iraq’s biological 
declaration of full, final and complete disclosure be conducted until Iraq commits itself to 
provide a new and substantive information.” According to these experts, “any other approach 
would be a waste of time.”613 This prompted Aziz to condemn UNSCOM for the refusal to 
verify that Iraq was disarmed, and subsequently lifting sanctions. According to Aziz, there 
were only two remaining questions from the weapons inspections. They were “whether Iraq 
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retained any weapons of mass destruction, including long-range missiles; and whether Iraq 
retained capabilities for their production.”614 Aziz’s simplification of the remaining weapons 
inspections objections did not garner support from Butler. 
The answer to both of Aziz’s questions was an emphatic, no. According to Iraq, UNSCOM 
had deliberately emphasised minor issues with documentation in order to justify the United 
Nations Security Council continuing sanctions on Iraq. But, Butler argued that he was “not 
permitted to make disarmament by declaration,” and that without credible evidence provided 
by Iraq “members of the council would challenge his claim that Iraq had no more proscribed 
weapons or capabilities.”615 The purpose of the meeting, stressed Butler, was to implement a 
work schedule that would lead to the suspension of sanctions providing Iraq cooperated with 
UNSCOM. Aziz dismissed the plan out of hand, stating simply that “There are no more 
proscribed weapons and materials in Iraq.” According to Aziz, if UNSCOM could not report to 
the Security Council that Iraq was disarmed now there was no guarantee that UNSCOM 
would make that report in the future. Therefore, went on Aziz, Iraq would refuse to cooperate 
with inspections, referring to the proposed work schedule as “useless.”616 As a result of 
Iraq’s refusal to cooperate with weapons inspectors, in December the U.S. advised 
UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors to leave Iraq immediately and proceeded to conduct the 
airstrike campaign Operation Desert Fox. The operation was a punishment, dealt out by the 
U.S., for Iraq breaching the Security Council resolutions demanding unconditional 
cooperation with weapons inspectors. However, the airstrikes only prompted Tariq Aziz to 
officially announce, on December 19, that Iraq would not comply with UNSCOM’s mission in 
Iraq any further, eliminating weapons inspections in Iraq.617 In response, President Bill 
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Clinton announced that U.S. policy was no longer to contain Iraq, but to replace Saddam 
Hussein’s regime.618 
In January 1999, the United Nations Security Council began an inquiry into the situation in 
Iraq in order to review all the evidence that had been gathered by UNSCOM and the IAEA 
over the weapons inspection period. The inquiry comprised of three panels that evaluated 
the humanitarian impact of the sanctions regime that was determined by the verified 
disarmament of Iraq’s weapons programmes and addressed the concerns that were aired in 
the meeting between Butler and Aziz in 1998. Brazil’s Ambassador Celso Amorim headed 
the panel that reviewed UNSCOM and IAEA conclusions. According to the IAEA, inspections 
had determined that Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme “had been very well funded and 
was aimed at the development and production of a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, but 
there was no indications that Iraq had achieved its programme’s objective.”619 The IAEA 
concluded, based upon the information that had been collected and presented to the United 
Nations Security Council up until weapons inspectors withdrew from Iraq in 1998, that “there 
is no indication that Iraq possess nuclear weapons or any meaningful amounts of weapon-
usable nuclear material or that Iraq has retained any practical capability (facilities or 
hardware) for the production of such material.”620 Although there were remaining concerns 
over a lack of documentation that covered specific technical aspects of the Iraqi nuclear 
programme, the Amorim report concluded that Iraq was disarmed of nuclear weapons 
capability, and that the IAEA was in a position to move to an ongoing monitoring programme. 
However, UNSCOM findings had been more problematic. Although UNSCOM inspectors 
had disarmed Iraq of its verified ballistic weapons capabilities, concerns remained over the 
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status of over fifty warheads and seven missiles that had been unilaterally destroyed without 
documentation. Similar concerns were expressed over the status of chemical weapons. Over 
the course of inspections, UNSCOM inspectors had verified and destroyed a significant 
amount of munitions and production capacity. However, there were munitions that the Iraqi’s 
unilaterally destroyed that lacked documentation. UNSCOM were also unable to find 
evidence that explained the discrepancies in financing for chemical weapons during the 
1980s, the status of five hundred and fifty artillery shells that had gone missing during the 
Gulf War in 1991, and the military panning for Iraq’s VX programme. However, despite the 
issues surrounding Iraq’s chemical weapons programme, the Amorim report concluded that 
UNSCOM had destroyed and rendered inoperable all declared biological weapons facilities 
in Iraq. After reviewing all the available information presented by UNSCOM and the IAEA, 
the Amorim report concluded that “although important elements still have to be resolved, the 
bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated.”621 The Amorim report 
did not, however, vouch for the complete disarmament of Iraq. 
Ambassador Amorim’s evaluation was that weapons inspections in Iraq had reached a “point 
of impasse,” where “further investigation of these issues under the current 
procedures…might correspond to an apparent diminishing return in recent years.”622 The 
weapons inspection programme was based on the belief that Iraq could be disarmed beyond 
any reasonable doubt, something both the IAEA and UNSCOM believed was not possible, 
and therefore the programme had to shift priority to an ongoing monitoring and verification 
programme that would “attempt to determine that proscribed activities are not being carried 
out.”623 In order to do this, the core mission for UNSCOM was reinterpreted, and 
Ambassador Amorim concluded that “such a reinforced OMV system, which should include 
intrusive inspections and investigation of relevant elements of past activities, is viable.”624 
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Hans Blix, watching the report’s findings closely, approved of the revised UNSCOM mission. 
Blix was satisfied that the nature of UNSCOM inspections had been found ineffective, and 
that Ambassador Amorim’s report had insisted that “inspection should be effective and could 
be highly intrusive, but should avoid being unnecessarily confrontational.”625 For Blix, then, 
the Amorim report reinforced United Nations authority over the weapons inspection process. 
However, there still remained questions over the status of sanctions that had been devised 
around the objective of verified, and complete, Iraqi disarmament. The U.S., ceding authority 
over weapons inspections to the United Nations Security Council, refused to support 
relinquishing sanctions, arguing that Iraq was still in breach of its Security Council 
requirements. In an effort to compromise with the members of the United Nations Security 
Council, and regain some consensus on Iraq, the U.S. spent the end of 1999 negotiating a 
new sanctions resolution. The U.S. agreed to loosen economic sanctions, if Iraq made 
significant progress on a number of outstanding disarmament tasks that would be 
determined by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC), the weapons inspection commission that had replaced UNSCOM and 
contained the recommendations of the Amorim report.626 Iraq refused to readmit weapons 
inspectors under the new conditions, instead, choosing to remain isolated from the 
international community. 
 
The Evolving United Nations Security Council Consensus 
In January 2000, Hans Blix was nominated for the chairmanship of UNMOVIC. Accepting the 
appointment, Blix reflected on the reasons for leaving retirement to take on another posting 
in the United Nations. Blix explained that since his tenure as head of the IAEA, and 
throughout UNSCOM inspections, he believed that the confrontational nature of the 
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inspections were counterproductive, and served only to antagonize Iraq. Blix recalled, “I had 
heard it many times from inspectors that they thought the IAEA often got more information 
through a more restrained, professional UN Style.”627 Upon being asked to head UNMOVIC, 
Blix found it difficult to resist applying this preferred style of inspections to UNMOVIC. 
Alongside Mohamed el-Baradei, who had replaced Hans Blix as head of the IAEA in 1997, 
the new weapons inspections regime showed a re-evaluated approach to the questions that 
had emerged from Ambassador Amorim’s report. By March 24, Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon reported to the Security Council that there was a humanitarian crisis in Iraq as a result 
of the ongoing sanctions, and the United Nations Security Council had to find a solution. Ban 
Ki-Moon reminded the Security Council that “the United Nations has always been on the side 
of the vulnerable and the weak and has always sought to relieve suffering. Yet here we are 
accused of causing suffering to an entire population.”628 Ban Ki-Moon’s report was the 
beginning of a change in the Security Council’s consensus over Iraq. 
Ban Ki-Moon’s report to the Security Council served as cover for the permanent members of 
the Security Council to express their dissatisfaction with the current sanctions imposed on 
Iraq. Russia’s Ambassador Sergey Lavrov pointed to a double standard in the application of 
sanctions and complained that states who were attempting to conduct legitimate business 
with Iraq had found their efforts blocked by other Security Council members for “artificial 
pretexts.” According to Ambassador Lavrov, some business contracts were placed on hold, 
while “requests for deliveries of similar goods from other countries are endorsed without any 
problem.”629 If the administration of sanctions was so ineffective, went the reasoning, then it 
was assumed that they would not be successfully implemented. Furthermore, the unilaterally 
imposed no-fly zones that were enforced by the U.S. and United Kingdom were a source of 
antagonism for Iraq. Ambassador Lavrov explained that it was “inadmissible to call upon Iraq 
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to cooperate while at the same [time] continuing to bomb Iraqi territory.”630 France’s 
Ambassador Jean-David Levitte agreed with the Russian appraisal of the situation in Iraq. 
The inconsistency of the Security Council application of Iraqi sanctions was unacceptable, 
and they could no longer ignore the developing humanitarian crisis. Ambassador Levitte 
explained that as a result of sanctions “in the future, the effectiveness and consequences of 
broad, indiscriminate sanctions that hurt civilian populations exclusively and whose human 
cost clearly exceeds any political benefits that the Council could expect of them.”631 United 
States Ambassador James Cunningham could not believe that the Security Council was 
developing a consensus that absolved Iraq of its past indiscretions. Defending the Security 
Council’s stance in regards to Iraqi sanctions, Ambassador Cunningham recited a list of 
resolutions that Iraq had failed to implement, and concluded that “Iraq remains a threat.”632 
Ambassador Cunningham, appealing to Security Council members, explained that so long 
as Saddam Hussein retained leadership in Iraq there would be no cooperation with the 
Security Council, and that “Where there has been deprivation in Iraq, the Iraqi regime has 
been responsible.”633 Although the Security Council was seen to be moving away from the 
consensus that sanctions deserved to be enforced because of Iraq’s defiance, 
Cunningham’s response illustrated the shift in U.S. perceptions of the problems faced in 
Iraq. The emphasis placed on Saddam Hussein reflected the shift, seen under Clinton, 
toward regarding the dictator, rather than the state, as the source of instability in the Persian 
Gulf. 
The U.S. position remained unchanged in Security Council. Ambassador Cunningham 
refused to back down from the commitment to contain the threat posed by Iraq by enforcing 
no-fly zones, and dismissed the administrative difficulties some states had raised concerning 
the application of sanctions. According to Cunningham, it was Iraq that had to change its 
                                                          
630
 Ibid. 6. 
631
 Ibid. 16 – 17. 
632
 Ibid. 7. 
633
 Ibid. 8. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Six      Chapter Six 
202 
 
relationship with the United Nations Security Council, not the other way around. Cunningham 
insisted that the oil-for-food programme, a sanctions compromise that the U.S. had agreed 
to when UNMOVIC was created, was a necessary concession. Cunningham went to great 
lengths to emphasise that it was the Iraqi government that was failing the Iraqi people, not 
the international community, explaining that “The United Nations works for the Iraqi people. 
The Government [of Iraq] does not. Non-governmental organisations work for the Iraqi 
people. The Government [of Iraq] does not.”634 Although Ambassador Cunningham made a 
cursory effort to stress the importance of the United Nations Security Council consensus 
against Iraq, the ambassador lacked direct support from the Clinton administration. Kenneth 
Pollack, a CIA analyst specialising in the Middle East, explained that by the end of the 
Clinton Administration attention had turned away from the situation in Iraq. Pollack observed 
that “By the summer of 2000…The Vice President was campaigning full-time, the president 
was investing ever more of his time in trying to secure a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement 
before he left office, and the rest of the government was just trying to prevent its position on 
Iraq from deteriorating further.”635 Just as the weapons inspections had suffered from fatigue, 
so too had U.S. attention toward Iraq. 
In June, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to continue the oil-for-food 
programme that was the backbone of emergency humanitarian aid to Iraq. However, the 
continuation of the programme only showed the unwillingness of the permanent members to 
explore new possibilities for improving the situation in Iraq. China’s Ambassador Wang 
Yingfan was not restrained in expressing China’s disappointment with the Security Council, 
arguing that they were not “entirely satisfied with the resolution that the Council had just 
adopted…because it does not fully reflect an important element favoured by most States 
members of the Council.”636 Focused on the humanitarian impact of the sanctions, 
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Ambassador Yingfan stated, “The humanitarian suffering of Iraqi civilians is, principally, a 
consequence of the 10 years of sanctions against Iraq”637 and, therefore, the Security 
Council was responsible for the welfare of the Iraqi people. Despite China’s efforts to refocus 
the Security Council on the humanitarian impact of the sanctions, the oil-for-food programme 
was again reviewed in December and extended into the New Year, the only alteration 
attributed to financial provisions that would streamline funds into the reconstruction of Iraq’s 
oil industry. Even this minor alteration was enough to prompt Ambassador Cunningham to 
warn the Security Council against loosening the economic constraints on Iraq, as it was still 
clear that even “during the negotiation of this new phase of the programme we have seen 
numerous Iraqi attempts to avoid, rather than accept, obligations to the international 
community.”638 However, it was also clear that for as long as the U.S. remained focused on 
the presidential election, the administration was unwilling to compromise or consider any 
new approaches to Iraq, and sanctions remained in a suspended state. Ambassador Sergey 
Lavrov was adamant, in response to Cunningham’s indictment of the Iraqi regime, that “a 
fundamental resolution of the problem of the humanitarian crisis will be impossible as long 
as sanctions are maintained.”639 With the election of U.S. president George W. Bush, there 
was, at least, an opportunity to pursue an alternate solution. 
Bush was inaugurated as the 42nd President of the United States in January 2001. Despite 
the controversial election results that were, in the end, determined by a Supreme Court 
decision, Bush ended the Democrat occupation of the White House. This also meant the 
appointment of a new selection of secretaries, advisers, and policymakers. Kenneth Pollack, 
in a final memo briefing the incoming administration on the status of Iraq, warned that 
containment had eroded, and that there were two choices that had to be made – “to adopt 
an aggressive policy of regime change to try to get rid of Saddam quickly or undertake a 
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major revamping of the sanctions to try and choke off the smuggling and prevent Saddam 
from reconstituting his military, especially his hidden WMD programs.”640 Pollack complained 
that the second option was more difficult because of the lack of consensus in the United 
Nations Security Council and the unwillingness of other states to match U.S. intentions to 
confront Iraq. However, among the incoming policymakers, revamping sanctions appeared 
far more plausible, in the immediate future, than regime change. U.K. Prime Minister Tony 
Blair recalled, in his first meeting with Bush in February 2001, that there was no sense of 
urgency regarding Iraq. Blair explained that “George was set on building a strong right-wing 
power base in the US, capable of sustaining him through two terms, and was focused 
especially on education and tax reform.”641 Any concerns regarding Iraq involved the 
possibility of new sanctions. Richard Haass, who was now Director of Policy and Planning at 
the State Department, forwarded a plan to impose “smart” sanctions on Iraq that was based 
on research he had conducted with Meghan O’Sullivan at the Brookings Institution. The plan 
was simple. Smart sanctions allowed a larger range of non-military goods to be imported by 
Iraq, in exchange for an increased revenue stream from Iraqi exports going into accounts 
controlled by the United Nations instead of Iraq. The plan was embraced by Secretary 
Powell, and despite scepticism from the rest of the administration, Bush signed off the 
initiative.642 Haass noted that the administration understood from the beginning that Iraq was 
an important foreign policy concern. However, Haass explained that what the administration 
was focused on “when it came to Iraq was…recasting the sanctions regime. There was a 
directive to look at existing military plans, but this lacked any real intensity at the time. It was 
more a dusting off of what was there rather than anything new.”643 Bush was not inaugurated 
with a plan to oust Saddam Hussein. Indeed, Bush’s priorities rested in cutting government 
expenditure. This meant the Pentagon did not receive the increased funding that was 
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required for a new generation of weaponry, and the administration did not present any 
urgency in matters of defense. Any advanced plan to confront Iraq militarily, included.644  
The smart sanctions were put to the test at a United Nations Security Council session in 
June. Despite having received support from the U.K. for the revised sanctions, there 
remained significant opposition from the remaining members of the Security Council. Russia 
was particularly critical of the proposed changes, and Ambassador Lavrov argued that “key 
elements of the United Kingdom draft appear to lead not to easing the very harsh economic 
situation of Iraq, but rather to tightening the sanctions.”645 Lavrov explained that by further 
complicating the list of items that were under sanction, the Security Council was inhibiting, to 
a greater degree, legitimate trade with Iraq. China agreed with Lavrov’s assessment, and 
Ambassador Yingfin argued that “Foreign companies should be allowed to invest in Iraq, and 
countries should be allowed to freely sign service contracts with Iraq.”646 China and Russia 
agreed that the Security Council was exacerbating and prolonging the humanitarian crisis in 
Iraq by not relinquishing sanctions. This time U.K. Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock argued 
against opposition in the Security Council, stressing that “it is our responsibility in the Council 
to prevent Iraq from posing a threat to its region and, as part of this, to ensure that Iraq is 
fully and verifiably disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction.”647 Implementing smart 
sanctions was a step towards streamlining sanctions so that Iraq could not re-arm, and the 
impact of sanctions on the people of Iraq was negated. Greenstock reminded the Security 
Council that “we are all aware that Iraq continues to export oil outside the United Nations 
system to build up illegal revenue with which it can purchase weapons and other proscribed 
items.”648 Although Greenstock was reserved in his arguments against Chinese and Russian 
opposition, U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham was not. Cunningham stated simply that 
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smart sanctions were designed to prevent Iraq from acquiring the materials it needed to re-
arm. At some point in the future the Security Council might revise those limitations, but only 
“once there is confidence that they would not be used to rebuild Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction or improve its military capabilities.”649 The U.S. remained unconvinced that Iraq 
was disarmed, and remained committed to imposing sanctions on Iraq until it was. France, 
however, attempted to find a middle ground between the permanent members. Ambassador 
Levitte reminded China and Russia that weapon inspectors had been absent from Iraq for 
two and a half years. However, Levitte argued that “recovery requires the return of normal 
economic conditions.”650 As a result of the inconclusive debate between the permanent 
members, the introduction of smart sanctions was delayed. Bush remained confronted by 
the lingering problem of Iraq. According to Richard Haass, this was not a bad outcome. 
Reflecting on policy initiatives to confront Iraq, including forceful regime change, Haass 
concluded that “the current and projected situation was not intolerable. Saddam Hussein 
was a nuisance, not a mortal threat. Trying to oust him, however desirable, did not need to 
become such a preoccupation that it would come to dominate the administration’s foreign 
policy absent a major new provocation. The United States had more important goals to 
promote around both the region and the world that would be put in jeopardy were it to get 
bogged down in Iraq.”651 The failure of the U.S. to pressure the United Nations Security 
Council into embracing revised sanctions only diminished the authority the Security Council 
wielded over Iraq.  
The debate over Iraqi sanctions, however, had been opened to non-members of the Security 
Council, and the majority consensus of the non-Security Council members was in favour of 
reducing the severity of sanctions imposed on Iraq in order to alleviate a humanitarian crisis. 
This support encouraged Iraq’s Ambassador al-Qaysi, who blamed the U.S. for the 
continuing sanctions. Ambassador al-Qaysi complained that Iraq had been antagonised by 
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U.S. airstrikes in early February that destroyed a number of air-defense sites in Iraq.652 
According to al-Qaysi, Iraq was being unfairly and severely punished. Pointing to the 
consensus of the Security Council that sided with abandoning sanctions, Ambassador al-
Qaysi explained that “the faltering of the sanctions regime represents in reality a concrete 
reflection of the lack of conviction of the majority of the international community.”653 Smart 
sanctions that had been proposed by the U.S. and U.K. were accused of being a front for 
Western companies to receive preferential treatment. Ambassador al-Qaysi asked “Do we 
have any guarantee that those companies are not going to be fat cats of Western origin and 
be the only ones allowed to buy Iraqi oil?”654 However, this was beside the point. 
Ambassador al-Qaysi noted that the Amorim report had concluded that Iraq was disarmed, 
and warned the U.S. and U.K. that they could not accuse Iraq of reinstating weapons of 
mass destruction programs without evidence. Secretary General Kofi Annan had agreed with 
Iraq on this point, stating in an earlier report on the situation in Iraq that it was imperative to 
“put the burden of proof on any side that alleges that Iraq still has weapons of mass 
destruction.”655 The result of the open debate within the Security Council was a resounding 
rejection of the U.S. proposed smart sanctions, and the implemented oil-for-food program 
continued without change. Ambassador Cunningham rued that the Security Council had 
missed an opportunity to force change in Iraq, declaring that smart sanctions would “have 
been adopted today save for the threat of a veto.”656 Although disappointed at the lack of 
support in the Security Council, Ambassador Cunningham promised that “We have made 
considerable progress and have come too close to agreement to concede the field to 
                                                          
652
 Ibid. 173. 
653
 United Nations Security Council, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, Document Number S/PV.4336 
(Resumption 1), 28 June, 2001, 25. 
654
 Ibid. 27. 
655
 Ibid. 28. 
656
 United Nations Security Council, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, Document Number S/PV.4344, 3 
July, 2001, 3. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Six      Chapter Six 
208 
 
Baghdad.”657 It would take a greater effort from Washington to force change in the Security 
Council, let alone Iraq. 
 
A 21st Century Threat 
Surveying the international standing of the U.S. at the turn of the twenty-first century, 
diplomatic historian Andrew Bacevich observed that “For members of the young Bush 
administration charged with responsibility for American statecraft, the future looked rosy 
indeed.”658 However, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, irrevocably changed 
Bush’s diplomatic stance. The death of over three thousand American civilians stunned not 
only the U.S., but reverberated throughout the international community. At the behest of the 
U.K., the Security Council convened a session on September 12 in order to condemn the 
terrorist attacks. Ambassador Greenstock, reflecting on the attacks, explained that “we all 
have to understand that this is a global issue, an attack on the whole of modern civilization 
and an affront to the human spirit. We must all respond globally and show the strength of 
spirit.”659 The attacks had spurred a new solidarity between the permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council, as Ambassador Lavrov added that the terrorist attacks 
reminded every nation of the “the timeliness of the task of joining the efforts of the entire 
international community in combating terror, this plague of the twenty first century.”660 
Ambassador Levitte, summarising the collective thoughts of the United Nations Security 
Council, reminded the U.S. that “We stand with the United States in deciding upon any 
action to combat those who resort to terrorism, those who aid them and those who protect 
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them.”661 The offer to extend the hand of the United Nations Security Council toward fighting 
those involved in terrorism supported the new U.S. war footing. Ambassador Cunningham, 
proud of the support from the United Nations Security Council, stated that “we look to all 
those who stand for peace, justice and security in the world to stand together with the United 
States to win the war against terrorism. We will make no distinction between the terrorists 
who committed these acts and those who harbour them. We will bring those responsible to 
account.”662 The U.K., in leading condolences from the Security Council to the U.S., 
illustrated the close relationship between the two states, a fact that Blair stressed.663 
In the wake of the attacks, al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden was agreed on by U.S. 
intelligence as the likely organiser of the terrorist attacks, and was therefore the target of a 
U.S. military response. As one of al-Qaeda’s main training facilities was located in 
Afghanistan, and the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan refused to cooperate with the U.S. to 
hand over Osama Bin Laden and destroy the training facility, the U.S. set about achieving 
those two objectives itself. But, as expressed by Phillip Zelikow, the administration “had no 
plan whatever for ground operations in Afghanistan – none. The plans against Afghanistan, 
bearing the blustery codename Infinite Resolve, were little different than when the Clinton 
White House had looked them over after the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. Central 
Command (CENTCOM) commander Tommy Franks regarded them as hardly deserving the 
title ‘plan’.”664 The administration fell back onto a CIA plan to utilise tribal leaders in a loosely 
based Northern Alliance to agitate the Taliban government, and the U.S. pushed forward 
with its objectives to capture Osama Bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda’s base in Afghanistan, and 
                                                          
661
 Ibid. 7. 
662
 Ibid. 7-8. 
663
 A running theme in Blair’s memoirs is the U.K. standing ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ with the United States. The 
September 11 attacks, according to Blair, were not just an attack on the U.S., but on the U.K as well. As a 
consequence of the September 11 attacks, Blair viewed Iraq with a different filer, stressing that “I believed then, 
as I do now, that the US could not afford to lose this battle, that our job as an ally who faced a common threat 
should be to be with them in our hour of need.” Blair, A Journey, 401. 
664
 Phillip Zelikow, “US strategic planning in 2001-2002,” in ed. Melvyn P. Leffler, Jeffrey W. Legro, In Uncertain 
Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11 (Cornell University Press, 2011), 103. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Six      Chapter Six 
210 
 
expel the Taliban government. In November, the Taliban government dissolved and the U.S. 
military commitment was deemed a success. The lack of multilateral assistance also 
reinforced the success of U.S. unilateral action. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld had 
rebuffed an unprecedented offer from NATO for military assistance, determining such a large 
coalition as tactically prohibitive, and was relishing U.S. success.665 By March 2002, the U.S. 
began a larger operation against the remaining al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan that lead 
to anti-Taliban tribal leaders consolidating their control of Afghanistan. The war in 
Afghanistan was considered an overall victory when diplomats from several nations 
negotiated for the formation of a new Afghanistan government under the leadership of 
Hamid Karzai, a well-educated tribal leader who was the pick of the western governments. 
Riding a wave of popularity into 2002 as a decisive war-time president, Bush utilised his 
State of the Union address to lay the groundwork for the next step in what was regarded as 
a global war on terror. Referring to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “axis of evil” that 
threatened the peace and security of the world, Bush made it clear that the next step was to 
confront those threats. According to Zelikow, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
and speechwriter Michael Gerson believed the diplomatic emphasis of the State of the Union 
would focus on the “nonnegotiable demands of human dignity,” in an effort to describe a 
world “beyond the war on terror.” However, it was clear that Iraq had returned as a concern 
for the administration.666 The leaked military plan from the Department of Defense in 
February 2002 reinforced the assumption that Bush was supporting a plan to confront 
Saddam Hussein. In briefings, Bush had “overwhelmingly emphasized doable operations to 
defeat Iraqi forces and topple Saddam.”667 The reconfiguration of strategies to confront 
Saddam Hussein was reinforced by the success of the operations that had toppled Taliban 
and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. By June, a shift had been made in Bush’s stance on 
Iraq. In a graduation speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Bush suggested 
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that “deterrence could not be relied upon in an age in which rogue states and terrorist groups 
could acquire weapons of mass destruction,”668 a conclusion that was contrary to the advice 
of Richard Haass and the State Department. Haass noted that the administration was 
suffering from diverging advice over plans to confront Saddam Hussein, and that he was 
concerned when “those who worked with me on the Policy Planning Staff began to come 
back from meetings around the government and report that those of their counterparts 
known for advocating going to war with Iraq appeared too cocky for comfort.”669 With the 
military success in Afghanistan, the Defense Department had earned a reputation for results, 
unlike the State Department’s efforts to confront Saddam Hussein, and the increased 
planning within the Pentagon for war with Iraq intensified the public scrutiny. The cycle 
became self-fulfilling. As the media reported that war was being planned, the administration 
made sure that there were plans for war, lest they be caught unprepared.670 By August 2002, 
Blair remarked that “at times we would not be sure whether we were driving the agenda or 
being driven by it.”671 Bush waited to clarify the U.S. position at the United Nations in 
September.  
On September 12, 2002, Bush addressed the United Nations General Assembly for the first 
time. Secretary-General Kofi Annan set the agenda by listing threats to international peace 
and security one year on from the terrorist attacks in the U.S. First, Annan gave priority to 
the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Second, he referred to Iraq’s continued defiance of 
Security Council resolutions and the refusal to readmit inspectors. Annan considered the 
renewal of weapons inspections as an “indispensable first step towards assuring the world 
that all Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction have indeed been eliminated.” Third, he stressed 
the commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan was maintained in the wake of major military 
operations. And, fourth, was reconciling differences between India and Pakistan, both of 
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whom had recently acquired nuclear weapons.672 Bush’s address, however, ignored to a 
great extent Annan’s list and reinforced the perception that the U.S. had focused on Iraq. 
Bush stated that the “greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions 
when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies enabling them to kill on a 
massive scale.”673 According to Bush, Iraq was an outlaw state that continued “to shelter and 
support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iraq, Israel, and Western 
Governments.”674 By accusing Iraq of supporting terrorism, Bush had stretched the 
parameters of the global war on terror to legitimate action against Iraq. In support of the 
claim that Iraq posed an imminent threat to international peace and security, Bush explained 
that intelligence suggested Iraq was in the process of rebuilding its weapons of mass 
destruction capabilities, a claim that remained unverified because of the lack of weapons 
inspectors in Iraq. Bush was convinced that “Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be 
able to build a nuclear weapon within a year.”675 The central purpose of Bush’s address was 
to ignite support for a United Nations sanctioned mission to rectify the situation in Iraq, even 
suggesting that the United Nations help “build a Government that represents all Iraqis.’676 
However, there remained no doubts that the appeal to the United Nations for assistance was 
a take it or leave it proposition. Finishing his address, Bush promised that “the Security 
Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, 
or action will be unavoidable, and a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its 
power.”677 Indeed, Blair had noticed the shift in the U.S. attitude toward Iraq immediately 
after September 11. Blair recalled: 
Saddam had been an unwelcome reminder of battles past, a foe that we had beaten but 
left in place, to the disgruntlement of many. But he had not been perceived as a threat. 
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Now it was not so much that the direct threat increased, but he became bound up in the 
US belief that so shocking had been the attack, so serious had been its implications, that 
the world had to be remade. Countries whose governments were once disliked but 
tolerated became, overnight, potential enemies, to be confronted, made to change 
attitude, or made to change government.678  
Having disregarded Annan’s list of prominent threats to international peace and security, 
Bush left no doubt that there was a strategic shift in the global war on terror, and that it 
would focus on Iraq. 679 
Bush’s stance was confirmed in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) published on 
September 17, 2002, which emphasised the unilateralism of the U.S. The NSS was clear 
about what the U.S. was prepared to do to confront the twenty-first century threat of 
terrorism. The NSS stressed that “the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive 
posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of 
today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our 
adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike 
first.”680 This left the U.S. with the option of “pre-emptive actions” to counter perceived 
threats to its national security. The NSS added that “to forestall or prevent such hostile acts 
by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.”681 The strategy 
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embodied the vision of the world after September 11 that had been encouraged by 
Condoleezza Rice, a vision that “the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attack were bookends 
for a transitional period in world history.” Zelikow noted that Rice added “before the clay is 
dry again, America and our friends and our allies must move decisively.”682 However, even 
before the publication of the National Security Strategy, and Bush’s United Nations General 
Assembly address, it was already perceived through diplomatic channels that the U.S. was 
moving into militant posture. In July, Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of Britain’s Foreign 
Intelligence Service (MI6), had met with senior U.S. officials in Washington. In a memo from 
Downing Street on July 23, 2002, Dearlove recorded “a perceptible shift in attitude. Military 
action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, 
justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.”683 It was already clear to Iraq after Bush’s 
address to the United Nations that the U.S. was prepared to resort to force against Iraq and, 
pre-empting the publication of the NSS, Iraq readmitted weapons inspectors on September 
16, 2002. 
The United Nations Security Council spent October negotiating the conditions of the 
resumed weapons inspections in Iraq. In an effort to promote consensus, the Security 
Council session was an open debate. Secretary General Kofi Annan set the agenda by 
admitting, although the readmission of inspectors to Iraq was welcome, “Iraq has to 
comply…If Iraq fails to make use of this last chance, and if defiance continues, the Council 
will have to face its responsibilities.”684 However, Annan also warned the permanent 
members of the Security Council that “if you allow yourselves to be divided, the authority and 
credibility of the organization will undoubtedly suffer.”685 It was hoped that by opening the 
debate over two days, a broader consensus might emerge from the opportunity for states to 
articulate a position that was not normally heard in the Security Council. South African 
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Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo related the mission to disarm Iraq to the same process of 
disarming South Africa of nuclear weapons in the late 1990s, warning that the “pre-emptive 
response” position of the U.S. meant that the Security Council might taint the work of the 
weapons inspections. Kumalo warned that “it would be tragic if the Council were to prejudge 
the work of inspectors before they set foot in Iraq.”686 Kumalo reminded the permanent 
members that “The Security Council represents our collective security concerns and should 
ultimately be accountable to the entire United Nations.”687 However, Australia’s Ambassador 
John Dauth added his support to the hard-line stance taken by Bush. Dauth agreed with the 
U.S. that “Iraq today poses a clear danger to international security because it has sought to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction and has a well established record of using them 
against its neighbours, and, indeed, against its own people.”688 Australia remained 
convinced that Saddam Hussein maintained his ambitions to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction and that “in the aftermath of 11 September and, I say with great sadness, the 
events of 12 October in Bali, the international community must be scrupulous in addressing 
threats to international security, or face the disastrous consequences.”689 Australia’s support 
had additional strategic value as it emerged from an alignment of interests between the U.S. 
and Australia that was supported by the ANZUS treaty, and guaranteed by military 
support.690 
Hans Blix and Mohamed el-Baradei had also spent October in meetings with U.S. officials in 
order to flesh out a proposal for suitable objectives for weapons inspections. The 
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expectations of inspections differed depending on whom Blix and el-Baradei met in the 
administration. Vice President Cheney was upfront about U.S. expections of the weapons 
inspectors. Blix reflected that Cheney told both the inspectors that he “in talking about the 
world at large [always] took the security interests of the United States as his starting 
point.”691 However, Cheney warned that the inspections could not continue indefinitely, and 
that the U.S. was “ready to discredit inspections in favour of disarmament.”692 It was clear 
that the vice president was ready to recommend bypassing the Security Council if the 
weapons inspections did not produce results that favoured U.S. intelligence. Cheney’s 
attitude was different from Bush, who greeted Blix and el-Baradei warmly and said that the 
U.S. had full confidence in the weapons inspectors, promising that the U.S. would “throw its 
support behind us.”693 These bipolar attitudes were present in the final days of the open 
debate in the Security Council. Ambassador Greenstock stressed the importance of an open 
debate and welcomed the input from non-Security Council members. However, “The United 
Kingdom analysis, backed up by reliable intelligence, indicates that Iraq still possesses 
chemical and biological materials, has continued to produce them, has sought to weaponize 
them and has active military plans for the deployment of such weapons.”694 Quoting Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, Ambassador Greenstock agreed with the U.S. that “the policy of 
containment isn’t any longer working…we know from 11 September that it is sensible to deal 
with these problems before, not after.”695 United States Ambassador John Negroponte, who 
had replaced Ambassador John Cunningham, struck a harder line and dismissed the 
moderate appraisal of the Security Council, warning that the United Nations was at risk of 
becoming irrelevant. Ambassador Negroponte referred to legislation that had passed 
through the U.S. Congress that “expressed support for the Administration’s diplomatic efforts 
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in the Security Council to ensure that ‘Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and non-
compliance’ and authorized the use of United States armed forces should diplomatic efforts 
fails.”696 Although Blix and el-Baradei had received the impression of some support for the 
weapons inspection process when they were in Washington, it was clear from the U.S. 
stance at the United Nations that that was not the case. Ambassador Negroponte added a 
quote from Bush declaring that “Either the Iraqi regime will give up its weapons of mass 
destruction, or, for the sake of peace, the United States will lead a global coalition to disarm 
that regime.”697 Opposing the U.S. and U.K. were the remaining permanent members of the 
Security Council. Ambassador Levitte summarised the opinion of the remaining permanent 
members by stating that the “objective is the disarmament of Iraq. This implies the return of 
the inspectors and the resumption of monitoring on the ground.”698 Both the U.K. and U.S. 
were presumptuous in assuming that Iraq was a threat that required immediate military 
action, reminding the two states that “any kind of ‘automaticity’ in the use of force will 
profoundly divide us.”699 The Security Council was beginning to understand that the 
opportunity to restrain the U.S. had long since passed. For the U.K., however, Blair had 
decided to back the U.S. to the hilt. Blair recalled that “I was well aware that ultimately the 
US would take its own decision in its own interests. But I was also aware that in the new 
world taking shape around us, Britain and Europe were going to face a much more uncertain 
future without America…So when they had need of us, were we really going to refuse; or, 
even worse, hope they succeeded but could do it without us? I reflected and felt the weight 
of an alliance and its history, not oppressively but insistently, a call to duty, a call to act, a 
call to be at their side, not distant from it, when they felt imperilled.”700 Blair’s ‘call to duty’ 
ensured Bush was not alone in confronting Iraq. 
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The result of the open debate was the unanimous approval of resolution 1441 in November 
that introduced weapons inspectors back into Iraq with a renewed set of objectives for 
UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Although the intent of the resolution was to gauge the extent of 
Iraqi cooperation with weapons inspectors, Ambassador Negroponte was adamant that 
should Iraq breach any conditions of the resolution there would be no restraining “any 
Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce 
relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.”701 Ambassador 
Greenstock was more measured, reassuring the rest of the Security Council that “there is no 
‘automaticity’ in this resolution. If there is a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament 
obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion as required by paragraph 
12.”702 This was an apparent attempt to moderate the U.S. posture. Although France and 
Russia voted in favour of the resolution, they reiterated that there was no condition under 
which any member state could act unilaterally. Ambassador Yangfin confirmed that “the text 
no longer includes automaticity for authorizing the use of force.”703 Differing interpretations of 
the resolution were apparent from all members of the Security Council. Despite this, Blix 
noted that “the differences in interpretation faded into the background in the general delight 
that the Council had come together and had come out strong.”704 Although there had been 
compromise, there was no doubt that the resolution was an important step in ending the 
stalemate with Iraq. However, it was a minor victory. There was no doubt that the resolution 
would not have been accepted by Iraq without the threat of armed intervention by the U.S.705 
By November 13, Iraq had accepted the conditions of resolution 1441. 
 
                                                          
701
 United Nations Security Council, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, Document Number S/PV.4644, 8 
November, 2002, 3. 
702
 Ibid. 5. 
703
 Ibid. 13. 
704
 Blix, Disarming Iraq, 89. 
705
 Ibid. 




The question if Iraq constituted a terrorist threat was discussed at a ministerial level meeting 
of the United Nations Security Council on January 20, 2003. This meeting, influenced to a 
great extent by French opposition to an attack on Iraq, was later described as an ambush. 
Powell went into the meeting expecting a discussion concerning terrorism, and instead 
received a rebuff of U.S. efforts to confront Iraq.706 Germany’s Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Joschka Fischer explained that he was “greatly concerned that a military strike against the 
regime in Baghdad would involve considerable and unpredictable risks for the global fight 
against terrorism.”707 It was beyond doubt that the U.S. had convinced the United Nations 
Security Council that it was prepared to go to war with Iraq as part of the global war on 
terror, and the U.K. Secretary of State Jack Straw added that he supported the U.S. position, 
explaining “it is the leaders of rogue States who set the example, brutalize their people, 
celebrate violence, and – worse than that – through their chemical, biological and nuclear 
weapons, provide a tempting arsenal for terrorists to use.”708 According to Secretary Straw, 
there was no doubt that Iraq threatened the international community. However, despite the 
unanimity of the Security Council when it had offered collective support for the U.S. led 
initiative to combat terrorists in Afghanistan, there was no support among Security Council 
members for a repeat in Iraq. Russia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov warned that 
“we must be careful not to take unilateral steps that might threaten the unity of the anti-
terrorist coalition.”709 The mixed response from ministers at the Security Council suggested 
that the U.S. had not done enough to argue the importance of confronting Iraq. Secretary 
Powell simply explained that “we cannot shrink from the responsibilities of dealing with a 
regime that has gone about the development, the acquiring and the stocking of weapons of 
mass destruction, that has committed terrorist attacks against its neighbours and against its 
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own people and that has trampled the human rights of its own people and its neighbours.”710 
According to Powell, there was no doubt that Iraq presented a threat to international peace 
and security under the aegis of the global war on terror, and the U.S. was prepared to 
confront that threat.  
On January 27, Hans Blix and Mohammed el-Baradei, tabled their first reports of the 
preliminary UNMOVIC and IAEA weapons inspections. Blix began by clarifying that the 1999 
Amorim report was the foundation for the resumption in weapons inspections. After 
analysing the report, it was clear that its findings did not “contend that weapons of mass 
destruction remain in Iraq, nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to a lack of 
evidence and to inconsistencies, which raise question marks and which must be 
straightened out if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise.”711 
Therefore, the primary objective of UNMOVIC was to determine the location of 
documentation that illustrated gaps in the unilateral destruction of weapons. Although Blix 
admitted that the recent discovery by inspectors of chemical weapon warheads, that were 
argued to have been overlooked in 1991, could “be the tip of a submerged iceberg,”712 Iraqi 
cooperation had been adequate and unobtrusive. However, Blix worried that the Iraqi 
authorities did not take the inspections as seriously as they should have, treating the 
inspectors with a casualness that suggested ignorance toward the situation in the Security 
Council. Blix’s report produced a balanced appraisal of the situation in Iraq from UNMOVIC’s 
perspective. Blix later reflected that it was not up to him to suggest what the Security Council 
should do in regards to Iraq, as his task was “to render an accurate report. That was what 
we were asked to provide and could contribute. It was for the Council to assess the situation 
and draw conclusions whether there should be continued inspections or war.”713 Although he 
privately hoped that the presentation would shock Iraq into cooperation, and out of “petty 
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bargaining,” he did not expect to see “the hawks in Washington and elsewhere would be 
delighted with the rather harsh balance they found in my update.”714 Mohamed el-Baradei, 
however, was far more precise with the IAEA’s recommendations, bolstered by the Amorim 
report’s findings that the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme was fully decommissioned by 
1999. El-Baradei stated simply that after sixty days of inspections “no prohibited nuclear 
activities have been identified.”715 Turning to intelligence that suggested Iraq had attempted 
to import aluminium tubes machined to standards that were suitable for use in uranium 
enrichment, el-Baradei explained that “from our analysis to date, it appears that the 
aluminium tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, 
would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges.”716 More information had to be provided 
by Security Council member states before any other conclusion could be reached. However, 
where Blix was insistent that he could not tell the Security Council how long inspections 
would take, el-Baradei was adamant that, although inspections would be time-consuming, 
“we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no 
nuclear weapons programme.”717 El-Baradei reflected that the U.S. response to his report 
was surprising. Despite the IAEA reporting that inspectors had found the aluminium tubes to 
be for use in Iraq’s rocket research, Bush stated in his State of the Union address on 
January 28, one day later, that the aluminium tubes were suitable for nuclear weapons 
production. El-Baradei noted that “There was no mention of the IAEA’s contradictory 
conclusion based on direct verification of the facts in Iraq. Nor did Bush note the differing 
analysis of the U.S. Department of Energy.”718 For all appearances, Bush had made it clear 
that U.S. intelligence was considered more reliable than the IAEA. 
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As the preliminary reports from weapons inspectors did not produce the immediate results 
that the U.S. desired, Secretary Powell convened a ministerial-level Security Council session 
in order to present the dossier of intelligence the U.S. was using as basis for its claims 
against Iraq. It was apparent from the presentation that the U.S. was adamant Saddam 
Hussein was involved in terrorism, and had concealed his efforts to produce weapons of 
mass destruction from inspectors. Through intercepted audio from phone calls between Iraqi 
military officers, referring to satellite images that showed unusual vehicle movement at sites 
that had been visited by inspectors, and consulting human intelligence sources, Secretary 
Powell stated that the accusations levelled at Iraq by the U.S. “are not assertions, these are 
facts.”719 Further adding to the dossier of U.S. evidence were eye-witness accounts of 
mobile biological weapons facilities, rendered in illustrations produced by the U.S., that 
confirmed the belief that Iraq was capable of producing anthrax and botulium toxin. 
Secretary Powell emphasised the lengths Saddam Hussein had gone to hide these 
technologies from inspectors, claiming “Call it ingenious or evil genius but the Iraqis 
deliberately designed their chemical weapons to be inspected. It is infrastructure with a built-
in alibi.”720 Ignoring el-Baradei’s report that the aluminium tubes were not part of an Iraqi 
nuclear weapons programme, Secretary Powell stressed that they had been certified by U.S. 
experts for use in centrifuge design, and they meant that there was “no indication that 
Saddam Hussain (sic) has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons programme.”721 However, it 
was a link to terrorism that Secretary Powell believed would diminish scepticism within the 
Security Council. According to intelligence sources, Iraq was accused of harbouring al-
Qaeda member Abu Masab al-Zarqawi in the North-Eastern Kurdish regions of Iraq. 
Although those regions were outside of Baghdad’s control, Secretary Powell insisted that 
Saddam Hussein was involved.722 Warning the Security Council that they could not ignore 
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the presence of terrorists in Iraq, Secretary Powell explained that “Ambition and hatred are 
enough to bring Iraq and Al Qaeda together – enough so that Al Qaeda could learn how to 
build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that Al 
Qaeda could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction.”723 
There was no doubt that the U.S. believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and 
that Saddam Hussein was determined to use them. Issuing a final warning, Secretary Powell 
stated that “The United States will not, and cannot, run that risk to the American people. 
Leaving Saddam Hussain (sic) in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more 
months or years is not an option – not in a post 11-september world.”724 Condoleezza Rice 
was satisfied that the presentation was the accumulation of intelligence that had been 
personally vetted by Secretary Powell, and had best presented the U.S. case against Iraq. It 
had represented a “tour de force.”725  
Despite the administration’s confidence in Secretary Powell’s presentation, the Security 
Council consensus did not change. Secretary Straw was unrelenting in his statement of U.K. 
support for Powell’s presentation, admiring that “the international community owes [Powell] 
its thanks for laying bare the deceit practised by the regime of Saddam Hussain (sic) – and 
worse, the very great danger which that regime represents.”726 It was a reality that no matter 
how powerful the inspectors might be, or how good they were, because of the size of Iraq it 
was impossible to guarantee that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. Turning back to 
an historical analogy, Secretary Straw reminded the Security Council that “at each stage, 
good men said, ‘Wait. The evil is not big enough to challenge.’ Then, before their eyes, the 
evil became too big to challenge…We owe it to our history, as well as to our future, not to 
make the same mistake.”727 However, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan was convinced that it 
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would be beneficial if “various parties will hand over their information and evidence to 
(UNMOVIC) and the (IAEA)…through their on-the-spot inspections, that information and 
evidence can also be evaluated.”728 Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov sided with China’s 
assessment and appealed to the Security Council to immediately “hand over to the 
international inspectors any information that can help them discharge their responsible 
mandate…they alone can say to what extent Iraq is complying with the demands of the 
Security Council.”729 Foreign Minister Dominque De Villepin suggested that a third solution to 
the crisis could be found if the Security Council could agree on a permanent structure for the 
ongoing surveillance of Iraq. De Villepin explained that a coordinated “information-
processing centre…would supply Mr. Blix and Mr ElBaradei, in real time and in a 
coordinated way, with all the intelligence resources they might need.”730 Explaining the 
severity of the dilemma confronting the Security Council, De Villepin added that “with the 
choice between military intervention and an inspections regime that is inadequate for lack of 
cooperation on Iraq’s part, we must choose to strengthen decisively the means of 
inspection.”731 Stuck in the shadow cast by the debate among the permanent members, 
Iraq’s Ambassador Mohammed Aldouri kept his rebuttal short. Ambassador Aldouri 
promised the Security Council that “if we had a relationship with Al Qaeda and we believed 
in that relationship, we would not be ashamed to admit it. We have no relationship with Al 
Qaeda,”732 and that Secretary Powell’s presentation was made “to sell the idea of war and 
aggression against my country, Iraq, without providing any legal, moral or political 
justification.”733 Despite the mixed consensus of the Security Council, the sense of urgency 
was deliberately orchestrated by the U.S. Condoleezza Rice, explaining why the U.S. was 
compelled to outline the case against Iraq through the Security Council presentation, 
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reflected that “our sense of urgency was driven by two factors. First, our military forces were 
approaching levels of mobilization that could not be sustained for very long…it wasn’t 
possible to stand still, since doing so would leave our forces vulnerable in-theater without 
sufficient logistical support…Second, the President believed that the only way to avoid war 
was to put maximum and unified pressure on Saddam. That argued for continued 
mobilization, not pulling back.”734 The reality was that the U.S. was prepared to confront Iraq 
with, or without, United Nations support, and despite the reports of weapons inspectors. 
On February 14, the weapon inspectors gave their second report to the Security Council. 
Despite Secretary Powell’s presentation in early February, Blix remained sceptical that 
UNMOVIC had had enough time to comprehensively understand the situation in Iraq. The 
inspectors had managed to cover over four hundred inspections at more than three hundred 
sites in Iraq, and Blix was adamant that at no point “have we seen convincing evidence that 
the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming.”735 Blix explained that 
UNMOVIC had an adequate idea of the condition of Iraq’s industrial and scientific capacity, 
and besides the small number of empty chemical munitions that had been found during the 
initial declaration there had been no further discoveries. However, Blix was hesitant to state 
that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction, explaining that “One must not jump 
to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded.”736 Although, 
on one hand, UNMOVIC had made progress in destroying ballistic missile systems that 
breached sanctions, on the other hand, inspectors were unable to verify the status of 
unilaterally destroyed chemical and biological weapons that were outstanding from the 
Amorim report. There were suggestions that soil tests might help determine possible 
destruction sites, but Blix insisted that more evidence would be required to assess Iraqi 
compliance. In this sense, Blix stressed the good relationship between UNMOVIC and 
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intelligence agencies around the world, and was satisfied to see an increased amount of 
information passed on to the inspectors. However, Blix warned that “we must recognize that 
there are limitations and misinterpretations can occur.”737 Referring directly to intelligence in 
Secretary Powell’s presentation, Blix noted that intelligence had led to sites where there 
were no weapons, or any activity indicating otherwise. In these cases intelligence had been 
useful for “proving the absence of such items and in some cases the presence of other items 
– conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the 
country and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass destruction.”738 
But, Blix remained unconvinced by Secretary Powell’s presentation. 
In his report, Blix had subtly questioned the intelligence that was fundamental to U.S. 
allegations against Iraq. There was no doubt of the importance of Blix’s report. Reflecting on 
the situation as he arrived at the United Nations Security Council chamber, Blix noted that he 
was often mobbed by the media and had to be taken into the building in a car through a 
garage. According to Blix, “it was as if the decision whether there would be a war in Iraq was 
to be taken in the next hour in the Council, and as if the inspectors’ reports on Iraq’s 
cooperation were like a signal of red or green. Although neither was the case, it was a very 
important meeting.”739 Mohamed el-Baradei was under no such illusion as he detailed the 
progress in Iraq with the IAEA inspections. Since Bush’s State of the Union address in 
January, 2003, the IAEA had been preoccupied with evaluating intelligence that suggested 
Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from a source in Niger. As for progress, the IAEA had 
uncovered a cache of documents concerning past Iraqi nuclear program at an Iraqi 
scientist’s house. El-Baradei noted, however, that the documents offered no new insight on 
previous conclusions that had been stated by the IAEA. The documents had been useful in 
clarifying aspects of Iraq’s previous nuclear weapons programme that were already known to 
inspectors. El-Baradei’s conclusion was concise, stating that “we have to date found no 
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evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq.”740 The 
inspector’s reports were dismissed by the U.S. 
In response to the UNMOVIC and IAEA reports, the Security Council once again erupted in 
disagreement. Blix observed that the debate was remarkable because it “seemed like a 
pitched battle in which the participants had only seven minutes each to send their words and 
arguments like colourful tracer bullets through the room.”741 Once again, a ministerial 
meeting had been convened to consider the reports. Foreign Minister Jack Straw was 
adamant that UNMOVIC and the IAEA reports were clear that Iraq was in material breach of 
Security Council resolutions, as there was evidence Iraq was not cooperating with 
inspectors. The only response that would suffice was for the Security Council to “back a 
diplomatic process with a credible threat of force and also, if necessary, to be ready to use 
that threat of force.”742 Secretary Powell added to Foreign Minister Straw’s speech by 
arguing that no amount of inspections would diminish the threat posed by Iraq, and that 
“what we need is immediate, active, unconditional, full cooperation on the part of Iraq. What 
we need is for Iraq to disarm.”743 The U.S. was clear that it was unacceptable for the Security 
Council to wait for inspections to conclude. Secretary Powell went on that because of the 
threat of terrorism, the Security Council could not wait “for one of these terrible weapons to 
show up in one of our cities and wonder where it came from after it has been detonated by 
Al-Qaeda or somebody else. This is the time to go after this source of this kind of 
weaponry.”744 Secretary Powell’s final appeal to the United Nations Security Council was the 
last effort made by the U.S. to receive United Nations approval for a war with Iraq. The effort 
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was largely to appease Blair, who was facing domestic criticism and had promised his own 
party that he would look for United Nations approval before going to war with Iraq.745  
The remaining permanent members of the Security Council were unconvinced. Foreign 
Minister Tang Jianxuan explained that “China believes that the inspection process is working 
and that the inspectors should continue to be given the time they need so as to implement 
resolution 1441 (2002).”746 Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov agreed, adding that “we should be 
guided not by feelings, emotions, sympathies or antipathy with respect to any particular 
regime. Rather, we should be guided by the actual facts and, on the basis of those facts, 
should draw our conclusions.”747 However, Foreign Minister Dominique De Villepin objected 
outright to the use of force that was supported by the U.K. and U.S. De Villepin explained 
that “The option of war might seem, on the face of it, to be the swifter but let us not forget 
that, after the war is won, the peace must be built. And let us not delude ourselves: that will 
be long and difficult, because it will be necessary to preserve Iraq’s unity and to restore 
stability in a lasting way in a country and region harshly affected by the intrusion of force.”748 
There were no guarantees that a military confrontation with Iraq would produce a safer 
world, nor a more stable Iraq. Accusing the U.S. of acting rashly, De Villepin concluded “that 
nothing will be done in the Security Council, at any time, in haste, out of a lack of 
understanding, out of suspicion or out of fear.”749 The accusation added to earlier criticism 
from De Villepin to Secretary Powell at the Secretary-General’s private luncheon, after 
Secretary Powell’s presentation in February. It was there that De Villepin chided Secretary 
Powell, saying “You Americans…do not understand Iraq. This is the land of Haroun al-
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Rashid. You may be able to destroy it in a month, but it will take you a generation to build 
peace.”750 De Villepin’s criticism was prescient. 
 
Resorting to War 
On March 7, Blix and el-Baradei gave their final reports to the Security Council, hoping to 
stress the progress of inspections. The reports would come in the wake of yet another open 
debate that had been held in the Security Council concerning the situation in Iraq.751 Blix 
reported that UNMOVIC was able to satisfactorily perform inspections without notice across 
Iraq and was being assisted by increased aerial surveillance, both improvements on 
UNMOVIC’s previous inspection capacity. If the Security Council were to give UNMOVIC 
enough time, even the outstanding issues regarding additional Iraqi documentation and an 
interviewing process that was not inhibited by the Iraqi Security apparatus, could be 
resolved. Blix, instead, turned his criticism toward intelligence that had served to underpin 
allegations that Iraq had reconstituted a weapon of mass destruction programme, noting that 
“intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around 
Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for biological 
weapons.”752 Indeed, Secretary Powell had been adamant that Iraq was hiding biological 
and chemical weapons manufacturing equipment in trucks. Blix reported that “several 
inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile 
production facilities. Food-testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been 
seen, as well as large containers of seed-processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed 
                                                          
750
 El-Baradei, The Age of Deception, 61-62. 
751
 United Nations Security Council, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, Document Number S/PV.4709, 18 
February 2003; United Nations Security Council, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, Document Number 
S/PV.4709 (resumption 1), 19 February 2003. 
752
 United Nations Security Council, The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, Document Number S/PV.4714, 7 
March, 2003, 3. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Six      Chapter Six 
230 
 
activities has so far been found.”753 Blix also responded to intelligence claims that Iraq was 
storing weapons underground, adding that “no underground facilities for chemical or 
biological production or storage have been found so far.”754 In order to emphasise the 
progress UNMOVIC had made Blix reported that Iraq had taken steps to destroy ballistic 
missiles that had been deemed in breach of Security Council resolutions. He explained “we 
are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed.”755 
Although the remaining tasks for UNMOVIC were difficult to finalise, they were not 
impossible, and Blix concluded that “It would not take years, nor weeks, but months” to 
conduct the necessary analysis on the remaining unresolved disarmament tasks.756 Blix 
maintained that he was in no position to judge whether Iraq was in material breach of 
Security Council resolutions. However, he had his own definition of his role as weapons 
inspector. Recalling a conversation with an American, Blix wrote “it would have been 
presumptuous of me to pass such judgment, and he commented ‘Hans, they wanted you to 
be presumptuous.’ Well, yes, if it went their way, but not if it had gone the other way!”757 
Blix’s ambiguity did not provide solace for those opposing armed intervention in the Security 
Council.  
On the other hand, Mohamed el-Baradei was more direct with the IAEA report. Restating 
that the IAEA’s task was to determine whether Iraq had revived, or attempted to revive, its 
nuclear weapon programme since inspectors had left, el-Baradei stressed the degradation of 
Iraq’s industrial capacity since the 1980s, when Iraq was known to have a strong industrial 
base and a fledging nuclear program. The overall deterioration of Iraq’s industrial capacity 
was “of direct relevance to Iraq’s capability for resuming a nuclear weapons programme.”758 
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Much like Blix, el-Baradei was critical of some intelligence claims, reporting that the IAEA 
had conducted tests on the aluminium tubes that the U.S. had insisted were for use in 
centrifuges, concluding, “extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to 
uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use those 81mm tubes for any project other than 
the reverse-engineering of rockets.”759 Referring to other claims that Iraq had attempted to 
import high-strength magnets, el-Baradei explained that IAEA experts concluded that the 
magnets would be unsuitable for use in centrifuge enrichment facilities. El-Baradei even 
responded to claims made by Bush in the State of the Union address that Iraq had 
attempted to import uranium from a source in Niger, explaining that “the IAEA has 
concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents – which formed 
the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and the Niger – are, in 
fact, not authentic.”760 Blix remarked later that the U.S. “in its uncontrolled eagerness to nail 
Iraq to a continued nuclear weapons program [would] now have to live with Mohamed’s 
revelation and suffer from its own poor quality control of information.”761 El-Baradei, however, 
justified his findings by explaining that “because many of the IAEA inspectors were returning 
to well-trodden ground and familiar faces, the Agency was correspondingly more confident in 
its judgments.”762 El-Baradei, unlike Blix, was confident that Iraq did not possess nuclear 
weapons, nor had to capacity to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programme. 
Once again, it was ministers who responded to the inspectors reports within the Security 
Council. Secretary Powell dismissed the reports outright, claiming that “If Iraq genuinely 
wanted to disarm, we would not have to be worrying about setting up means of looking for 
mobile biological units or any units of the kind – they would be presented to us. We would 
not need an extensive programme to search for underground facilities that we know exist.”763 
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Secretary Powell warned the Security Council that the IAEA had been wrong once before 
about Iraq’s nuclear weapon capabilities, therefore “we have to be very cautious.”764 
Referring to the unresolved disarmament issues prepared by UNMOVIC, Powell remarked 
that the report still indicated Iraq was a threat. Foreign Minister Straw was as dismissive of 
the inspectors as Secretary Powell. The inspections had made no substantial progress since 
November, and “It defies experience that continuing inspections with no firm end date…will 
achieve complete disarmament if…Iraq’s full and active cooperation is not forthcoming.”765 
The only option that remained, reminded Foreign Minister Straw, in order to see the 
disarmament of Iraq “is by backing our diplomacy with the credible use of force.”766 Straw 
assured the Security Council that a new resolution, co-sponsored by the U.S. and offered as 
a diplomatic pause, asked for a deadline for Iraq to comply with Security Council demands. 
However, there was no indication that a resolution that justified using force against Iraq 
would be supported within the Security Council. Foreign Minister Ivanov and Foreign 
Minister Tang openly opposed any resolution that included the use of force to resolve the 
crisis. According to Russia, weapons inspections were functioning for the first time in years, 
and by prematurely ending the inspector’s mission the Security Council diminished its 
authority.  
The opposition to Bush’s unilateral posture toward Iraq was made more tangible when 
Foreign Minister Ivanov asked “What is really in the genuine interest of the world community 
– continuing the albeit difficult but clearly fruitful results of the inspectors work or resorting to 
the use of force, which will inevitably result in enormous loss of life and which is fraught with 
serious and unpredictable consequences for regional and international stability?”767 
According to Foreign Minister De Villepin, the weapons inspectors had concluded that Iraq 
represented less of a threat to the international community than it did in 1991, and, therefore, 
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Iraq was disarmed. Instead of addressing the weapons inspector’s reports, Foreign Minister 
De Villepin turned his questions toward the U.S., asking “Is it a question of regime change? 
Is it a question of fighting terrorism? Is it a question of reshaping the political landscape of 
the Middle East?”768 Although France had sympathy for the U.S. and its insecurity in the 
wake of September 11, on a practical level Iraq had no link to the attacks, and there were no 
guarantees that the world would be a safer place after a military confrontation with Iraq. 
Under the circumstances, France was left with no choice. Foreign Minister De Villepin stated 
that “As a permanent member of the Security Council France will not allow a resolution to be 
adopted that authorizes the automatic use of force.”769 El-Baradei, after the meeting, was 
scathing in his portrayal of the U.S. and U.K. treatment of the weapons inspector’s reports. 
Referring to the IAEA, el-Baradei explained that they had spent “years in Iraq with sweeping 
‘anytime, anywhere’ authority. We had crisscrossed the country. We had interviewed every 
nuclear scientist available. We had destroyed equipment, confiscated records, put the 
remaining nuclear material under IAEA seal, and blown up the nuclear production facilities at 
Al Atheer. To liken 2003 to 1991 was an act of deliberate distortion. The die, it seemed, had 
been cast.”770 In his concluding statements to the Security Council, Iraq’s Ambassador 
Mohamed Aldouri reassured the ministers that “war against Iraq will wreak destruction, but it 
will not unearth any weapons of mass destruction, for one very simple reason: there are no 
such weapons, except in the imagination of some.”771 Ambassador Aldouri’s warning added 
to De Villepin’s early criticism of the U.S. that a confrontation with Iraq was the wrong 
decision. 
Despite U.S. and U.K. pressure on the weapons inspectors, there was no further support for 
the U.S. and U.K. position since the failed attempt in late February to secure a resolution 
that authorised the use of force. For a second time in only a few weeks, the Security Council 
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held another open debate across two days, showing the widespread opposition of United 
Nations members to a war with Iraq, other than as a last resort.772 As the Security Council 
approached March 17, the presumed deadline for the beginning of a ground war in Iraq, 
members in the Security Council attempted to negotiate a resolution that would place 
conditions on Iraq for the suspension of the impending war. The compromise resolution 
required Iraq to complete a series of tasks that amounted to an ultimatum for the use of 
force, should any tasks be outstanding. However, by March 14, the negotiations were over. 
An informal Security Council session had heard the concessions, but had produced no 
consensus as ”the draft prepared by Chile and five other elected members was withdrawn, 
the European Union ambassadors met without any convergence, and a meeting of the five 
permanent members was cancelled. There was no traction except under the tanks in 
Kuwait.”773 In the wake of the failure of the Security Council, and in an effort to create a 
minor coalition despite United Nations opposition, the U.S. and U.K. convened a meeting in 
Azores, Portugal for allies that did support the use of force, namely the U.S., U.K., and 
Spain. It was in Azores, as Condoleezza Rice recalled, that “we sat rather glumly, realizing 
that a united international community would not materialize. We would take on Saddam 
either with a coalition of the willing or not at all.”774 The statement that was issued from the 
meeting was in no way peaceful. Blix noted, as he watched the statement issued live from 
New York, which “referred to Saddam’s defying UN resolutions for twelve years. The 
responsibility was his. If conflict were to occur, the U.S. and its allies would seek the 
affirmation of the territorial integrity of Iraq. Any ‘military presence’ would be temporary.”775 
However, even at this stage, Blix detected a difference between the U.S. and U.K. stances 
that intimated there was a possibility for the Security Council to still make its presence 
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known. Blix recalled that “Bush had talked about the dictator and the cruel regime and what 
a bright future Iraq would have if Saddam was taken out. Blair had talked about going the 
last mile for peace and about the need for the UN to strop a proliferator.”776 Despite little 
optimism expressed in the statement from Azores, it was the final declaration that war with 
Iraq was imminent. On Monday 17, United Nations weapons inspectors were told to 
withdraw from Iraq ahead of possible armed action.777 
Condoleezza Rice explained that this was not the first time the U.S. had acted with force 
without explicit authorisation from the United Nations Security Council, adding, “From the 
1948 Berlin airlift under Truman to the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the coalitions 
involved were acting without that specific authority.” Rice stated, “We believed that both 
Resolution 1441 and the sixteen before it were more than adequate to express the 
international community’s view that Saddam Hussein was a threat to international peace and 
security. And in our view, ‘serious consequences’ had to mean something.”778 Indeed, 
George H. W. Bush was prepared to go to war with Iraq in 1991 without the support of the 
United Nations. However, in 2003, as the U.S. split from the United Nations with few allies, 
Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed his disappointment at the disunity of the Security 
Council. Instead of preventing the humanitarian crisis that had developed in Iraq, “the conflict 
that is clearly about to start can make things worse – perhaps much worse.”779 The United 
Nations had to ensure there were provisions in place for responding to the post-conflict 
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conditions that would engulf Iraq. However, Secretary General Annan stressed that “under 
international law, the responsibility for protecting civilians in conflict falls on the belligerents. 
In any area under military occupation, responsibility for the welfare of the population falls on 
the occupying Power.”780 Not that the lack of international support mattered for Bush, and 
the situation had taken a toll on Blair because of his unwavering support. Blair recalled that “I 
was about as isolated as it is possible to be in politics. On the one hand, the US were 
chafing at the bit and essentially I agreed with their basic thrust: Saddam was a threat, he 
would never cooperate fully with the international community, and the world, not to say Iraq, 
would be better off with him out of power. My instinct was with them. Our alliance was with 
them. I had made a commitment after September 11 to be ‘shoulder to shoulder’. I was 
determined to fulfil it.”781 With U.K. support, and United Nations warnings, Bush initiated 
airstrikes that preceded the invasion of Iraq. 
As this chapter demonstrates, Bush did not so much as decide to go to war with Iraq as 
allow it to unfold as a consequence of his domestic circumstances. Similar to George H. W. 
Bush in 1989, from the outset of George W. Bush’s administration U.S. foreign policy toward 
the Persian Gulf remained largely unchanged and a low priority. However, unlike 1989, the 
coinciding policy precedence toward Iraq was not a measured tolerance of Saddam Hussein 
but the persistent national security threat that he posed. As the September 11 terrorist 
attacks unfolded and Bush was forced to react decisively, securing military victories in 
Afghanistan, the decision to confront Iraq was taken for granted and reinforced by the 
legitimacy that was conferred to the U.S. in the wake of the terrorist attacks. This diplomatic 
stance was compounded by Bush’s relative inexperience in foreign affairs, relying to a great 
extent on the dispersal of intelligence across his advisors, to whom he deferred for 
judgment. The result, as can be seen in the United Nations Security Council, was an 
obstinate U.S. that was not restrained by the international community in its pursuit of 
                                                          
780
 Ibid. 23. 
781
 Blair, A Journey, 412. 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Six      Chapter Six 
237 
 
anything considered an unacceptable threat. Hence, the diplomatic origins of decision to go 
to war with Iraq illustrate Bush’s belief that Saddam Hussein’s previous intentions to pursue 
weapons of mass destruction suggested he had the capabilities to fulfil them, proving an 
unacceptable risk to U.S. national security. Unable to be restrained by the international 
community, Bush decided to go to war with Iraq, confident in the intelligence procured by the 
U.S. and wary of the potential threat posed by Saddam Hussein.  







“We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it – and stop 
there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a 
hot stove-lid again – and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one any 
more.”782 
 
As a scholar of international relations and history, Hans J. Morgenthau was careful to point 
out that the historian, if they were careless, could derive all manner of lessons from history if 
they lacked a footing in reality.783 Diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis was equally critical 
of contemporary history that was moulded to a set of answers, rather than allowing the 
history to speak for itself. Therefore, this research is careful to avoid conclusions that are 
overly prescriptive. However, the analysis in chapters three through to six does suggest an 
answer as to why the United States decided to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The 
concluding remarks that follow restate the research aims that have guided this research, and 
explore the relevance of this thesis. However, the purpose of this research is encompassed 
within the research questions that were posited at the beginning of the thesis. In order, each 
research question will be answered with reference to chapters three through to six. These 
questions are: why did the United States go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003; what were 
the similarities; the differences, and what other considerations influenced those decisions to 
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go to war. As a result, this research interrogates a history of the domestic and diplomatic 
origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003. 
 
Research Aims and Structure 
This research had several aims, including the framing and articulating of the domestic and 
diplomatic history surrounding the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003; a 
consideration for how that history could answer the question as to why a decision was made 
to go to war; an illustration and comparison of the similarities and differences in the foreign 
policy making process; and the emphasis of considerations from that history that influenced 
the decision to go to war. To each end, this research has satisfied the research aims.  
In the methodology, it is stressed that the explaining and framing of foreign relations, and 
American foreign policy, are central to the exploration of the decision to go to war with Iraq. 
How this is accomplished is subject to debate between both diplomatic historians and 
political scientists. Diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis offers an astute, critical look at 
both schools of thought in order to deconstruct the major faults afflicting the framing of 
American foreign policy. Gaddis contends that diplomatic historians lack methodological 
rigour and fear contemporary history; whereas political scientists over emphasise 
methodology and trend toward prescriptive conclusions. These criticisms are useful to the 
framing of this research as they help craft an analytical framework that can compare 
accounts of contemporary history, and explore foreign policy decision-making.  Therefore, 
this research is framed in the following way. There are two frames that illustrate the origins 
of the decision to go to war with Iraq. In each frame, the history adheres to a timeline that 
emerges from the inauguration of George H. W. Bush in 1989, and George W. Bush in 2001. 
These two frames qualitatively analyse historical source material in order to derive an 
historical account of George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush arriving at the decision to go 
to war with Iraq. In the first frame, the domestic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq 
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are emphasised. Comparatively, the diplomatic origins are emphasised in the second frame. 
The purpose of these frames is to highlight the different considerations that contributed to 
the decision to go to war. In the first frame, the fluctuations of domestic politics influence the 
timing, rhetoric, and direction of foreign policy as both presidents balanced their domestic 
commitments with the responsibility for foreign policy. In the second frame, the complex and 
unpredictable international system is shown to be engaged in a way that reflected each 
president’s differing understanding of the conduct of American foreign policy, and 
emphasized the self-interested conduct of international politics. As a result of these frames, 
there is a methodological rigour that helps reinforce the diplomatic history, yet the frames are 
not over-endowed with methodological constraints that they inhibit the history that is being 
portrayed.  
After reviewing the literature that discusses why the United States went to war with Iraq, the 
importance of reinforcing the methodology of this research becomes clear. The existing 
literature is diverse, yet sparse, when illustrating and exploring what compelled George H. 
W. Bush and George W. Bush into deciding going to war with Iraq. The framing of American 
foreign policy that is utilised by other scholars ranges from personal histories to international 
relations theory, each narrowing rather than broadening the scope of the decision to go to 
war. As a result of the diverse array of frames that focus on the two presidents, there is a 
lack of literature that expressly compares the decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991, and the 
decision in 2003. This gap provides a rationale for this research. By developing and 
establishing comparative historical accounts of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 
and 2003, this research can also develop and establish a shared history between George H. 
W. Bush and George W. Bush. 
Despite the contribution that already exists in the literature, this research explores the 
domestic and diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq. Chapter three begins 
with the domestic origins of George H. W. Bush’s decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991. 
Bush’s domestic justification for intervening in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait fluctuated depending 
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on the political climate in the U.S. As Bush was inaugurated in 1989, the Persian Gulf region 
was an area of minor concern despite the accusations that reverberated in Congress, and 
the American media, that Saddam Hussein was responsible for human rights abuses. Bush 
was so confident that the Persian Gulf was a minor domestic concern that the revised and 
updated policy toward the region, released one year into his presidency, changed little from 
the previous administration. It would take Saddam Hussein annexing Kuwait to force Bush 
into reacting to the changes developing in the region, and to shift Bush’s domestic appraisal 
of Saddam Hussein. However, Bush was deliberately vague when addressing the American 
public about his intentions and actions toward rectifying the increasingly tense crisis in the 
Persian Gulf, especially when asked by Congress, and media commentators, just how the 
United States would reverse Saddam Hussein’s aggression. Compounding matters 
domestically was an obstructionist Congress that placed pressure on Bush as he sought to 
resolve a budget crisis. This frame shows that the domestic origins of the decision to go to 
war with Iraq affected Bush’s legitimacy and authority as a leader. Bush would rely on a firm 
grasp of international affairs in order to lead the U.S. into war with Saddam Hussein, despite 
the efforts of Congress to thwart his domestic authority.  
In chapter four, the diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq show that George 
H. W Bush relied on his diplomatic expertise at the expense of his domestic standing. 
Initially, Bush maintained diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein, prolonging the 
relationship that had been developed under previous administrations. Bush persisted with 
the diplomatic relationship, despite the emerging difficulties in the region, in the belief that by 
remaining close to Saddam Hussein he might moderate his actions. However, Saddam 
Hussein’s unilateral annexation of Kuwait highlighted the inability of Bush to moderate, in 
any way, the actions of Iraq, and the United Nations Security Council was engaged when 
Bush sought international options to confront Saddam Hussein. Bush took advantage of the 
diplomatic environment that was favourable toward the U.S., in the wake of a receding 
Soviet Union, to gently guide the United Nations Security Council, first, toward condemning 
Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Seven 
242 
 
Saddam Hussein and, second, to authorising armed action to reverse Iraqi aggression. 
Unlike the domestic origins of the decision to go to war, the diplomatic origins illustrate Bush 
as a self-assured and confident leader as the United States embraced the international 
leadership of the United Nations Security Council and confronted Iraq. However, these two 
frames juxtapose the contributing considerations that influenced Bush’s decision to go to war 
with Iraq, creating a history that contrasts with George W. Bush’s decision to go to war with 
Iraq in 2003. 
This contrast between George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush begins in chapter five, 
where the focus shifted to the domestic origins of George W. Bush’s decision to go to war 
with Iraq. The domestic context was, from the outset, remarkably different as Bush was 
controversially elected president after a Supreme Court decision on the Electoral College 
vote count, and after losing the popular vote. However, it was not only the different election 
circumstances that separated George W. Bush from George H. W. Bush. George W. Bush 
lacked the public service experience of George H. W. Bush, and was instead a domestically 
oriented politician. Wasting no time settling into the role of president, Bush immediately set 
out to domestically distance his administration from the policies of his predecessor. Despite 
how comfortable and confident Bush was in front of his domestic audience, the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, shattered the peaceful façade of national security, and 
forced a response from Bush that endowed the presidency with a new foreign policy mission. 
Vowing retribution against those who were responsible, Bush promised his domestic 
audience that another attack would never occur on American soil, and as a result launched a 
war on terror. During this campaign, Saddam Hussein emerged as a lingering threat to the 
U.S., and Bush, embroiled in a war against terror, justified the targeting of Saddam Hussein 
on the grounds that he presented an unreasonable threat to the American people. These 
domestic origins of the decision to confront Saddam Hussein show that Congress supported 
Bush, and the American people helped propel Bush’s decision to go to war with Iraq, as the 
U.S. was still reeling from the attacks on September 11, 2001. 
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As chapter six shows, the diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003 
came at the expense of U.S. diplomacy. George W. Bush differed significantly from George 
H. W. Bush because he lacked the foreign policy experience that George H. W. Bush had 
garnered throughout many years in public office. Despite the advisors George W. Bush had 
arrayed throughout his administration, the U.S. did not have the diplomatic nuance to exert 
influence in Iraq, aside from the crumbling United Nations Security Council regime that had 
been set up in 1991 to contain and dismantle the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. In the 
wake of September 11, 2001, Saddam Hussein emerged once again as a threat to U.S. 
national interest, only this time it was a perceived, rather than actual, threat. Bush took his 
administrations fears to the United Nations Security Council with the confidence that had 
made him a popular domestic leader, and gave Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to prove he 
was no longer a threat, or to face the U.S. neutralising the perceived threat. The ultimatum, 
emerging from the precedence set by the war on terror that had been supported by the 
United Nations Security Council, caused a division among the permanent members. Bush 
was unrepentant, and despite the lack of support in the United Nations Security Council 
proceeded to lead a separate coalition of states into an invasion of Iraq after the United 
Nations Security Council failed to approve and support armed action against Saddam 
Hussein. These diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003 show the 
entrenched difference between George W. Bush, and the decision of George H. W. Bush to 
go to war with Iraq in 1991. 
These two frames, and four chapters, show why the U.S. went to war with Iraq in 1991 and 
2003, and illustrate the similarities and differences between George H. W. Bush and George 
W. Bush. In the domestic origins of the decision to go to war, it can be seen that both 
George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush acknowledged the role of domestic politics in the 
formulation and implementation of a foreign policy. In the diplomatic origins, both presidents 
embraced the United Nations as a platform for American foreign policy, and leveraged, in 
their own way, the prestige of the institution to implement foreign policy. In the Persian Gulf, 
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both presidents faced Saddam Hussein, and stressed his evil, immoral leadership traits, 
deferring to weapons of mass destruction as the justification for military action. However, 
there were also stark differences between George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush. The 
former was comfortable conducting diplomacy, whereas the latter preferred to conduct 
diplomacy in front of a domestic audience. George H. W. Bush confronted the end of the 
Cold War, whereas George W. Bush confronted the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In 
1991, the United Nations Security Council was the institution that legitimated George H. W. 
Bush the decision to go to war with Iraq. In 2003, that authority was instead legitimated by 
the U.S. As a result, the aims and structure of this research stress the importance of 
historical framing, and point to many similarities and differences in the conduct of both 
presidents in response to Saddam Hussein. It is possible to extend the analysis to 
encompass concerns and trends that may have lead one president to rely on the domestic 
origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq, more so than the diplomatic origins. However, 
the fundamental conclusion to this research is the role of the president in the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy, and the different influence of domestic and diplomatic 
considerations on the decision to go to war.  
 
Research Questions 
Why did the United States decide to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003? 
For both George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, the decision to go to war with Iraq was 
considered necessary and imperative to U.S. national interests. In both cases, the decision 
to go to war took a different trajectory that depends on the similarities and differences in 
presidential decision-making, and domestic and diplomatic priorities between the two 
presidents. As is shown in chapter three, George H. W. Bush regarded the Persian Gulf in 
1991, as a low-priority policy concern. The primary concern of Bush’s presidency was not 
altering the diplomatic stance of the U.S., but to distance his administration from the 
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domestic policies of his predecessor that had left a budget deficit and threatened to engulf 
Bush’s domestic agenda. Iraq only emerged as a point of concern in the media when reports 
alleged Iraqi bureaucrats of being involved in human rights abuses and financial fraud, 
emphasising the absence of an official stance from Bush. This lack of policy was 
exacerbated by increasing media scrutiny of Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, and his militant 
posturing. It was only when Iraq went the extra step, and invaded Kuwait, that Bush 
publically responded to Saddam Hussein. The reactive nature of Bush, which included the 
deployment of the U.S. military to Saudi Arabia to form a defensive line against possible Iraqi 
expansion, was criticised in the wake of the invasion. Bush was accused by Congress, and 
commentators, of operating foreign policy away from the influence of the American people. 
As a consequence, the Democrat controlled Congress used the opportunity to press Bush 
for concessions over his domestic agenda that reached a crescendo in November in the 
wake of Congressional mid-term elections. Bush conceded ground on his budget in order to 
facilitate the smooth passage of the United Nations Security Council authorisation for the 
use of force against Iraq. Although it was a deft political manoeuvre at the time, broadsiding 
Congress only consolidated opposition against any potential military actions aimed at Iraq, 
and the Congressional vote held in January that supported Bush’s efforts to force Iraq from 
Kuwait was a bitter and divisive debate and, although in favour of action, hardly definitive.  
In contrast was chapter four, where the diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war were 
shown to be consistent with precedents set by Persian Gulf policy created by previous 
administrations. When George H. W. Bush was elected president, he made no effort to 
distance himself diplomatically from the foreign policies of his predecessor, unlike in his 
domestic agenda. This was, in part, aided by his long experience in the foreign policy 
establishment of Washington and, after eight years as vice president, intimate understanding 
of foreign policy into 1989. Indeed, the diplomatic relationship with Iraq was marked with an 
almost infinite patience, as Ambassador April Glaspie maintained a cordial relationship with 
Saddam Hussein despite the Iraqi leader’s efforts to test U.S. tolerance. Again, chapter four 
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showed that it was the invasion of Kuwait that forced a change in U.S. policy toward Iraq, 
and Bush, recognising that the unilateral relationship the United States had with Saddam 
Hussein would not moderate his actions, turned instead to the United Nations Security 
Council to elicit a condemnation of Iraq. This decision to confront Iraq through the United 
Nations illustrated U.S. international leadership, and emphasised Bush’s role in compelling 
the United Nations Security Council toward achieving U.S. diplomatic goals. Through careful 
diplomacy, facilitated by Bush and his foreign policy advisors, the U.S. was able to create a 
regime of unanimous outrage, and multilateral sanctions were focused on Iraq under the 
authorisation of the United Nations Security Council. When it became clear, four months into 
the crisis, that Iraq would not leave Kuwait, Bush made the final diplomatic push of resorting 
to armed intervention to force Iraq from Kuwait, and relied on the diplomacy he had 
conducted within the United Nations Security Council to legitimate armed intervention in 
Kuwait.  
The domestic and diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war with Iraq that are illustrated 
in chapters three and four show that George H. W. Bush went to war with Iraq for diplomatic 
purposes and, resorting to his experience as a Cold War foreign policy maker, referred to an 
international solution for what he deemed an international crisis. Therefore, Bush went to 
war with Iraq because he believed Saddam Hussein’s capabilities defined his intentions. If 
Saddam Hussein was prepared to jeopardise the stability of the Persian Gulf by invading 
Kuwait over a minor dispute regarding oil resources, then Bush believed Saddam Hussein 
would exercise that power elsewhere in the region, ultimately, and unacceptably, threatening 
U.S. national interests. 
In chapter five, however, it is shown that in George W. Bush was elected under very different 
circumstances in 2001. Instead of focusing on differentiating some aspects of policies with 
his predecessors, Bush immediately distanced himself from the previous administration in 
both domestic and foreign policies, not because President Bill Clinton had left a damaging 
legacy, but because Bush had to justify the differences between the presidencies. Therefore, 
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Bush’s domestic priorities were set around his standing as a morally sound person, unlike 
the ‘morally corrupt’ presidency of Bill Clinton. Bush also relished the opportunity to work 
with a Congress that had a Republican majority. It was in light of these domestic political 
considerations that Bush’s lack of foreign policy experience was inconsequential. On 
September 11, 2001, that lack of foreign policy experience was tested when terrorists 
attacked the United States. This sudden and unexpected attack on the mainland of the U.S. 
transformed Bush’s fickle approach to foreign policy into a domestic campaign to seek 
retribution against those who had attacked the U.S. Bush began a war on terror that 
demanded the international community support the U.S., and sent the U.S. military into 
Afghanistan on the hunt for the terrorist group al-Qaida that were believed to be sheltered by 
the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the 2002 State of the Union address, it was clear that the initial 
war on terror had expanded as Bush extended his domestic campaign against terrorism to 
encompass the ‘Axis of evil,’ rogue states who posed unacceptable threats to the United 
States. On the axis of evil was Iraq. The swelling domestic support for Bush’s war on terror 
coalesced around his campaign to emphasise Saddam Hussein as an imminent threat to the 
United States under the new domestic conditions. Appealing directly to Congress, Bush 
established support and approval for a push against Saddam Hussein to disarm Iraq of 
weapons of mass destruction, believed to exist despite the international weapons inspection 
regime that had been established after the war in 1991. With the shadows of intelligence 
fuelling a domestic news cycle, and Bush and his advisors arguing that Iraq was dangerous, 
Bush ignored the efforts of the United Nations to diminish the threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein and proclaimed a U.S. lead effort to disarm Iraq by force. 
Chapter six juxtaposed these domestic origins of the decision to go to war with the 
diplomatic realities that George W. Bush faced. The diplomatic origins of the decision to go 
to war were based on the accumulation of ambiguous United Nations efforts to disarm and 
contain Iraq in the wake of the 1991 war. The sanctions and weapons inspections that had 
been set up to monitor Iraq were envisioned by George H. W. Bush, in 1991, as the new era 
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of international responsibility, led by the U.S. In reality, the lack of resources, fractured co-
ordination, and policy inconsistency interfered with the efforts to disarm Iraq, and the 
sanctions and weapons inspections withered over time under accusations of inefficiency and 
corruption. Therefore, the international consensus that confronted George W. Bush when he 
was elected president in 2000 had evolved, as the international regime containing Iraq 
neared ten years old, and the strongly held conviction of grinding Saddam Hussein into 
submission through the United Nations Security Council dissipated. Meanwhile, Saddam 
Hussein persevered. Iraq was not a foreign policy priority for Bush from the outset of his 
presidency, a familiar refrain from previous administrations. It would take the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks to force attention back on to the Persian Gulf, and the lingering threat 
posed by Saddam Hussein. Overall, the terrorist attacks marked a broader shift in foreign 
policy from intransigence to proactive policy, eventually merging into pre-emptive actions. 
Iraq, with its status as an international pariah, was the definition of a twenty-first century 
threat. Although Bush compounded the danger posed by Iraq to his domestic audience, U.S. 
diplomatic efforts were met with resistance. The United Nations Security Council was divided 
over the insistence by Bush that the international community confront Saddam Hussein 
immediately, and instead the international consensus was to reinstate weapons inspections 
to verify any threat. These efforts, however, were doomed to failure because the U.S., the 
nation that was pivotal to leading the United Nations Security Council efforts, maintained 
unrealistic expectations for any weapons inspections. With the inability of any diplomatic 
partners to moderate the U.S., the Security Council remained divided and Bush resorted to a 
unilateral effort to confront Saddam Hussein. Confident in the intelligence that the U.S. had 
gathered, and committed to curtailing any threat to the U.S. in the wake of September 11, 
Bush made the decision to go to war with Iraq with a minor coalition of international partners.  
These two chapters show that George W. Bush’s decision to go to war with Iraq grew from 
the precedent set by George H. W. Bush, and was defined by the proactive foreign policy 
stance of the United States in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. George W. 
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Bush could not defer to his foreign policy experience in order to inform his response to the 
terrorist attacks, and he therefore relied on his abilities as a domestic leader to act on the 
international stage. Unlike George H. W. Bush in 1991, George W. Bush interpreted Saddam 
Hussein’s intentions to pursue weapons of mass destruction as evidence of his capabilities, 
and because Saddam Hussein was never absolved of his desire to retain or pursue 
weapons of mass destruction, he was seen as an imminent and unacceptable threat to U.S. 
national interests. Therefore, the domestic and diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war 
with Iraq in 1991 and 2003 suggest that George H. W. Bush went to war with Iraq in order to 
destroy Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage war. George W. Bush, on the other hand, went to 
war with Iraq in 2003 to destroy Saddam Hussein’s intention to wage war. 
 
What were the similarities in the decision to go to war? 
There are a number of similarities across both decisions to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 
2003. At the beginning of each presidency, both presidents regarded Iraq, and Saddam 
Hussein, as a low policy priority, and assigned the Persian Gulf as a low risk region because 
of its relative stability and adherence to the status-quo. This observation shows that the 
decision to go to war, a destabilising action, was influenced significantly by circumstances as 
they emerged. In both 1991 and 2003, a crisis demands a response, and Saddam Hussein 
is the focal point. Both presidents afford Saddam Hussein an opportunity to retreat from his 
militant position. George H. W. Bush gave Saddam Hussein four months to retreat from 
Kuwait before pushing for an authorisation to use force, and George W. Bush focused on 
Saddam Hussein only because of Iraq’s intransigence in regards to weapons inspections. 
However, Saddam Hussein remains resolutely against the U.S., and forced the eventual 
decision to go to war. Both presidents also share similarities in the makeup of decision-
making as it is conducted throughout their presidency. In both 1991 and 2003, the decision 
to go to war with Iraq was made and compelled by the president. George H. W Bush, as is 
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shown in chapters three and four, crafted Saddam Hussein into a threat that primarily 
confronted the entire world, and George W. Bush, in chapters five and six, crafted Saddam 
Hussein into a threat that primarily confronted the U.S. Finally, in both decisions, the 
president committed the U.S. military under an executive order that preserved the agency of 
the president to decide when the U.S. goes to war. 
 
What were the differences? 
Despite the similarities that were shared between George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, 
there were differences. These differences can be put down to the character of the president, 
and the changing nature of politics.  In 1989, George H. W. Bush was seen as the 
continuation of stability as experienced under the Republican presidency of Reagan. This 
was consolidated by Bush’s experience as a policy-maker, and vice president. Bush was 
defined by his foreign policy credentials, and at no point in his presidency, or even prior to it, 
was he at a loss as to how to maintain a diplomatic relationship. Indeed, his decision to 
appeal to the United Nations Security Council in order to condemn the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait before approaching the American people highlighted Bush’s confidence in diplomacy. 
Nevertheless, Bush represented stability and wisdom, a fact that belied the relatively lowest 
voter turnout in modern history when Bush went to the polls in 1988. However, international 
events would also define the president that Bush believed himself to be. As the last of the 
World War II presidents, Bush had experienced firsthand the events that had shaped the 20th 
century. Therefore, diplomacy was practiced with the same assumptions about international 
politics that had crafted American foreign policy for almost fifty years. With the collapse of 
the Berlin wall, revolutions throughout Eastern Europe, and a receding Soviet presence in 
the United Nations Security Council, the Persian Gulf crisis presented the perfect opportunity 
for Bush to consolidate the United States leadership that had been assumed at the end of 
World War II, and to utilise the United Nations for the purposes it was envisioned for in 1946. 
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The diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war in 1991, as shown in chapter four, 
emphasised Bush’s belief in the international system, and suggested a blueprint for how it 
would function into the 21st century.  
George W. Bush, however, was elected specifically because he was a departure from the 
previous Democrat administration, and he campaigned on the promise of a better standard 
of presidency. Unlike George H. W. Bush, George W. Bush did not have an established 
cadre of Republicans with experience in administration, and was forced to consolidate the 
‘second-coming’ of Republicans in the White House. George W. Bush lacked the foreign 
policy experience that had defined George H. W. Bush and had helped reassure the 
American people. Bush did have a college education, had owned a Baseball team, and had 
been Governor of Texas, but he lacked the extent of George H. W. Bush’s public service 
experience. Nevertheless, it was George W. Bush’s domestic leadership that consolidated 
his presidency, and his advisors, some of whom had served earlier administrations, ensured 
that Bush had at his disposal a mixture of experience and advice. Bush’s strengths were in 
his relationship with the American people, and his domestic focus shined through with his 
response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, rallying the nation to war. This 
decisive domestic leadership contrasted with Bush’s lack of focus at the United Nations 
Security Council, where George H. W. Bush was held in high esteem. This lack of focus was 
exacerbated when George W. Bush, building the case against Saddam Hussein as a threat 
to the national interests of the U.S., approached Congress to approve and support a 
campaign against Iraq, before the United Nations Security Council. The domestic origins of 
the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003, as seen in chapter five, demonstrated Bush’s 




Going to War in the Persian Gulf  Chapter Seven 
252 
 
What other considerations influenced the decision to go to war? 
Despite the similarities and differences between George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, 
there were considerations that influenced both decisions to go to war with Iraq, and these 
were seen throughout the diplomatic and domestic origins of the decision to go to war. There 
were elements of the decision-making process that both presidents had to confront that 
determined the approach of foreign policy to the Persian Gulf. Likewise, both presidents had 
to contend with the unchallenged superiority of the U.S. on the international stage, and this 
led to a broader concern regarding the application of power in the international system. 
However, it was in the domestic origins that the influence of national politics could be seen in 
the formulation and application of foreign policy. Both presidents understood that their 
authority was derived from the American people, and that Congress had a role to play in the 
decision-making process. Therefore, the presence of national politics impressed itself on the 
foreign policy process to differing degrees. For George H. W. Bush, Congressional attacks 
over the budget threatened the diplomatic standing of the U.S. and were opportunistic, 
targeting the president when he was preoccupied with a crisis that was developing 
elsewhere in the world. Bush returned Congress’s respect by shielding the foreign policy 
process from Congress, only inviting Congress to pledge their support behind his actions 
and preventing any Congressional efforts at influencing U.S. diplomacy. The result was a 
game of brinkmanship that saw Bush led Congress to the point of no return, forcing a vote to 
support the use of force against Iraq at the very last minute and consolidating the domestic 
support for an action that had already been determined. George W. Bush, by comparison, 
understood just the same that the source of his authority was determined by the American 
people, and his character traits appealed him to an even greater audience than George H. 
W. Bush. As a result, antagonistic domestic politics did not affect George W. Bush, and he 
enjoyed a Republican majority in Congress that eased his policymaking. Bush’s domestic 
leadership helped him to fortify the U.S. in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, and to lead the United States to war.  
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In the diplomatic origins of the decision to go to war, both presidents were burdened with the 
overwhelming power of the U.S. as it emerged from the Cold War. George H. W. Bush was 
restrained with the application of this power, having observed the lessons of prudence that 
had dictated foreign policy during the Cold War, and having been impressed by leaders who 
had grown within its constraints. George W. Bush, however, was separated from the Cold 
War by both experience and time, and flourished the full extent of American power as he 
embraced the unparalleled international presence of the U.S. in response to the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks. George H. W. Bush had understood that the U.S. had to accept 
the role of a reluctant superpower in the wake of the Cold War and believed that the 
measured application of that power could promote stability and peace. The first test of that 
resolve was going to war with Iraq. According to Bush, the presence of American power 
would be enough to guarantee stability. George W. Bush accepted these same 
fundamentals of American power, but it was not enough for America to possess it – the U.S. 
had to be prepared to use it. In the wake of the terrorist attacks, Bush understood that he 
would have to utilise that power to its fullest extent to impose stability around the world, and 
to protect the U.S. against any possible attacks. But, both presidents reflected the conflicted 
nature of American power in the absence of a competitor. George H. W. Bush was 
restrained in using American power because he feared what the repercussions of such 
unchecked power would mean for the United States and the fragile international order. 
According to George W. Bush, not using that power was a failure to protect the U.S. in a 
moment of vulnerability and weakness. 
The consideration that transcends from both the domestic and diplomatic origins of the 
decision to go to war with Iraq is Saddam Hussein. The Iraq leader remains consistent from 
1991 through to 2003, and does not waver. Both presidents refer to his vileness, evilness, 
and compare him to Hitler and Stalin interchangeably. Saddam Hussein’s human rights 
abuses and immoral leadership are used by both presidents to justify American action 
against Iraq, and this loathing of Saddam Hussein was even included in legislation that 
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stated the U.S. would support efforts to depose him from leadership. When George H. W. 
Bush assessed the risk Iraq posed toward the Persian Gulf, it was Saddam Hussein that 
embodied Iraq’s expanding interests. Likewise, George W. Bush assessed Saddam Hussein 
as the embodiment of the hatred and loathing that faced the United States. Saddam Hussein 
is the central concern that illustrates the continuity between the decisions to go to war with 
Iraq. Because of Saddam Hussein the wars in 1991 and 2003 were intrinsically connected 
by the same considerations and concerns, despite the intervening twelve years. The reason 
why George H. W. Bush did not bring the full extent of United States power down on 
Saddam Hussein in 1991 was because he did not have the domestic authority to inflict such 
a wound. George W. Bush in 2003 was free to depose Saddam Hussein because he lacked 
the diplomatic nuance to foresee the consequences.
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